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Houn

Like many developing countries of Asia and Africa,

Korea was first introduced to the alien institution of

.

political parties in the wake of her independence from
colonial rule.

This study probes into the performance

of political parties in the Korean political rirocess

from 19^5 to 1969 by utilizing the historical-institutional approach along with

select aggregate and survey

research data.
The ruling parties in Korea have been externally cre-

ated parties.

The Liberal Party was founded by the decree

of an authoritarian President who saw it indispensable
for consolidating his power against the National Assembly;
the Democratic Republican Party was organized preemptively

by military men after they seized power through

a

coup.

As externally created parties, they have tended to be iden-

tified with the executive branch rather than the legislature.
The opposition party, during the Rhee era, on the other hard,

was created in the legislature more or less as

President Rhee's assault on the legislature.

a

response to

Other than that

however, it had little or no common denominator which

guaranteed unity of action and thought within it.
The conservatism of Korean parties was assured when

her international position dictated the elimination of
the leftist and progressive parties.

This in turn has

produced party politics to struggle for power and con-

fined the political dialogue to the procedural matters

rather than the suhstantive ones.

Institutionalization

of party structure and leadership has been delayed by per-

sonality-centered political parties.

At

the rank-and-

file levels, the commitment to a political party is rarely

made on the basis of ideology or nolicy, but for reasons
of money, personal power, special interest, blood relations

and the like.

Although there has been

a

conscious attempt

made on the part of the founding members of the present

ruling party (DRP) to overcome

the past ills of Korean

parties, it is much too early to tell whether such

an

at-

tempt has met with complete success.
Since the associ ational interest groups in the Korean

context lack autonomy from state power, they have tended
to shy a'way from taking independent nolitical actions. The

strength of the institutional and anomic interest
in Korea may be viewed as

party politics.

a

grout>s

consequence of the failure of

Where the legitimate interests cannot be

articulated into government policies, the likelihood that

the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond
the prescribed procedures are increased.
The imported system of liberal democracy and political

parties appears to be on the way

oi"

earning legitimacy

through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition,
acceptance and adaptation.

The "gap" evident in Korea

between the urban and rural voters in terms of party oreference, political parti cit>ation and the other aspects,
of electoral behavior has substituted the ethnic, religious,

and class cleavages evident in other political systems.
In the legislature, the militant struggle and confron-

tation between the ruling and opposition parties have been
the norm.

This has been eloquently expressed in the fre-

quent opposition walkout and the so-called "one party National Assembly."

Through

a

number of years of confrontation

in the National Assembly, the Assemblymen from the two

major parties appear to have internalized distinct value systems;the

different life-styles have often resulted in the

paralysis of the legislative process and the domination
by the executive branch in the lawmaking function of the

National Assembly.

The consequence has been that the

politicians have lost touch with the general public and
the party politics have become a "game" among the elites.
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INTRODUCTION

Since Korea emerged from the four decades of Japanese colonial
rule in 19^5, she was introduced to the idea of Western liberal

democracy and its institutional apparatus, including political
parties.

Needless to say, the constitutional

^jcverrjr.ent

established

in 19^8 was an alien form of government, and the values it represented

were different from Korea's traditional political culture, if not
in direct opposition to it.

In some twenty-five years since the

liberation, the Korean political system has performed well short of
the standards of a stable democracy.

One most obvious failure has

been its breakdown of constitutionalism: since her independence, the
transfer of political power from one group to another has never been

effected through constitutional means.
In i960, the Liberal rarty regime of Syngman Rhee was ousted

by the April Student Uprising.
regime under H5 Chong.

It was followed by a brief interim

In May, I96I, the Second Republic of the

Democrats was overthrown by a military coup d'etat .

After two years

of rule by men in military uniform, the Democratic Republican Party
government of Park Chung Hee came to power with the resources and
advantages accrued during the military rule and with the help of
the preemptive organization of a new party.

Under various pretexts,

resorting
the rule of each of these regimes has been facilitated by
of dubious
to constitutional, legal and political manipulations

ii

merit.

By the time of the writing of this study, martial law has

been declared five times; constitution has been revised six times.
The apparent failure of the constitutional government in Korea

demands explanations and solutions.

Students of the Korean political

system have described such failure in terms of "trial of democracy,"
"the triumph of personalism over institutionalism,

"authoritarian rule," and so on and so forth.

"

"instablity,"

The burden of this

thesis is to argue that the roots of such failtire lie in the defects
of Korean parties and party

sjrs terns.

In the chaos of the post-liberation era, a kaleidoscopic number

of parties emerged overnight.
the strictest sense.

of notables.

These "parties" were not parties in

They resembled the cliques, clubs and groups

These political groupings had little durability and

practically no structure other than paper organizations required by
the United States military authorities.

In this period, these

parties reflected the fragmentation of the Korean nationalist

movement.

With the coming of independence and the election of the

Constituent National Assembly, these parties were no more than

parliamentary negotiating groups without any social base.

The

groupings split and merged in a confusing series of permutations

and combinations.

The competition among them was a "closed system"

and antagonists
in which the actors continually shifted partners

without ever enlarging the number of participants.

I

iii

The attempts to perpetuate power though
constitutional

amendments polarized the politicians.

This polarization is significant

in the context of party development in Korea and eventually
helped
to bring about a fairly stable division of the electorate,

^ith

the third party having been eliminated for various reasons,
a

modified version of two party politics has been the norm of
Korean
politics at least since. 19 5^.
The aim of this dissertation is to probe into the place of

political parties in the Korean political process from 19^5 up to
the time of 1971 elections.

The word "place" is carefully chosen.

The massive recent literature on political parties notwithstanding,

political scientists have failed to agree on the most desirable

methodology on approaching the problems of political parties.

The

chief difficulty arises as to whether the operations of political
parties and party systems should be seen as functions in the course

of political develooment, or whether the general course of development
has instead shaped parties and party systems, or simply whether

decent monographs and articles on political parties are too
numerous to mention. £ut to name a few: Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Develonment ( Princeton:
Princeton University Jress, 1966); »;illirum Chanoers, Political
Parties in a Lew Pation: The American Zj<:rerience (i.ew York: Oxford
University Press, 1963); William Chambers and waiter Burnham, The
American Pa^'ty S:/s terns Sta^-es of Political Development ( Pew York:
Oxford University Press, 19o7); Samuel rumtin.- ton, rolitical Order
in Changing Societies ( Pew Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Kenneth
Janda,."The International Gomoarative Political Parties Project"
(Prepared for delivery at 65th Annual Peeting of the American Political
Science Association, Kew York City, September 2-6, 1969).
:

»

iv

parties can serve as an organizational setting for the
occurrence

of political behavior.
and Walter

i:urnhain,

developTient

At one juncture, according to William Chanbers

"parties may be viewed as the outgrowth of a

process— the culmination

as it were of process of

social, economic and political change,"^ thus confirming
their

dependent role.

At another juncture, however, they "can be seen as

an independent institutional force affecting political development
itself."

"Thus the capacity of a society to cope with the crises

of integration, participation or distribution... may in large measure
be affected by the kinds of parties which have materialized.

Parties

may thus be seen here as independent variables which have prof o 'and
effects on the process of political, social and economic change."^

In this study, the author chooses to approach the problem of

Korean political parties both as dependent and independent variables.
The development of political parties in Korea should be seen within
the framework of the series of crises the country was subjected to
in the postwar era.

Like many new nations of Asia and Africa, a

series of political, social and economic crises decended upon Korea

2

Chambers and Burnham, on. cit .

op . cit .

,

,

LaPalombara and -Reiner, oo. cit .
•^The concept of "crises" is
of Political Develo^ment ( Boston:
67. Also see Leonard Biner, et.
Political Develoment C Princeton:

pp. 3-72.

p.

^ and see also Janda,

p. 5»
,

pp. 41-42.

discussed in Lucian W. rye. Aspects
Little, Brown iz Co., 1966), pp. 62al.. Cruses and Sequences in
Princeton university Press, 1971)

^

V

overnight.

Inability to deal with these crises in an orderly and

leisurely manner spelled problems for achieving stability.

Joseph

LaFalombara and Kyron Reiner have hypothesized that the configuration
of political parties will continue to be strongly conditioned by
the manner in which historical crises, subsequent to the onset of

parties, materialize and are responded to.^

Second, it should be imtxjrtant to probe into the role of Korean

political parties as an institutional force affecting the course of
political development and the question of democracy itseK.

Among

the earlier writers of political parties, there had been a tendency
to equate democracy with xxslitical parties.

There seems to be a

good reason for this assumption for the rise of political parties
in the West roughly coincided

with the democratic impulse.

Although

Roberto Kichels' "iron law" questioned this assumption, many political
scientists nevertheless have come to argue that the study of political

parties is synonymous with the study of democracy itself.

Competition

among parties was held to be necessary, if not sufficient proof of
democracy.

Perhaps the strongest statement regarding the inseparability

of parties and democracy has been made by E. E. Schattschneider in
his Party Government .

-

-^LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit .

,

p. 2.

^E. S. Schattschneider, Party Goveir.ment( :;ew York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston,. 196?), p. 1. inphasis mine. lerhaps
Schattschneider overstated his case. It may be safe to say that
when democracy is considered to be in crisis, a considerable
portion of the blame is assigned to political parties.

.

vi

The parties, in fact, have played a major
role
as makers of governments, more especially
thev have
been makers of democratic erovernment. It should
be
stated flatly at the outset; this volume is devoted
to the thesis that the political p£.rties created

democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable
save in terms of parties.

In light of the importance accorded to political parties in the

functioning of democracy and political develoment, it should be
fruitful to make a study of political parties in the Korean democratic
process

In accordance with this broad guideline, Chapter I will be

devoted to a discussion of several themes in Korean political
tradition that set the framework for the modern Korean political
parties and processes.

I

fully recognize that there is an inherent

limitation in discussing such a vast topic in so limited a space,

but I also realize that some attempts must be made to provide the
historical, cultural and social profile of premodern Korea from

which modern Korea has em.erged.
In Chapter II, I shall probe, in a rather detailed fashion,
the origins and the stages of development of political parties

within the peculiar context of postwar Korean politics.
parties are seen here as dependent variables.

The Korean

For convenience's

sake, I have divided the period under study into four sections,

one each for the three republics and a separate section on the
period of the American military occupation.

Here, I shall explore

the functions and operations of Korean political parties relating
to significant political events.

vii

In structural terms, a party can be said to be composed of
three sectors, which are unevenly and differentially involved in'

various activities

:

the party organization which includes

,

among

other things, party leadership and formal as well as informal machinery

or hierarchy; the

mrty

in the rovernment . which is that part of

the party structure in the executive and the le-^islative branches

of the government; the party in the electorate , composed of
individuals or groups of individuals who have varying degrees of

loyalty to the party.
structures. 7

I

call this trinity of party sectors party

These structures have, in turn, sub-structures and

they perform certain activities in the pursuit of Power,

we shall

use this scheme in discussing Korean political parties as an

independent variable.

In Chapter III, the major existing parties are discussed from
the perspectives of ideology, organization, and leadership*

The

nature of the variables such as ideological orientations, the formal
structure, the locus of power, the degree of centralization, the

patterns of decision-making, the recruitment of resources, and the

values and goals of the individuals will be the subject of scrutiny.
Chapter IV will examine the party in the electorate, including

such problems as the nature of the ties between interest groups--

my ideas to Frank Soraif , Party Politics in
Brown & Co., 1963), pp. 1-25.
Little,
America (Boston;
'^Eere,

I owe

viii

of associational, institutional and anemic
parties.

An attempt

vrill be

variety

and political

made to sketch a profile of the Korean

electorate uith the help of the available opinion surveys and

aggregate

data—

the electorate's view about democratic institutions,

political parties, the differences between the urban-rural and

regional voters in all aspects of voting behavior.

Unfortunately,

I did not possess the resources sufficient to conduct my own opinion

survey of the Korean electorate.
In Chapter V, a case study of the 1971 presidential election
is made in the belief that the activity and the vitality of the

party can be best discerned in times of electoral campaigns.

I shall

discuss the strategic environment, the procedures for selecting
candidates and the campaign activities themselves.

Chapter VI discusses the hold of the party in terms of the

degree of cohesion, the conception of representation and the style
and the intensity of oppositions in the legislature.

In this chapter,

the emphasis is placed upon the social and psychologicsil differences

between the ruling and opposition party legislators.
Finally, some clarification of terminology seems to be in
order.

A "political party" in this study will be understood simply

as any "organization that pursues a goal of placing their avowed

ix

representatives in government positions."^

A "faction" is used as

a value-free word, as opposed to such synonyms as "clique," "cabal,"

or "sect," and simply means a grouping within a political party
regardless of the basis of cohesion.

The "mainstream" or the

"maincurrent" faction is defined as that grouping within a political

party which controls

m.ost of its

decision-making agents and the

"anti-maincurrent" or "anti-mainstream" faction is used to mean

.

that minority grouping within the same party.

This is the definition provided by Janda, oo. cit . p. 6.
To list but some other definitions of a political oarty, LaPalonbara
and Weiner say: "An or~anization that is vocally articulated, that
interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support for the
general public, that plays a direct and substantive role in political
develoTDment, and that is committed to the capture or maintenance
of power, either alone or in combination with others." LaPalombara
and Weiner, ov, cit . , p. 29. The same co-authors list additional
characteristics which a political party should have; (1) continuity
in organization; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organizations
at the local level with communications with national units;
(3) self-conscious effort to gain pov;er; (4) a concern on the part
of the organizations for seeking followers at the polls or in some
manner striving for popular support. Ibid., p. 6, Sigmund Neumann
defines political oarty as "the articulate organization of society's
active political asrents, those who are concerned with the control
of governmental power and who compete for popular support with
another group or groups holding divergent views." As such, it is
"the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies
to official governmental institutions and relates them to political
action within the larger political community." digmimd Ueumann,
Modern Political Parties (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1956),
p. 396.
,

CHAPTER I

THE SETTING

The Legacies of Premodern Korean
Politics and Societ;;^

The twenty-five years of party politics in Korea must not be

viewed in isolation from the political tradition and cultures that
have preceded this period.

The introduction of party politics and

liberal democracy was in fact a superimposition of one kind of

political system, upon another which had existed for centuries.

It

is Lmtxirtant, for this reason, to exr)lore those characteristics of

the traditional Korean political culture which have helped mold the

environment under which the reoublican form of government has
functioned.
tfilture

In particular,

I

shall closely examine the Political

of the Yi Dynasty (13 92 -19 05) which was heavily influenced

by Confucianism, and the characteristics of the Japanese colonial
rule (1910-19^5) because these legacies seem to have had a greater
impact on the post-war socio-political milieu.

I shall also examine

socio-economic change since 19^5*
It is widely agreed that Korea's heritage of Confucian thought

and social pattern has had a strong indirect influence on Korean
society."^

^ee

During the early years of Yi Dynasty, Chu Hsi's (1130-1200)

Geors-e McCune, Korea Todav( Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1950), T3. 93; Cornelius CsFOod, T>e Koreans and Their Culture
(Mew York: The Ronald Press, 1951), "o. 12^1-; KLm Doo-hun, "Confucian
influences on Korean Society," Korea Journal , Vol. Ill (September, 1963)
pp. 17-21, 40-41; and Yim Kyoncrgu and william A. Douglas, "Korean
Confucianism Today," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, I.'o. 1 (Spring/Summer,
1967). op. 43-59.

2

Neo-Confucianism was adopted as the state cult replacing decaying
Buddhism.

The Confucian hold on the Yi society for nearly five

•

hundred yeaio had affected practically every sphere of
Korean life
then and, to an important degree, up to the present time.
The ethical system of Confucianism in a form practised during

Yi Korea was particularistic and family-oriented as opposed to
universalistic and state or religion oriented.

The elaborate social

ethics based on sankan? wulun, or the "Three Bonds and Five Relationships,"

defined the individual's orooer conduct in a hiearchically arranged
natural order in human relationshins and society.

5y preaching the

virtues of obedience, loyalty and remonstrance, the Confucian syster

played a sipnificant role in naintaining

social order and stability.

However, these nrecepts were essentially conservative ones and tended
to be status-quo oriented.

Aside from having an authoritarian undertone

in human relationships, this ethical system has had the effect of
the
atomizing/individual's loyalty and heightening his reliance on

small groups.

In its political aspects, the atomization of the individual
combined with the social conditions that prevailed during Yi Dynasty

precluded the development of social groups and other organizations
that could check the central power of the state.

As a homogeneous

state', no substantial cleavages and loyalties existed in terms of

religion, lanruae^e or ethnicity to allow for pluralism in society.

As Gregory Henderson has put it, "the [xi^ system gave the development

of pluralism no prop and tended to cantilever society... powerfully

3

toward central power."

In addition, Henderson has said:

Exclusion of foreip^n trade and the control and
deroTation of commercial functions by the central
bureaucracy prevented the development of business class,
ports or specialization that could serve„local strength.
Local institutions were weak, diffuse...
The existence of an all-enconroassing central bureaucratic power

and the concomitant lack of social orr;anizations meant that nearly
all aspects of people's lives were controlled by the state power.
The relations hio between the ruling elites and the masses was defined
in the idea of kwanion minbi,

"ftespect the Officials and Despise

the Commoners," in which the officials demanded unconditional

obedience and loyalty from the masses.

When the quality of adminis-

tration deteriorated to an intolerable degree in the latter half of
the Yi Dynasty, such servile masses could not help but be alienated

from the state and its a^^ents.

Generally speaking, the government

bureaucrats, central or local alike, were a feared lot who extracted

unreasonable levies and labor services from comrr.oners.

This fear

of bur eaucrats^^ intensified to a significant degree during the
Japanese rule, has persisted to the present day.

4

Meanwhile the

Gregory Henderson, Korea The Politics of Vortex (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 19^9) , ?• 24.
:

-^

Ibid .. p. 195.

4

For a brief but interesting discussion of centralization in
Korean history, see Grerary Henderson, "Centralization and Korean
Political Develo lament rteoort ( International Conference on the
Problem of Modernization in Asia) (oeoul: Asiatic .tesearch Center,
Korea University, I966), pp. 309-322.
•

,

existence of a powerful central bureaucracy inhibited
local initiative,
In an agrarian society, all local matters of agriculture
and marketing

were supervised by the state bureaucracy.

As the peasants were

discouraned from taking an independent action, they were in the
habit of

vraitinf:

solutions.

for the state to recornize problems and present

The lack of local initiative, a^ain greatly accentuated

under the Jananese colonial acininistration, presents itself as a

problem in Korea today.
The Yi society was divided into four distinct classes: the

yanrban

.

the aristocrats composed of higher echelon officials of

the government and their families and descendants: chuji^^'in
a.ion

.

or

.

lower echelon officials and clerks in both the central and

provincial administration: san;-min . mostly peasants: chgnmin

.

the

lowest social stratum comprised of butchers, peddlers and servants.^
The social status and occupations of these classes were patrimonially

fixed for their oosterity, although in rare instances, a rise or
fall in status did occur. ^

The top positions in the government

were onen only to the members of the yan.^ban class, and the latter
found the orecepts of Confucianism a convenient tool to perpetuate

^Han T'ae-su, Hyondap Hankuk Chonrch iron (Contemporary Korean
Politics) (Seoul: Huimun Ch'ulpansa, 19Ct)f pp. 36-39'
'

'^For social class system during the Yi Dynasty, see Han //oo-keun,
"The Stratification of Yi Dynasty Society and the rocess of Its
Change," Korean Affairs , Vol. II, r^o. 1(1963), PP. 3b-^3.
i

»
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their power.

Hence, the traditional society in Korea was marked by

a dual cultural system— that of the yan=rban and of the masses.

"

The ruling elites, by holding political power, held and monopolized
economic resoirrces as well.

Therefore, the history of the Yi Dynasty

was, in a way, that of struggles among the members of the top social
class to maintain and rain access to officialdom, which was the

single and the only source to power, wealth and social prestige.
Competition among the members of the yanp-ban

contributed

toward the widely condemned phenomenon called factionalism during
the Yi Dynasty.

As one student of Korean history has put it, "the

causes of txDlitical factionalism in Korea are a lot

m.ore

difficult

7
to explain than its characteristics."

Ko one has come forward with

a satisfactory causative theory of factions during the Yi Dynasty

and subsequent periods of Korean history.

As a pervasive phenomenon

then and later, it is im.perative that we make an attempt at explaining
Han Wu-kun

the causes of faction.

faction in the following manner:

had explained the origin of

g

The yangban in the ruling stratum, because of their
hereditary status, eventually increased as time passed.
Since the prime purposes of the yan.^ban was to occupy civil
public offices, whose number was fixed at approximately 500
it became obvious that there were not enough offices for the
number of officials .... Competition among the yan;:ban for
the limited number of public offices led to strife within

Warner, "Korean Modernization: Some Historical
Consideration," Comment No. 20, 1963, p.
'^Edward

j^,

.

Han Woo-keun, on. cit.

,

p.

^1

»
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their class. In fact, the political conflict among
the mid-Yi Dvr.asty can largely be attributed to this
fundamental social condition.

It could fui-ther be hypothesized that the fragmentation of the

ruling elite during the Yi Dynasty had been a product of kwako

.

the Civil Service Examination System, which emphasized mere

recitation of Confucian Classics.

The successful candidates

recruited into officialdom hence were generalists in their functions

and roles, which became highly undifferentiated.

This fact made

few persons indispensable.
The origin of factional disputes during the Yi Dynasty was

related ostensibly to the question of correct interpretation of
Confucian doctrines and decorums.

Gradually these disputes degenerated

into a political controversy on such small and insignificant matters
Q

V*>

as /whether the queen should be mourned for a year or for three years.

Starting toward the middle of the sixteenth century, the factional
rivalries were stabilized in Sasaek or "four Colors", representing

four factions, members of each having distinguishing colors and
dress styles.

Each of these factions was formed usually along

clan or provincial lines to recruit individuals in the struggle

9

^

For issues of factional disputes, see Kim Duk-hwang, Hankuk
Sasanrsa (A History of Korean Thought) (Seoul: ivamsandang, 195^)
pp. 140-143.
"^^For Yi factionalism, see Choi Suk, "The Factional Struggle
in the Yi Dynasty of Korea, 1575-1725, "1 and II, Koreana -Quarterly
Vol. VII. Ko. l(3pring, 1965), pp. 60-91; and iXo. 2(3ummer, 1965),
pp. 70-96.
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to place their members in influential positions.

Each consanguinary

faction gathered around one dominant personality, and this
pattern

of personal factionalism has its present-day manifestations
in all
Korean organizations.
Personal factionalism has had other consequences.

Organized

vertically and horizontally by blood relations, the victory of one
faction meant that the members of that faction would be recruited
to minor positions in the central or a provincial administration.

Under a recruitment policy based virtually on linea?re, the chokbo

.

lineage register, played an important part in the factional battles.
The confrontation of the cliques for the purcose of gaining power

was in a way a fight of one lineage clique against another, and this
was, in another dimension, one region against another where each of

these lineage cliques was concentrated.'''"^

Regional or sectional factionalism actually dates back to the
time of the Three Kingdoms and the struggle among the three kingdoms

of Kokuryo(37 3.0. -668 A.D.), ?aekche(l8 B.C. -660 A.D.), and Silla
(57 B.C. -935 A.D.) for hegemony in the peninsula.

The confrontation

between Silla and Paekche, which roughly occupied the present-day

Kyongsang and Chonra provinces, was especially prominent and the past
animosities were carried over to the present generations, albeit in

^i

Ki~baek, "Hankuksasangui Chibang Taerip, "(.-tes-ional
Confrontations in Korea History), in his Lin.jokkwa Yoksa (The Nation
and the History) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1971) t PP. 6b-d9.

t
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a different form. 12

In present-day Korea, regional origin often

becomes an important criterion for appointments to key
government
posts.

Charges of preferential treatment for certain regional

groups and persons are often heard.
If the causes of factionalism in traditional Korea are yet to

be explored, it is relatively easy to discern its consequences.
this regard, Edward W. V/agner

In

says:"'"-^

The most striking consequence m.ay be summed up,
though all too mildly, in the \rov%A maladministration. In
terms of mechanics of rovernment, this meant administrative
paralysis, bureaucratic inertia, irresronsibility and
insufficiency, crisis c^overnment. In the realm of political
m.orality, it meant corruotion, neootism, character assassination, ooT?ortunism, toadyism.. Elsewhere in the Korean
value system factionalism brought an excessive emphasis on
individual, clan, school, and regional loyalties it brought
an overriding concern with individuals rather tharuwith issues,
with minutiae rather than with matters of substance; and it
brought the conceot of dissent into dangerous proximity with
that of treason. Some of these features of traditional
Korean political life, this herita?-e of factionalism have
in some measure passed from the scene. But many of them
still today hamper the Korean effort to build a healthy,
modernized society.
To summarize several themes in the political tradition in premodern

Korea, it can be said that the rigid social class system prevented the
12

One of the ten testaments proclaimed by the founder of Koryo
Dynasty(93^-121l) Wanf^ Kon, reads as follows: "The topographic features
of the territory south of Kon^^ju and beyond the Kongju aiverQnresently
the Chonra orovinces] are all treacherous and disharmonious and its
inhabitants sLre also treacherous and disharmonious. For that reason,
if th.ey are allowed to participate in the affairs of the state, to
intermarry with the royal family, aristocracy, and royal relatives and
to take power of the state, they might imperil the state or injure the
grudging the loss of their o>m state which used to be
royal safety
the Kingdom of Paekche and being resentful of unification, quoted
and translated in Hahm Fyong-choon, The Korean Political Tradition
and Law( Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), pp. ^9-50.
,

,

—

13-

-^^agner, og. cit .

,

p. 25.

•
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masses from participating in the political process in any
form, and
that in the homogeneous socio-cultural environment,
no viable
interm.ediary organizations were able to c^n-vive, with the
state power

being comprehensive and authoritarian.

The Confucian precepts defined

the relationship between the masses and the state in a hierarchical,

authoritarian manner: the state was paternalistically authoritarian
and the masses were obediently submissive.
Toward the end of the Yi Dynasty, the social class system based

on the Confucian ethical values was difficult to maintain.
of

yan=:-ban

increased tremendously without the corresponding increases

in government posts.
thiat

The number

This caused a great number of the members of

class to be unemployed and impoverished.

As conflicts between

Western Powers and Japan and China were mounting during the latter part
of the nineteenth centiiry, many of the imtxsverished yanrrban members
took part in several extragovernmental attempts to awaken the decaying

kingdom to modernity and to the outside world.

Kon-governmental groups,

such as the Independence Club, founded by So Jae-p'il( Philip Jaesohn)
in I896, emerged to counter encroachments by foreign powers, but they

failed to attract widesiDread support from the masses.

1^

The Independence Club is regarded by some Korean political
scientists as a forerunner to political parties that emerged after 19^5
That the founder of the Club rerarded it as a political party is
revealed in his autobiography: "Since I believed that it would be
difficult to spread the reform ideology of liberal democracy only
through the medium of a newspaper Independence Press, published in
I896, I have decided to organize a political faction and to spread
that idea with the helD of many persons. Herein lay my motive for
organizing the Independence Club." Quoted in Han Hung-su, "Toknip
Hy5phoeui Chongch'i Jiptanhwakwachong, "(The f-oliticization of the
Independence Club), Sahoekwahak i.'on.iip ;.o. 3» i'onse University, (Seo'J.:
Institute of Social Sciences, 1970) » P« 29.
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The Colonial Situation

After Korea was annexed by Japan in 19IO.
a highly centralized
and authoritarian colonial rule was imposed
on Korea.

Korea was

ruled by decree under a line of active and retired
Japanese generals
and admirals.

In what amounted to a police state, the Government

General of Korea( Chosen Shotokufu) and its Japanese and
Korean
agents were the objects of fear and hate.

As far as the masses

were concerned, the image of the government was one of exploitation
and extortion.

Introduction of a public educational system, industry and a

modified administrative system had the effect of weakening the stratified social structure inherited from the Yi Dynasty.

In fact, the

social class system of Korea had been in the state of disintegration
even before the Japanese came to Korea.

During the Japanese rule,

the social class system was abolished by law, but many of the former

yangban were able to retain their high social status because of their
land base.

During the Japanese rule, although many of the former

yangban class were forced to sell their land for use by the Japanese,

many were allowed to retain it.

It was principally

those sons of

the landed aristocrats who could afford higher education either at

home or abroad.

With better education, they were able to keep

their high social status which the commoners could not achieve.
The Japanese policy called for the domination of the government

by

Japanese personnel.

Including a small number of the Yi cabinet

ministers who were made Japanese peers, only about one-half of all

11

government employees were Koreans by

^gt

19/4.5.

appointed to clerical and other minor posts.

Koreans were

In I936 there were

'

altogether &7,552 government employees in the various
bureaus of the
Government General's office and in the provincial,
municipal and
educational offices.
Japanese.

Of these, 35,282 were Koreans and the rest

More than 80 percent of the top grade officials

(chokunin and sonin ) were Japanese; about 60 percent of the
officials
in the intermediary ranks (hanmin) were Japanese: Koreans occupied

about 50 percent of the clerical, secretarial and other minor
posts in
the colonial government.

The only all Korean body allowed by the

Japanese was the Central Advisory Council( Chushuin )

.

nominally

representing Korean interests in advising the Governor General.
Com.posed of sixty-five Councillors, who were ap7X)inted by the Governor-

General and who were predominantly former yangban landed aristocrats,
this body had no substantive power.

The council could offer advice only

at the request of the Governor-General and then upon a specific subject. "^"^
The oligarchical rule by the yanp-ban class diaring the Yi Dynasty

was replaced by the Japanese bureaucrats.

The development of a modern

transportation system and modern comjnunication channels allowed the
colonial bureaucracy to penetrate deeply into the rural population.

George M. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems ( ew York:
Institute of Pacific iielations, 19^1-7), p- ^. oee also Pak Tong-so,
Kankuk "Cwanryo chedo ui Yoksajok Chonkae (A ;''tudy of the Koreaji
Bureaucratic System) (::3eoul: P.ankuk i'on'gu Tosok;>ran , I96I).
I,

.

^^'IcCune, oD.

cit .

,

p. 4.
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The massive bureaucracy affected the everyday lives of ordinary
peasants.

The imap;e of the exploitive and oppressive Yi Dynasty

adjninistrators was reolaced by the ordeal of the repressive

alien rulers.

In the beginning of the Japanese era, a village

administrative structure based on kinship groups was introduced for
better control, increased production and more efficient collection
of taxes.

In so far as the Koreans were concerned, the structure of

power in the society remained unaltered, though power

alien hands.

itself was in

The "reforms" carried out by the Japanese failed to

alter the traditional oligarchical pattern of distribution of power
in society.

It is no wonder that almost

half of the members of the

19^8 Constituent rational Assembly listed their occupation as "farmers."

It is easy to see that most of these farmers were actually landlord

by backcrround and txissibly descendants of yangban

families.'^'''

Korean nationalism budding with the Tonghak Rebellion of 189^,

went into full gear during the Japanese rule.

That the nationalist

movement, having been suppressed by the omnipotent and omniscient

Japanese police, remained ineffectual inside Korea left a serious

problem as far as the post-liberation politics was concerned.

main thrust of the nationalist movement

v/as

The

forced to operate abroad,

"Mature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary
."'"''Eae Ko Hahn,
Korea," Korean Affairs Vol. I, ::o. ZiV.ay/ June) , 19o2, pp. 152-153.
.

^^or history of Korean nationalism, see Chong-sik Lee, The
Politics of p:orean ationali5m (rerkeley: University of California
Press , 1963) . For the ororrams of reform and nationalist or:^c>jiizations
that had existed from the l890's up to 19^5, see Yi Ki-ha Iiankuk
Chonr-dan- ?altalsa(A History of Korean Political Parties) (oeoul:
Uihoe Chonrch'isa, I96I), pp. 4-49.
!
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with China, Russia and the United otates as
its main centers.

On

April 9, 1919, the Korean Provisional Government
was established in
Shanghai with Syn,gman Ahee as its first
^resident.
But the failure

to make headway in the 1920

's

and 1930's left the leaders of this

"Government" deeply divided and frustrated,
hence unable to provide
the sorely needed unified leadershii. in the
critical period after the

liberation, during which the major criterion of
leadership was one's

anti-Japanese record.

A writer has

m.ade the

following sarcastic remark:^^

Any persons who returned from China or Lancbaria
enjoyed the refutation of bein-: ardent anti-Jacanese
nationalists. Almost all of those who vrere freed from
prisons in Korea transformed into patriots and received
fabulous treatment from the populace. It was indeed
difficult to pick out a true oatriot.
The Japanese surrender brought these exiled nationalist revolutionaries

home from abroad.

They were men of various backgrounds with varying

claims of contributions to the nationalist cause.

They included^

among others, rightist revolutionaries, socialists, Communists,
anarchists, syndicalists, and liberal democrats of various levels of
commitment.

Samuel Huntington once noted that the importance of the

political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a riodernizing

political system varies inversely with institutional inheritance of
the

si^-^tem

from traditional society.

19

20

V/

The above analysis of the

^

Kan? Chin-hwa, Taehanminkuk Konkuk Sinnyon.ji CA Ten Year History
of the Republic of Korea) (deoul: Taehaniy.inkuk Konkuk Sipnyonji
Kanhaenffhoe, 195^), o. 186.

20

"Political Development and Decay," world olitics
3(1965), pp. 386-436.' By "institution," uuntin-ton
means "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior."
,

Huntinp-ton,

Vol.. ri/II,

::o.

i

.
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premodern Korean political traditions
and the colonial situation

clearly shows that such "institutions"
of great variety have cast
their shadov-3 upon the post-liberation
p-iod and beyond.

Social Change After

19'!4.5

As was discussed earlier, the Confucian
ethics combined with the

centralism of Yi Dynasty prevented the rise
of organizations that
could stand between the atomized individuals
and the all-inclusive
state power.

This tradition was reinforced during
the bureaucratic

rule by the Japanese colonial overlords.

In a society which is

homogeneous ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and
religiously,
the cleavares that are attendant upon other "new"
states do not exist

in Korea.

Cleavages occur along the lines of urban-rural, industrial

-agricultural, modern- traditional, or educated- uneducated.

The

social class system, already in a state of disintegration in the
last one hundred years or so of the Yi Dynasty, was undermined
legally

by the Japanese and then further shattered by the land reform program
immediately after independence, by the impact of the Korean War, and

by the availability of mass educational opportunities.

The only

social class that possibly inherited its status from the premodern
era and the Japanese rule was the peasants.

By the time of liberation, there were large number of absentee
landlords who were left alone by the Japanese colonial administration.

During the Jaoanese period, some of these landlords, many of whom
were former members of the yangban class or their descendants, sold

15

their land and redirected their
reso^^'ces to business where
the
Japanese industrialization program
left ooen many opportunities.
The social Lase of the Korean
Democratic Party that emerged at
the
•

wake of liberation was lar.^ely this
landlord class.
base of these men. however, deteriorated
wh«i

The economic

the land reform

pro-am w

initiated by the American occupation
authorities and finally carried
through by the new Korean Government in
1949.
The Agrarian Reform

Act that year redistributed close to
25 percent of the total fanr.ing
area in South Korea to more than a million
and a half farm households

which represented about 70 percent of all farm
households in South
21
Korea.
The absentee landlords were compensated
by installment
payments in cash from the national treasury.

As the value of money

was eroding rapidly by postwar inflation which came
imm.ediately after
the implementation of the pro.gram. the landlord class
reinvested what

was left of their resources in other endeavors— such as
in education

of their sons, or in business.

By weakening the economic base of the

landlords, this land reform had a levelling effect on the society.

Another factor at work was the newly arrived opport'onity for
education.

In a rigidly stratified society like the Yi Dynasty,

educational opportunity was severely limited to the yan?ban class and

few others.

"Letteredness" was the mark of yangban and this cultural

tradition helped the Koreans to respond enthusiastically to the newly

21

Kahn-Eeen Lee, Korea Time, Chan re and Administration
(Honolulu: East-,/est Center Press, 1966), p. 51.
:

.
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opened opportunities for higher education.

Public educational system

was introduced during the colonial rule, but
opportunities''^''^ in fact

severely limited.

Only the first sons of the well-to-do landlords

could afford a university education, and some attended
colleges abroad,

particularly in Japan.

A compulsory public educational system was introduced
at the
elementcxy school level by the American military authorities
in 19^5

and it was formally adopted by the Korean Government in 1948.

This

system was accompanied by a tremendous rise in secondary and university
level school population throughout South Korea.

As the following

Table 1 indicates. 22 the school population increased from 1.5 million
in 19^8 to 3.8 million in 1955 and six million in 1964-.

Table 1,

School Population in Korea, 1945-1964

1945

Elementary

Secondary
Higher
Total School Population (a)
Total Population (b)
(a) as percentage of (b)

1955

1964

1,382,000

2,959.000

4,744,000

85,000

748,000

1,066,000

8,000

87,000

143,000

1,^75.000

3,77^.000

5.953.000

16,000,000

21,000,000

28.000,000

9
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The spectacvilar rise in the school population reflected the people's

awareness that in the newly established order of "equality", the only

Ibid., p. 49.
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chance for unuard mobility lay in education.

Preoccupation with

education was so crreat that even many of the
not-so-well- to-do farmers

sent their sons to Seoul for a university
education, even at great

sacrifice to their financial status at home.

Eventually, the

consequences of such preoccupation were expressed in
the

j-reat

many

educated unemployed who could not be absorbed into the
labor force,
thus creatine: social problems of a serious magnitude.

The effects of the Korean

many resioects.

v/ar(

1950-1953) ^ere far-reachin.- in

The human casualties and physical

families and brouf^ht in refugees from the north.

dajna.^es

broke up

Through a universal

conscription system, young men from the rural villages were introduced
to the army camps' modern technologies and organization miodeled after

the United States Army.

The Korean Arm.y, now with some 600,000 men

in uniform, has served as the nation's largest educational system,

contributing significantly to reducing widespread illiteracy rate in
Korea.

The military forces also provided great educational opportunities

to those of peasant background, who were otherwise without means to

receive a civilian education.

Through various programs at home and

abroad, principally in the United States, a strccng corps of m.odernizing

elite in uniform was born.

As a student of Korean society has

observed, "Korea today comes close to having no class structure at

all."^

From the perspectives of the political parties, this

situation hinders a party from having a distinct class base.

23

This

V/illiam A. Douglas, "The Current Status af Korean Society,"
Korean Affairs, ^ol. I. ICo. ^-(1962), p. 390.
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is why the interest group activities based
on socio-economic growth

have largely been ineffectual.

One significant social development
the tremendous impact of urbanization.

f

n the postwar period has been

Impacts of modern education

centered in Seoul and large cities, industrialization which
has occurred

in the vicinity of large cities, the Korean War which has
created a
tremendous exodus from rural areas, and also the agrarian reform,
these
fragmenting average farm size and aggravating rural poverty— /are some

of the reasons for the growth of urban population.

The following table

recapitulates the trend of urbanization (Table 2).^^

A more recent survey by the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and

Forestry indicates that as of 1970. 55.3 percent of the total population
Table 2.

Urbanization in Korea 19^-1960

Administrative
Subdivisions with
Population of:

19^*

19^9

1955

I960

50,000 and Over

11.2

28.3

25.3

28.5

20,000 to 49,999

19.5

27.5

33.9

^.9

Percentage of the Total Population

The figure for 19^0 includes both North and
--South Korea.
lived in the cities of 50 $000 or over.

Compared with the figiire

28.5 percent ten years ago (I960), this has meant a 27.8 percent

Adapted from Economic Planning Board. Korea Statistical
Yearbook (Seoul: Economic Planning Board. 1965), Table 27, p. 17.

6

19

increase in a short span of ten years .^^

The city is defined in Korea

as an administrative area with a
population of 50.000 or more.

were fourteen such cities in Korea in
1950.
I960 and 32 in 1970.

There

This number grew to 28 iu

Similarly, the proportion of population
living

in large cities of 100.000 and more was
only 8.? percent in 19^0.

However, the same proportion increased to Ik.?
percent in

percent in 1955. and 20.1 percent in I96O.

m9.

19.

The rate of annual increase

in the size of urban population is as high as 6.4
percent.

In the

metropolitan area of Seoul, the population increased by
55 percent in
the five year period from 1955 to I96O. From I96O to
1970. the figure
period
.
for the same /was 220 percent.
As has been suggested, such a tremendous

tempo of urbanization has not been effected with concomitant changes
in

other socio-economic variables, but it was a consequence of rural

dislocation caused by the war, the educational revolution, the agrarian

reform and the industrial development in recent years.

This unbalanced

growth has had a significant political implication, which we will
discuss in a later chapter.

25
^For the characteristics of Korea urbanization, see Lee Taikwhi,
"Urbanization and Its Political Implications in Korea" Korean Affairs .
Vol. Ill (December, 1964), pp. 304-314.

^^The Dong-A Ilbo . June 30, 1971, p. 2.
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CHAPTER II
THE GENESIS A^JD THE
DEVELOMNT
OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 19^^5-1969

Liberation and the American Military
Government, 19^5-1948
In the delirium of liberation the
expected onrush of political
activities commenced with various
political groups and personalities
claiming their past virtues and
presenting, their vision for
the

liberated country.

Coming together of groups and
personalities on

the political stage in this critical
period of Korean history was

dictated largely by the circumstances of
the liberation.

When the

Japanese defeat in the war was imminent, the
Japanese colonial
administrator in Seoul. Governor General Abe
Nobuyaki. began to make
overtures to prominent Koreans in his quest to
protect Japanese lives
and property.

Abe and his Political Affairs Bureau Chief Endo
Ryusaku

approached Song Chin-u. a well known conservative publisher
of the
Ilbo, the oldest and the most prestigious daily newspaper,
to

form a caretaker government and to accept the transfer of authority
in return for the guarantee of the safety of Japanese lives.

Song

declined the proposal on the grounds that the American occupation
forces would arrive shortly and that any cooperation he would give

would be to these forces and not the Japanese.'^
The Japanese authorities then tiirned to a leftist publisher of

the Chung 'ang Ilbo. Yo Un-hyong, who had taken part in the Korean

Chung'ang Son'go Wiwonhoe( Central Election Management Committee).
Taehanminkuk Chon£dangsa(A History of Political Parties in Korea),
(Seoul: Central Election Management Committee. 196?). p. 76.
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Provisional Government in the early 1920 's and
who was equally well

known as Song.

Yo. who had anticipated the Japanese
defeat and

secrettly organized the Korean Alliance for
Independence inside
Korea as early as 19^. accepted ^only a few days
before the surrender
was announced, the Japanese proposal under several
conditions.

They

included, among other things, the immediate release
of all political

prisoners from Seoul cells; provision of food and supplies
for Seoul
citizens for the month of August, September and October; and no

interference with Yo's organizing activities among students, laborers
and farmers.

2

The decision on the part of the Japanese was a

critical one for this period, the rational for which can only be
speculated.

Yo's reputation among Koreans was an important factor

but the Japanese authorities, lacking information on the Allied
agreement on the 38th parallel and apparently believing that Seoul

would be occupied by the Russian troops shortly,-^ turned to the
leftists.^

On August

15,

when the Japanese surrender was announced, YS

called a meeting of his allies, including prominent Communists^ many

of whom had been freed from Seoul cells, socialists and progressives.
He also invited rightist nationalists to work with him during the
period of transition.

The result of this effort was the creation

^Ibid.
3

^

/

On August 16, Endo called on Yo to tell him that the Americans
would occupy only the extreme southern part of Korea, and the
Russians the rest of the peninsula. This is a rumor that had been
said to have originated in the active Soviet Consul-General in Seoul,
See Henderson, og. cit. p. 115»
Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics (Berkeley; University
of California Press, 196?), p. 6?.
,

.
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of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean
Independence(CPKI)

Although some rightists joined this organization,
most of them
refused to join the CPKI on the grounds that Yo
should await the

return of the Korean Provisional Government and its
leaders from
Chungking and also that it would be unwise to cooperate with
the
Japanese.

During the interval between the Japanese surrender and

the return to Korea of such recognized leaders of the independence

movement as Syngman Rhee who had been in the United States, Kim Ku
and Kim Kyu-sik(Kim Kiusic) who had been in China, Yo's CPKI had
no rivals in the first three weeks of the liberation.

Having

partially taken over the existing administrative machinery, it was
in far better position than any other group to wield power.

In the

opening days of the liberation the CPKI proceeded to organize "local
committees" throughout South Korea, effectively maintaining law and
order. ^

Its representatives told the Americans at their September 8

•Inchon landing that 135 such local committees had already been

established.^

Without the participation of the rightists, the CPKI

proceeded to hold a "national convention" on September

before the arrival of American occupation forces.
was already bearing progressively to the left.

6,

two days

By then, the CPKI

Three moderate

leftists were ousted from its Central Executive Committee on

September 3.

The intention of the CPKI leaders was unmistakable:

^Ibid., p. 68.
.

Henderson, ££. cit.

,

p. 118.
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it was to present the General Hodge's
entourage with a fait accompli

that a "government" in South Korea was organized.

The proclamation

that emerged on September 6 stated, among others, that
more than a

thousand delegates comprising of "nationalists from
all walks of life"

had decided to "establish a Korean People"s Republic and that
the
delegates were chosen to run the government.""^

It went on to say:®

From this day forward, by the demands of the
Korean people and their delegates, it is our intention
to overcome any difficulties on our way to eliminate all
the remnants of the Japanese imperial government, and
to struggle against all foreign elements who stand in
the way of establishing an independent nation based on
democratic principles.
In the "cabinet" announced on the same day, the delegates, most of

whom were leftists, elected, in accordance with an almost universal
sentiment, Syngman Rhee as Chairman and Y6 as Vice-Chairman.

One

significant development was the election of Ho Hon, then a non-

Communist leader who later became a North Korean leader, as Prime
Minister.

Most of the ministerial portfolios were given to extreme

leftists and Communists, and only a few ministries were headed by
rightists.

Alarmed at the inroads the leftists were making in the rapidly
changing political scene, the rightists countered with the organization

of the Korean Democratic Party(KDP) which sought to win the support
of any non- Communists at the time.

To this party flocked many who

"^Central Election Management Committee, Taehanminkuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Political Parties in Korea), p. 77.

^bid.

2if

had collaborated with the Japanese rule
over Korea.

The beginning

of September saw the formation of two other
rightist parties, the
Korean ^Nationalist Party and the Korean
People's
Party.

In addition

to these. Song Chin-u. who had refused to
cooperate with the Japanese

authorities and the CPKI earlier, organized a group
of rightists in
the Welcoming Committee for the Korean Provisional
Government.

The

Welcoming Committee, in its proclamation stated that the
naation "has
felt a clear presence and received spiritual guidance of
Korean
patriots abroad," and that the government which should replace
the

colonial government was the "Korean Provisional Government which
has

existed continuously from 1919."^

On September 8, the rightist groups

issued a joint statement deploring the CPKI:

"We solemnly oppose

any group or organization purporting to exercise governmental authority
in Korea, except the Korean Provisional Government, which was the

climax of our independence movement and which has been so recognized

by foreign nations. "^^
In addition to these relatively coherent and lasting groups,
the internal political scene in the first weeks of the liberation

witnessed a kaleidoscopic proliferation of parties, committees,

youth groups, farmer, labor and student organizations.

These

organizations were unstable alliances, some of which organized one

morning and were extinct by nightfall .

Organizations were made,

remade and unmade as their leaders switched their alliances.

^Ibid.

lOlbid.

,

p. 78.

The
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confusing alignment of political forces in the early weeks
and months

of the liberation is well attested by the common joke current
during
this time that whenever any five persons met to discuss the
future

of Korea, they formed a new political party.

When General Hodge arrived in Seoul with his entourage on
September 8, he was ill-equipped to handle the complex political
picbjre.

12

He immediately ran into difficulties and back tracked

the first few moves he had made.

The source of his difficulty was

varied and the roots of all problems lay in the vague framework of
directives he carried with him from his home government.

It is,

therefore, essential to sketch the outline of the United States

policy toward Korea and the state of preparedness for occupation
prior to the conclusion of the war.

All evidence seems to indicate

that the United States had not clearly formulated its objectives and
policies with regards to liberated Korea.
The decision to make Korea an independent nation was first

reached in the Cairo Conference on December 1, 19^3 by the United
States, Great Britain and China.

The Cairo Declaration took note

of the state of "enslavement of the people of Korea" and stated the
three powers' "determination" that "in due course Korea shall become

free and independent."

In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 19^5*

setting out the terms of Japanese surrender, the three powers

^Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture ( New York:
The Ronald Press, 1951), p. 303.

^^or American "comical" preparation for Korean occupation,
see, Henderson, o£. cit. , pp. 120-125.

.
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reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration regarding Korean
independence and
the Soviet Union expressed its adherence to the
Potsdam Declaration

in her declaration of war against Japan on August
8, 19^5

The primary duty of the occupying forces was to demobilize
the

Japanese military forces and to liquidate the Japanese
administration.
The former turned out to be a relatively easy task but the latter
was a painstaking process since it necessitated establishment of a

substitute regime.

The directives General Hodge carried explicitly

instructed him to superimpose an American Military Government upon
the framework of the Japanese Government General in Korea and to

oust the Japanese personnel by substituting them with Koreans

wherever possible, but he was not to recognize any Korean group as
having governmental authority.

13

One of the first declarations of

the American Military Government read: "United States policy prohibits

official recognition or utilization for political purposes of any
so-called Korean Provisional Government or any other political

organization by the United States Forces."

14

The initial Korean reaction toward the occupation forces was

a series of hostility and dismay.

An official publication of the

Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew stated on June 8,
1945 in reference to the Korean participation in the United Nations
Conference that the "'Korean Provisional Governnent' and other
organizations do not possess at any time the qualifications requisite
for obtaining recognition by the United 'States as a governing authority."
He went on to say: "It is the policy of this government in dealing with
groups such as the 'Korean Provisional Government' to avoid taking action
which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend
to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form
and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish."
Quoted in George M. McCune, Korea Toda,y
p. 42.
,
Summation of the
Korea,
in
Government
Military
The United States
No.
Korea,
p. 177.
in
1,
Activities
United States Army Military
-^The

,
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military government frankly admitted that
the initial step of the
American Command to retain Japanese
administrators created intense
dissatisfaction. 15

on September 18:

This prompted an explanation by
President Truman

"Such Japanese as may be temporarily
retained are

being utilized as servants of the Korean
people and of our occupying
forces only because they are deemed essential
by reason of their
qualifications.

Immediate steps were taken to remedy the trouble,

and, in a few days. General Hodge had removed the
high Japanese

officials and begun the process of de-Japanization.
In the political realm. General Hodge's difficulty hardly
improved.

Having proclaimed the "People's Republic", the leftists

refused to drop the world "Republic" and function as a political

party as General Hodge requested them to do.

Despite Hodge's

repeated press statements that the "military government is the only
government in southern Korea," the "Republic", now almost exclusively
controlled by the well-known Communists began to label the military

authority as "American imperialism" and publicly questioned the
sincerity of American intentions for Korean independence.
December 12, Hodge's patience ran out:

On

"I feel it necessary to the

public understanding to announce that, regardless of what it calls
itself, the Korean People's Republic is not in any sense a 'government'

•'•

^Ibid .

•^^The United States Department of State Bulletin . Vol. XIII
(September 23, IW), p. ^35.
17
'Quoted in. Cho, op. cit . . p.
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On that day he directed that the activities
of any organization "in
any attempted operations as a j^overnment"
were
to be treated as

'

unlawful activities.
This was a fateful decision and perhaps
indicative of the

pro-rightist inclination of the American occupying
forces,

as one

participant in the Military Government put it, "...
it was no secret
that it (the Military Government) favored the
right and was anxious
for the parties of the right to acquire strong
popular support. "^^
When, on October 5, an eleven-member Korean
Advisory Council was

announced to helo the United States Commander, it
called the "aepublic"
an "irresnonsible rxDlitical ^rouo."^^

This advisory group was concosed

mostly of the rightists and headed by KLm Song-su, then
the most
prestigeous rightist in Korea and the owner of the Dong-A
Ilbo.

In

hiring personnel for the government care was taken to exclude
leftists.
In the opening struggle between the rightists and the leftists

which had taken the form of confrontation between the followers
of
the Provisional C-overnment and the Republic, the former gained an

upper hand in winning the favor of the American Military Government.

It was no secret, however, that the Republic's main source of support

lay in the well organized support of the Communists at the time of
the liberation.

The history of Korean Communism dates back to 1918

when the Irkutsk Communist Party established a Korean section by

18

.Quoted in ibid., d. 50»
19
Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government in Korea," Far
Eastern Survey November, I9A-6, p. 35O.
.
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January of that year.

The KoryS Con^unist Party was
established in

Kharvosk in January. 1921. and the
pavement spread first to some
60.000 Korean residents in southeastern
Siberia, and then the party
under the direction and financial
support of the revolutionary

regime in Russia began to gain supfxsrters
in Manchuria and other
parts of China as well as inside Korea.

Although the Coimnunist

Party was forced to operate underground during
the Japanese rule.
the party nevertheless came to possess
a well-knit hierarchy of
leaders.

Pak Hon-yong. its acknowledged leader who
had little foreign

bonds, arrived in Seoul on August 1? from brick-laying
in Ch^nra

Province, carrying party lists and plans for reorganization.

On

September 12, he revived the party and was elected Chairman
of the
20
Korean Communist Party.

As a well organized group, the Communists became the heir of
the sudden emancipation from the Japanese rule.

In the opening

weeks of the liberation, the Communists and their affiliated
organizations had no rivals.

The "peoples* committees" in both

North and South Korea collected taxes:
Japanese factories.

they also took over many

One writer concluded that the Communists who

controlled the "people's republic" in the opening months of the

liberation "was imperium in imperio in South Korea, unquestionably
the country's most important single force for at least the first

20

Henderson, o£. cit.

,

pp. 312-32^.
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year. "21

the grassroots, the left
continued to gain strength.

The New York Tirnes report on
January 5. 1946 stated that the

conservative elements had "fallen far
behind liberal as well as

radical factions" and that the People's
Republic "continues to gain

strength in rural areas."

The Christian Science Monitor article
of

January 3 of the same year stated that "the
so-called People's
Republic, composed of socialist and Communist
elements, enjoys far

more popular support than any other single political
"^^
grouping.
Until the reappearance of the Dong-A Ilbo on December
1. most of
the newspapers were leftist inclined.

was impressive.

The gain by the Communists

From roughly 4,000 members at the time of liberation,

Pak Hon-yong, its leader in South Korea, claimed 29.000 on March
1,
The Military Ctovernment

1946.

itseK estimated 15,000

to 20,000

Communists during this period.
The rightists' position was strengthened considerably by the

return of Syngman Rhee on October 16, 1945 and the arrival of some
twenty other leaders of the Provisional Government on November 23.
including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik.

This trinity of leaders later

split, but in the early months of the liberation, they rendered the

rightists tremendous prestige and legitimacy.

the three was Syngman Rhee.

The most famous of

His popularity was based on the fact

that he was the first President of the Korean Provisional Government

2

^bid

22

. .

p. 322.

Quoted in McCune, Korea Today .

p. 50.

.
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and almost single-handedly agitated for
Korean independence abroad. Rhee.
on his return from the United States,
disavowed any connection between
him and a political group.

Rhee stated that "... the reason that

I come home without prior notice is not because
I was on any secret

mission or I had any previous arrangement with any
particular political
party.

My wish

is that all political parties and factions
unite and

cooperate for independence of a free nation in Korea. "^^

He seemingly

stood a'uove the political turmoil and later organized the National

Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence( NARKI)
Kim Ku, another aging revolutionary, was one of the original

members of the Provisional Government, and, at the time of liberation,
its President.

His fame was based primarily on the fact that he was

a moving spirit behind the most successful assassination plot ever

undertaken by Korean exiles in China.

In the Shanghai bombing of

1932, which was plotted under his direction, several Japanese generals

were killed or wounded.

The incident made him a hero in the eyes

of most Koreans and his eminence was further emphasized by his
marriage to the daughter of An Chung-kun, the assassin of Prince
Ito Hirobumi at Harbin in 1909-

Independence Party(KIP).

24

He became the leader of the Korean

The last of the three leaders, Kim Kyu-sik,

joined the Provisional Government in 1919 and represented it in

^^Quotfxi in Robert T. Oliver, Syngran Rhee The Man Behind the
Myth CNew York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1954), p. 370.
24
For his autobiography, see Kim Ku, Baekbom Ilji( Member of
Kim Ku), 8th Ed., (Seoul: Chonpung Publishing Co., 1969).
;
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4-^^
the

Pans Peace Conference.
t5

•

Isst position

-r,

A recipient

« doctorate
^
.
of a
degree
in the

provisional Government was Vice President.
Given the political situation at the
time, any form of unity of
political groups was conceivable only
under Rhee.
A .oil taken by the

Doa^

llbo on January 23, 19h6

,

vhich asked questions of passers-by

four street corners of Seoul, showed
that Rhee was a definite frontrunner as the "first President of Korea"
with 29 percent (out of some
T.OOO respondents.)
Kim Ku was a distant second with 11
percent; Kim
Kys-sik 10 percent; and the moderate leftist
leader of the "Republic"
Yo Un-Hyong with another 10 percent. 2 5
on

When the decision on December 27.

conference to impose

191+5

by the Moscow three-power

five-year trusteeship over Korea was announced,

a

the Korean reaction-of all political groups- was
immediate and

hostile.
it as
M

a

The Korean press condemned it

"Second Munich,"

and variously characterized

"mandatory rule," "insult to Korea,"

international slavery," and "violation of international treaties." 26
25

The Don^-A llbo

,

July 2U, 19^+6, p.

1.
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The key passages in the Moscow declaration which dealt with the
Korean question stated in part:
"It shall be the task of the Joint
Commission (U.S. Command in South Korea and the Soviet Command' in North
Korea), with the participation of the provisional Democratic Government
and of the Korean Democratic organizations, to work out measures also
for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress
of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and
the establishment of the national independence of Korea.... The proposals
of the joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation.! with
the provisional Korean Government, for the Joint consideration of the
United States, Great Britain, Russia and China... for working out an
agreement concerning a four power trusteeshit) of Korea for a period up
to five years."
Quoted in Report of the United Nations Temporary
Commi s s i on on Kore a Vol. I, General Assembly, Official Records:
Third
Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/5T5), Lake Success, New York, 19U8, p. 8.
,
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Without waiting for the clarification
of the reports, the rightists
organized a general work stoppage and
mass demonstrations throughout
the country.

They attempted to take over the police
force and the

judicial system and whipped up public hysteria
in opposition to the

Moscow decision.

The movement was impressive and the
following among

Korean employees of the Military Government gave
them additional
power.

The leftists joined in opposition to the
t2;steeship proposal.^?

but on January 3.

W6,

they suddenly reversed their position,

allegedly under instructions from Cominform, and came
out in support

of the trusteeship.

On the same day, the rightists held a mass rally

in Seoul in protest of the Moscow decision.^^

Any prospect of bringing

about the unity of the left and the right was now foreclosed.
As provided for in the Moscow Declaration, the first session

of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission was convened on March
20,
19^6 at Doksu Palace in Seoul.

Before the representatives from both

sides got down to substantive matters, however, a considerable number

of differences arose with regards to the procedure to be followed in
consulting with Korean "democratic parties and social organizations"

referred to in the Moscow Agreement and the meeting broke down finally

on May

8.

Each side blamed the other for the deadlock.

The United

States Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring explained that the

27

For the leftist statement opposing the trusteeship proposal,
see Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Ct^ngdangsa(A History of Korean Political
Parties) (Seoul: S hint taeyangsa , 1961), pp. 66-6?.
28
Haebang Yisipyinyonsa ( Twenty- two Years Since Liberation)
(Seoul: Munhaksa, 196?), Vol. I, p. 23^.
'
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cause for the deadlock was the Soviet contention
that "all Koreans

who had opposed in anyway the terms of the Moscow
Agreement should
be excluded."

Since the Communists were the onlor group supporting

the agreement in question, "the Soviet criterion would
have effectively

limited the Commission to consultation with one minority group. "^^
The Soviet explanation blamed the United States for proposing the
inclusiOii of "seventeen political parties and social groups
of

Southern Korea which opposed the Moscow Agreement and only three
democratic parties which supported the agreement, ""^^ and further
claimed that certain parties and social organizations had been

debarred for purposes of consultation by the Military Government
in Seoul.

Another session of the Joint Commission did not convene until

May 21, 19^7.

After lengthy discussions, the Commission was dead-

locked again on the requirement of consultation with Korean parties
and social organizations.

The United States delegation took the

position that all parties and organizations willing to uphold the

Moscow Agreement and abide by the decisions of the Commission should
be consulted.

The Soviet counterpart, however, insisted that the

representatives of parties and organizations belonging to the so-

called "anti-trusteeship committee" formed by Kim Ku should not be
eligible unless they had officially announced withdrawal from this
committee.

^^The United States Department of State Bulletin . Vol. XV
(March. IW), p. 5^5.
•^

^Report of the U.N. Temporary Commission

ojei

Korea,

p. 10
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Among other Issues that divided the American
and the Soviet
delegates were that the United States objected to
the alleged

exclusion from the Soviet list of consultees of twenty-four
political
parties claiming a total membership of over fifteen
million.

The

Soviet delegates, on the other hand, countered with the
argument
that democratic parties and organizations which supported the
Moscow

Agreement were being subjected by the Military Government to the
"severer t restrictions" including seizure of their premises, arrest

of leaders and suppression of press

organs.-^"*"

On the problem of

establishing a provisional Korean government, the American representatives proposed that a provisional representative legislature should
be elected by universal suffrage in each zone as a means of constituting
a national provisional legislature, to be made up of representatives

selected from the legislature of each zone in proportion to its
population.

The national provisional legislature would then establish

"a provisional government for a united Korea."

The Soviet delegation,

on the other hand, proposed that a provisional All-Korean People's
Assembly, constituted of representatives of democratic parties and

organizations having 10,000 or more members, and which were known to
"sincerely support the Moscow decisions and not be opposed

to the

Joint Commission or to the Allied Powers," should be established.
In the Soviet scheme, representation of the two zones in the Assembly
was to be equal.

32

^"Ibid., p. 11.

^^Ibid.
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In the face of these irreconcilable differences,
the fate of

the Joint Commission was sealed.

On August 26, 194? , the United

States Government proposed that the question of
implementing the

Moscow Agreement should be referred forthwith to the Four
Powers
adhering to that agreement.

The Soviet Union announced the refusal

to participate in the Four Power discussions on September

The Unit 3d States, convinced that further efforts to reach

19k7,

an

agreement on the basis of the Moscow plan would be futile, brought
the question of Korean independence before the United Nations on

September 1?. 33

The General Assembly ,on November 12, despite Soviet

opposition, adopted a resolution calling for a general election in
all of Korea before March 31, 19^8, representation of which was to

be based on population and created the United Nations Temporary

Commission on Korea ( UNTCOK )
The question of trusteeship drove the nation into a deepening

political turmoil.

Any chances of reconciliation between the

followers of the People's Republic and the Korean Provisional

Adversary organizations in
rapidly
moving times,
this battle took on different names in these

Government now appeared to be doomed.

but the battle line was drawn between the leftists and the rightists,

On January 19, 19^6, the leftists including the Communists met to
discuss the formation of a united front.

The resulting Democratic

People's Front(DPF), organized on February 15, brought together

^^George M. McCune, "Postwar Government and Politics of Korea,"
Journal of Politics , Vol. IX(Kovember, 19^7). P. 608.
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leaders of four leftist organizations which kept
separate entities

throughout the opening months of the liberation.

Kim Won-bong of

the Revolutionary Party, Ho Hon of the South Korean Labor
Party,

Pak H5n-y6ng of the Communist Party and Yo Un-hyong of the
Korean
People's Party were elected to the Supreme Committee of the
DPF."^^

The leftist strategy was to use their support of the Moscow
Agreement
as a stepping stone to political power.

They tried to discredit the

rightists, branding them as pro-Japanese and "national traitors"

and contrasting their own support of the Joint Commission to the

rightist opposition.
The leftist chances for gaining an upperhand deteriorated
rapidly.

After having been suspected of a massive counterfeit

scandal involving Communists, which was heavily publicized by the

Military Government authorities, the leftists', especially the
Communists' image suffered considerably.

The incident gave the

military authorities pretext to tighten the control of the leftists
and Communists.

The latter, as the most powerful group in the

early post-liberation period, was an anathema to Hodge and his

military government.

The rightists under the protection and

encouragement by the military government were beginning to gain
-

popular support.

The military authorities lost no time to

capitalize on the scandal.

On May

8, 19^6,

two days after the

"^Haebang Yisipyinyonsa ( Twenty- two Years Since Liberation),
p. .236.

.
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scandal was revealed to the public, the military
authorities searched
the Communists' headquarters in Seoul.

This act was followed by a

series of moves which tended to vitiate the Communists.

On Kay 18,

the occupation authorities proceeded to close the Haebang
llbo . an

official Communist daily, and closed six other semi-official Communist
newspapers on September 6.

To make the Occupation authorities*

dis pleas-ore with the Communists complete, the Military Government

ordered the arrest of Pak Hon-yong, the head of the Communist Party
in South Korea. 35

Communists.

The leftist movement was now captured by the

With Yo's assassination in June, 19^7, any hope of the

moderates holding the reigns of the leftist movement was doomed.
The rightists, on the other hand, united under the name of

Emergency People's Committee on January

2l'

t,he

and proceeded to lead

the protest movement against the trusteeship.

The leadership of

this group included all prominent rightists including Rhee, Kim Ku

and Kim Kyu-sik.

This committee soon dissolved itself in favor of

the NARKI under the chairmanship of Rhee.

This loose federation of

rightists of various backgrounds and experiences, however, had to

endure another realignment when the first session of the Joint Com-

mission folded amid differences between the participants.

The

differences among the rightists emerged over the question of whether
to establish a government south of the 38th parallel or for all of

Korea.

The J.ine was drawn as a military expediency for the Soviet

and the American troops to disarm the Japanese.

^^Ibid., p. 238. Pse

Also

Henderson, o^. cit., p. 322.
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Syngman Rhee. who had been travelling
throughout Korea in his
campaign against the trusteeship,
announced on June 3.
that he

W6

was considering "some sort of
a provisional government
or a committee
in South Korea alone. "^^ ^his
marked the departure of Kim
Ku and

Kim Kyu-sik from Rhee's camp.

Kim Kyu-sik. who had been advocating

one government for all of Korea, flatly
refused to cooperate with

Rhee on his proposal from the beginning.

Kim Ku at first consented,

but announced withdrawal shortly thereafter,
stating that he favored

a "unified government of North-South.
Left-Right."^''

The KARKI.

however, received the support of the KDP.
whose leaders were princi-

pally those nationalist leaders who had been in
Korea at the time
of liberation, and who were under special favor
by the American

military authorities.

Rhee's political line was also supported by

those rightists who served in the Japanese bureaucracy.

Hence the

rightists were divided into two large camps— the followers
of the
NARKI and its leader Rhee on the one hand and the Provisional

Government circles and their leaders, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik
on
the other.

With the birth of the Korean Independence Party in

April, 19^6, this division was to endure right up to the time of

independence.

While the right wing groups were beginning to drift apart,
the moderates of the left and some right wing elements attempted
to bring about some sort of unity.

^bid ..
37.

Ibid.

p. 237.

One such movement was organized
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on the initiative of Kim Kyu-sik
and Yo Un-hy^n, in July,
19^6.
However, the so-called Left-Ri.ht
Unity Conference stalemated
after
a month of discussion due to
the participants

views.

•

widely diverging

3S
^^^^^

^^^^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^

^

participate in such a venture
foreclosed the fate of the Unity
Conference. The Korean Interim
Legislative Assembly, a
.halfelected and half-aor^ointive organ
formed in December, I945, was
largely a consequence of the efforts
by Kim Kyu-sik and those
others who favored the union of the
leftists and the ri^^htists.

Here arain. m.any prominent political
leaders refused to participate
in the Occupation sponsored
Assembly with advisory f unctions.

As of June, 1946, Political parties
registered with the

American Military Government numbered
10? and a year later, this
number increased to 344 in South Korea.

When the Joint Commission

invited the political parties and social
organizations to file

applications so as to determine their qualification
to be consultees,
some 463 parties with a massively inflated
membership of 60,000.000
40
responded.
The Korean population at the time was hardly
26,000,000,
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Haeban? YisiPy^nsaC Twenty Years Since Liberation),
p. 239.
For the composition of this assembly, see United
States Mlitarv
Government in Korea, Summation . No. 13(0ctober,
1946), p. 13 and
No. 14 (November, 1946). p. I7.
39 For

insistence by both sides, see Kim Chon?r-hun. Hankuk
ChoncdancsafA History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Seoul
Koshinhakhoe, I969), p. 25.
40
Pak Ilun-ok. Hankuk Chonqburon (A Study of Korean Government)
^

_

(Seoul:. Pakyon^-'sa. 1963). p. 377.
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vnien the second session of the Joint Commission
was deadlocked

toward the end of August, 194?, the lU^RKl began to
push for the

establishment of a government in South Korea alone.

The United

Nations General Assembly resolution introduced by
the United States

representative called for a general election on Karch
3, 1948 and
a United nations Temporary Commission on Korea, composed
of

representatives from ei^ht nations, was created to implement the

resolution and to oversee the election.

As the UKTCOK members were

refused entrance to r:orth Korea by the Soviet Occupation Forces, the

decision was made by the Commission to hold a general election in

South Korea alone on Kay 10, 1948.

This decision by the Commission

practically sealed any hope of uniting the three prominent rightist
leaders, who, previous to that, had generally acted in unison in
their confrontation with the leftists through the second Joint

Commission.

Rhee reiterated his position on September 18, 194?

when he called for "an immediate establishment of a provisional
government in South Korea with a right to negotiate directly with

Soviet Russia and Am.erica on matters of occupation of Korea..."
and he added that the "American forces... should stay in Korea until
the Soviet forces are withdrawn from North Korea."

41

Kim Ku's position on the future of Korea diverged widely with.
Rhee^s.

In the statements he made to the UNTCOK hearings on January

28, 1948, he called for "a unified, sovereign, independent government.

•

41

(Quoted in Lee, Joung-sik, "Some Characteristics of Korean
Political Culture: A Study of Korean Political Leaders* Statements,
I948-I96O," Koreana ^^uarterly Vol. VIII, I.o. 3(Autumn, 1966), p. 66.
.
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established throuf^h a general election
for the entire country;"
"Iimnediate withdrawal of IS-OSSR troops
from Korea... with the

'

United IJations takinc, the responsibility
for maintaining public
peace durinr. the interim period;" and
"A meeting of prominent
leaders from North and South Korea [in
order thatl the Korean

problem could be solved by the Korean people.

"^^^

The hardenin- of

Kim Ku's position was manifested in several
concrete steps he took
jointly with the leaders from the moderate ri?^htist
camp such as

Kim Kyu-sik.

In early March, 19^8, it was announced that both

Kims' had sent a letter, which was later made public,"
to Kin Il-son.-,

Chairman of the i\orth Korean People's Committee and
Kim Tu-bon-,

Chairman of the North Korean Labor Party, outlining their
proposal

for a l^orth-South Korean Leaders' Conference.

In this letter, they

reaffirmed that the Koreans themselves should settle the problem of

Korea and that the measures for the establishment of a unified and
democratic government should be discussed through a conference of
political leaders of both zones.

In the event that the proposal

was acceoted by the North Korean leaders,

the representatives from

South Korea to attend the conference were to be elected from those
political parties of South Korea which vere in favor of holding such
conference.

including

•

Ki:n

On Karch 13, seven prominent South Korean leaders

Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued

Simmation , February, 19^8,

^-^Ibid., Karch, 19^8, p. 153.

p.

^,

171,

joint statement calling

^

for a unified independence of
Korea and vowing never to participate
in the election in South Korea,
which, they claimed. «,uld perpetuate
the division of Korea.

When the invitation list was announced
by North Korea, it mostly
included leaders of organizations of
moderate and leftist inclination
despite the fact that the initiative came
from Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik.
both rightist leaders.

The so-called National Unity Conference
was

convened with some 5^0 members of ^6 organizations
from North and

South Korea in P'yongyang from April 22 to
23.

Upon returning

from there. Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued a joint statement
on April
30.

It claimed that the leaders' conference "has pointed
the road to

construction of a united, democratic nation," and it was a
"further
testimonial that Korea, freed of foreign interference, can begin
a
prosperous national life in peace."

The basis of the national unity

envisaged by the unity conference were:^^
1. Withdrawal of the two occupation forces from Korea.

2. The organization of a provisional government by a

national political conference immediately after
the withdrawal of troops.
3. The adoption of a national constitution and the

formation of a united national government by
representatives to be elected through a national
election.

^Ibid

.

Donald G. Tewksbury, ed. , Source Materials on Korean
Politics and Ideologies (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1950), p."9^.

The last minute efforts by some
rightists notwithstanding, the

hour for a unified government for all
of Korea had already passed.
There was nothing achieved as a result
of the Unity Conference
except that it had a tremendous propaganda
boost for the Communists.
an

The mJTOCKdecision to hold/election in South
Korea alone proceeded

with the blessing of rightist groups headed by
the eventual victor
in the tliree years of political turmoil since
liberation.

Witnout the participation of the leftists and those
organizations
that had gone to P'yongyang for the Unity Conference, both
of which

urged the boycotting of the election, 91 percent of the eligible
the
voters went to /polls on May 10, 19^8 to elect their representatives
to the Constituent National Assembly.

Amid the reported incidents

of interferences by the leftist organizations, especially in the
rural districts of Cheju Province and the southwestern provinces

where the police was unable to establish and maintain order, 198
members were elected on the basis of the single-member district

system ,with two electoral districts in Cheju Province unable to hold
elections due to riots created by the Communists.
in

In the election that was participated /by some 942 candidates,
the NARKI candidates showed remarkable strength.
seats.

The NARKI won 59

The Korean Democratic Party, whose support of Rhee was

instrumental to the eventual victory of his political line, followed

with 29 seats.

Next came the candidates of two youth corps: the

Taedong Youth Corps of Yi Ch'ong-ch'Sn won 14 seats; the Nationalist

^5

Youth Corps ,le.d by Yi Bom-so^k^won
Ik and 6 seats respectively.^^
The nation's first election
saw the proliferation of
independents.

Some 85 men without party
affiliations were elected to
the first
National Assembly. The voting
criteria seemed to have been
the

candidate's record as an independence
fighter and as an antiJapanese. Where parties were
organized and dissolved overnight,
the party label could not provide
the voters with meaningful
images

that corld guide the voters.

One surprising result of the
election

was the small number of winners for
the Korean Democratic Party.

As the most highly organized and wealthy
political group among the
rightists and having accrued advantages as
an extensive participant
in the American Military Government, it was
expected to have a better

showing.

But it is noteworthy that the KDP had by far
the highest

ratio of candidates to winners(32 percent),
considerably higher than
the national average of 21.1 per cent.
The election brought to a close a turbulent chapter
in Korean
politics.

The shape of politics in the post-liberation era was
more

or less determined by the extent to which the two superpowers agreed
or differed.

Liberation having been attained through their hands,

the American-Soviet occupation of the Korean peninsula had left a

The Secretariat. National Assembly, the Republic of Korea.
Kukhoe Sipnyon.ii (Ten Years of National Assembly) (Seoul: The
Secretariat of the National Assembly. 195B). pp. 2-3.

The figure for the independents was 20.^ percent. This
seems to indicate that being a member of a political party or
groups brought no appreciable benefit for the candidates in this
election.

he

deep imprint on the course of
oi Doiifi^oi
political adevelopment in Korea.
Independence was achieved
uaievea, hnt
but +v,^
the price
to pay was dear.

The First Republic and the
Shaping of
Party Politics, 19U8-I960

Syngman Rhee

,

as

the oldest member of the
newly elected

Constituent National Assembly,
convened its first session on
May 31, 10^8.
On the opening day, Rhee was
chosen as Speaker
and Kim Tong-won and Shin Ik-hi as
Vice-Speakers.
The new

Assembly immediately proceeded to write
an organic law for the

a

constitution and

forthcoming government.

The Constitution

Drafting Committee was said to have favored
the cabinet system
as were the leaders of the KDP.
Having supported Rhee through
the turbulent post-liberation politics
and having supported Rhee
in securing the speakership, the KDP
leaders expected to

share the spoils of power with Rhee.

have been more amenable than

their purposes.

It was

a

The cabinet system would

presidential system to suit

also known that Rhee himself had

been in favor of the cabinet system at one time.^^

But

he seemed to have a change of heart overnight, believing

that a cabinet system would entail sharing power with the
KDP,

which had deeper roots in Korea at the time than himself.

At any

rate, when the draft constitution was reported out of the drafting

committee, it called for among other things,

a

presidential system

See Yu Chin-o, "Reflections on the Days of Drafting the
Constitution," Kukhoebo, No 2 (1958), p. 32.
See also Yun Ch'^n-.1
Hankuk Ch5ngch i Ch egye (The Korean Political System) (Seoul:
Koryo University, I961), pp. II5-II6.
'

'

'^7

a unic^eral legislature, and
indirect election cf the President
by
the National Assembly.

The new Constitution was promulgated
by Rhee as Speaker of

the National Assembly on July 17;and
there was no doubt as to who

was going to be the first President
of the Republic of Korea.

won one-sidely. obtaining 180 out of I96
votes.

Rhee

Kext came Kim Ku

who won 13 votes despite the fact that he
boycotted the first
general election.

Rhee's prominence was widely recognized, and
the

loose political groupings of the first general
election were not
a factor in Rhee's election.

The vice presidential post went to

the octogenerian Yi si-y5ng. the former Vice
Chairman of the Korean

Provisional Government at the time of liberation.

On July 2k,

Syngman Rhee was inaugurated as the first President of
the First
Republic.

Public attention now turned to the appointment of a cabinet.

Rhee's inauguration speech was indicative of what was to
come:
"... regardless of party affiliations or personal relations,
men

best able and best suited to administer the enacted laws in
accordance with the wishes of the people will be chosen to

governmental positions."

^

When the cabinet was announced on

August 6, the KDP hopes to dominate the new cabinet were betrayed.

Kim Song-su, the head of KDP was given no government post at all,
and only one of the active members

of

tha.t

party was given a

49
^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 19^8, p. 1.

ministerial post.

Kim Song-su was later offered a post
as Minister

without Portfolio, which he declined.^°

were unfavorable.

Reactions to Rhee's choices

Newspapers in general felt that the cabinet
was

nothing but a gathering of Rhee's friends and
followers, most of

whom were mainly

mediocre men.

One paper criticized that the

criterion for the appointment seemed to be the ability to
speak
English.

More than half of the cabinet appointees were educated in

the United States or in Great Britain.

For the KDP and its members,

power in the newly established nation appeared to go elsewhere,

particularly to the Nationalist Youth Corps: its leader Yi Bom-sok
received simultaneous appointment as Prime Minister and Defense
Minister.

Another influential ministry, the Home Ministry went to Rhee
,

another loyal follower who had a previous connection with the

Youth Corps in question.
Deeply disappointed ty

having been blocked in their expectations

to share power with Rhee, the KDP revived the issue of a cabinet

system they had favored

.

From late 1948 on, the party was

launched on the steady road to becoming the first opposition party

According to Rhee himself, Kim Song-su was the "most
appropriate person to become the Prime Minister" due to his
"integrity, personal virtues and patriotism." The reason why he
avoided designating Kim Song-su as his Prime Minister, he stated,
was because of the fact that Kim was a leader of a political party.
In 19^8, he also repeated his fundamental distrust of political
parties in his message to the nation. See Cho Il-mun, Sae
ChSngdangron ( New Theory of Political Parties) (Seoul: Samhwa
Ch'ulpansa, 1971), pp. 23-24. In the initial stages of his presidency,
Rhee appeared to have a deep distrust of political parties, an
inclination which is consistent with his populist proclivities.

't9

in the republic.

The party platform announced
at the conclusion of
the October, I949 party
convention included a program
for a
constltutioral amendment in favor
of a cabinet system. At
first
such constitutional issue
attracted very little public
attention.
but it did Win the sympathy
of some Assemblymen who
later Joined the
party. As Rhee-s authoritarian
rule becar.e manifest in
time, the
issue of the constitutional
^endment gradually became
synonymous.
vith the "anti-dictatorship issue.-Sl
^s Rhee battled the Assembly
on such post-indeoendence issues
as punishin, the collaborators,

land reform, local autonomy and
the disposition of the culprits
of
the unsuccessful ySsv rebellion.
Speaker of the Assembly Shin Ik-hi
led a lar.e part of his 70-member
confederation of minor politicians
into the KDP on the issue of cabinet
responsibility. The new group,

now renamed Democratic Kationalist
Farty(DKP) became the first
the
Korean group formed with
explicit purpose of being an opposition
party.

The prewar period also saw the beginnings
of political amalga-

mation on the government side as well.

In

IW

Khee ordered that

all youth groups combine into the Taehan
Youth Cores and that all
combuie
unions/into the Korean Federation of Trade Unions.
They led directly

into party politics in 1951, when tx)th of these
organizations became

ancillary organizations of the Liberal Party(LP).

In the National

Assembly, Rhee quietly moved to absorb inzo his own circles
independent

^''Henderson, od. cit.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 291.

,
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legislators and legislators
belonging to splinter groups
with the
objective of weakening
the opposition in the Assembly.
He began to
win the sunrx^rt for
his glides in the legislative
body.
Even before the I95O
general elections, a large number
of
independent legislators
in the Assembly, in the course
of deliberating
various important bills,
had begun to form friendship
circles and
associations, "starting out
strictly as a grouping based on
personal
relations and goodwill, it
became not uncommon for each friendship
circle to win m.ore
le^^islators on the basis of agre^
policy, and
this also provided the
basis for a new circle.
The amalrar.ation
process received a tremendous
boost when on September 29, 19^9 the

Assembly passed a law concerning
negotiation groups within the
National Assembly. A negotiation
group was defined as a group of
twenty or more legislators, who,

as a group, were given the privilege

to "negotiate" on the
Assembly floor.^^

The adoption of such system

brought a tremendous change
in the rower configuration of the Assembly.

Lesser friendship circles were
forced to fold and its members found
their places in the larger negotiation
groups.

53.
'"^^ Jin-hak, Jehon Kukhoesa(A Historv of
the Constituent national Assembly) (Seoul;
ohinjo Ch'ulp'ansa," 195^)
J-nitially, the negotiation ?:^rouo appears to have
^'
been
created^as a way of expediting business on the
floor of the Assembly.
The assignment of seats, selection of standing
and ad hoc committees
and the designation of speakers during the
Assembly sessions were
made accordm- to the negotiation groups. Later,
the ner-otiation
groups were made to consult on the agenda of the assembly
session.
See The Secretariat, the National Assem.bly, Kukhoe-^p
Haesol(A
Commentary on the Laws Governins: the I.'ational Assembly)
(Seoul: The
Secretariat of the National Assembly, I96&), op. 64-65.

By the fifth session of the
Constituent National Assembly,
the
floor was composed of five
"clubs" and political
parties.

Independent Club had 29 Assemblymen:
the
Politics Club). 23; the

Sinchor^(the

The

New

Nodon^ang( the Korean Farmer-Labor

Party). 23; the Ilmin Kurakbu(the
One People Club). 55; and
the
DNP. 70. By the final session
of the Assembly, the number
of

negotiation groups was reduced to
four.

The Independence Club had

28 legislators: Taehan Kukmindan^(the Korean
Nationalist Party),
organized by Rhee by uniting members
of the New Politics Club, the
Korean Farmer-Labor Party, and a
portion of the One People Club.
71;
the One People Club, having lost
25 of its members to the Korean
Nationalist Party, now had 30 members; the
DNP's strength numbered

69.^
Confrontation between Rhee and the Assembly
reached its climax

when the DNP members, along with several
independents introduced a
,

constitutional amendment bill in favor of a cabinet
system on

January 2?. 1950.

The bill also included a provision in accordance

with which the term of the Assembly could be prolonged
for one year
in case of "emergency."

The 19^7 Constitution provided a two year

term for the National Assembly.

The adoption of a cabinet system

would be clearly advantageous to the DNP at that time, and by
elevating President Rhee to a ceremonial post and transferring the
locus of power from the executive branch of the government to the

Han T'ae-su. Hanguk Chongdangsa (A History of Korea Political
Parties), pp. 118-119.
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Assembly, the DNP wanted to emasculate
Rhee's power.

A cabinet system,

its supporters argued, would be a superior
system than the presidential

system as responsibility could be more
easily located.

A cabinet

system would also better foster oarty
politics on the basis of
political platforms or policies.

The presidential system, on the

other hand, invites factionalization of
parties, with each faction

vying for the confidence of the President, and
results in the
defeneration of Dolitical parties, because there
is a danger for the
political parties to de^renerate into an arm of
the executive branch
headed by the President.
that any

aj-.endm.ent to

rthee's supporters held on to the
principle

the Constitution should be effected only
after

the unification of the country.

The proposed amendment, moreover,

would be an invitation for political instability and would
encoura-e
"thirst for TX)wer" on the part of the political parties,

while the

adversaries were engar'ed in the exchange of naive constitutional
volleyball, the amendment bill reached the floor of the National

Assembly but failed to receive the required two-thirds vote^ despite
the fact that it received 79 favorable votes to 33 opposins^ votes.

The fate of the bill was decided by 66 abstentions.-^^

This narked

the beginning of the vicious cycle of the politics of constitutional

amendment which prevailed through most of ahee's Liberal Party
regime.

^^Ibid., D. 118.

^^The Done-A Ilbo, March 15, 1950, p. 1.
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In response to the inability of the
government to deal effectively

with the confusion, terror and spiraling
inflation which affected'
everyone's life in the first two years of the
republic, the Kay 30.

1950 General Election returned only 31 members of the
Constituent

National Assembly.

The two major parties which were the adversaries

in the amendment struggle fared badly.

was reduced to 23.

The opposition Di;P's strength

The Korean People's Party, which sided with

.

Rhee toward the end of the Constituent National
Assembly, won 2k
seats.

Once again the independents won most seats^or
12? to be

exact. 57

offing.

Once again, a new alignment of Assemblymen was in
the
The new Assem.bly opened just 9 days prior to the start
of

the Korean War on June 25, 1950.
The Assembly moved six times as the fortunes of the war changed

durine the next six months,

i^en it reconvened in March, I951 in

Pusan, the war-time capital, the battle between the Assembly and

Rhee was renewed.

With few exceptions the negotiation groups

registering with the Assembly now had taken different names.

The

New Politics Club had the largest membership with 70j the

had

^0; the Konghwa Kurakbu(the Reoublican Club),

k-C;

DI\P

the Kinuhoe (the

People's Friends Club), 20; the independents, who numbered to 12?

at the time of election, were now reduced to five.

In crucial votes,

the New Politics Club and the Republican Club sided with the governrrient.
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-^Central Election Management Committee(CE2-':C) Yokdae Kukhoewiwon
Son 'to San"-hwang (The Status of the Fast National Assembly Elections)
(Seoul: Central Election l-.'anagement Committee, 1967), pp. 173-17^.
,

5^

whereas the DNP could count on the help of
the People's Friends
Club.

The battle line was drawn again for a
showdown.

The DKP fired

the first shot when its members exposed and
criticized the conduct

of the Korean army and its hi?h rankincr officers
in the so-called
K^ch'anfT and Defense Corps incidents.

The turmoil, accusations

and counter-accusations that prevailed over these incidents
were
fii?rhtened

by the resi^rnation of Vice President Yi 3i-yong on May
9,

His Iptter to the oublic on the followin?: day scored

1951.

.-thee

for giving his Vice President no role, and explained that his

resignation was tendered to the National Assembly because he wanted
to assuine "the moral responsibility for the sad state of
affairs
59
this nation is in."^^

In the ensuing election of a new Vice

President, the pro-government candidate lost to Kim dong-su, the

former head of the KDP by 73 to 151 votes.

The deadlock between the

government and the opposition in the Assembly continued.

For Rhee,

the situation could no longer be tolerated.
eg

Koch'ang incident involved the killing of more than five
hundred innocent civilians by a Korean army unit after the latter
failed in a guerilla sweeoin? operation behind the battle lines.
For details, see Haebanc- Yisir)yinyon.-ii ( Twenty- two Years 5ince
Liberation), oo. 319-322. The Defense Corns incident was of far
greater seriousness than the incident at K^ch'anp- as it involved
graft
by the Coros Commander and his aides, resulting; in hunger
deaths of t'lousands of militiamen waitin: to join the re.;fular
Korean arm.y. Several Assemblymen in the i\ew rolitics Club were
also allegedly imolicated, as the Assembly investigation team
disclosed. For further details, see ibid., op. 315-31S.
59

For his resignation statement, see ibid., op. 321-322.
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On August 15. 1951. Rhee took the
first major step in order to
do away with the troublesome Kational
Assembly, or at least to tame
it for easier manipulation.

In his independence day speech on

August 15. 1951, he announced his intention
to form a new political
.

party:

60

So far I have considered premature to install
a party system until the people can fully
understand
the meaning of a political party. . .. But the
time has
has come to organize a large party covering
the whole
coimtry on the basis of farmers and working people,
in order to promote national welfare and to
protect
the common interests of the people, vie shall
have
to make such a political party a permanent base
upon
which the government can firmly stand.
The independence day proposal drew immediate response
as

soon as Rhee's intention was clarified through the Office
of
Public Information.

On September 3. representatives of various

social organizations organized a preparatory committee for the
establishment of a new political party.

These steps by social

Rhee's independence speech is translated in Hahn-Been Lee.
0£. cit.. p. 72. For a different translation, see Henderson.
22* cit., p. 293. Yi Jae-hak. later Vice Speaker of the National
Assembly, arxi then of Konghwa Kinchonghoe C the Republican Democratic
Society), the largest negotiating group and the supporter of Rhee.
stated in his memoirs that he and another member called on Rhee
in early May of 1951 to win support for their intention to form a
new party. Yi reports that Rhee at first told them that the
formation of a political party at that juncture would be inappropriate
for the exigencies which required the "unity of the people."
However, the two visitors finally convinced President that such a
move would help stabilize the political scene and to "normalize"
Assembly po3itics. Rhee gave them blessing and assurance of
assistance. See Yi Jae-hak in 3 as ilui Jo npurul Kisulhanda (All
Truths are Told: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders)
(Seoul: Himang Ch'ulpansa, 1966). p. 183.
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organizations were matched by a
similar initiative in the National
Assembly on September 6. Finally
on November 13. these two
separate
groups, each with 95 delegates,
met to discuss the establishment
of
a new party, and on November
30. the delegates of both groups
had
adopted a temporary organizational
framework.

While these steps were being taken.
Rhee introduced a bill for
a constitutional amendment in favor
of a bicameral legislature and
the direct election of President.

It is not certain why the government

proposal for the constitutional amendment was
announced while the
efforts were being made to create political
parties.

Of the two

groups that were simultaneously undertaking
the organization of a

new political party, Rhee hinted on several
occasions that he
inclined toward the extraparliamentary group.

On November 15. Rhee

stated that a democratic nation should be ruled by
the majority of
its people and that as farmers and workers were
in the majority in

Korea, "the party membership should be constituted
of these strata,"

whereas "the wealthy and the powerful should be prevented
from becoming

wealthier and more powerful.

This statement must be considered

as an appeal for gaining support among the extraparliamentary group.

Considering Rhee's distaste for the Assembly, the timing of the
proposal for the constitutional amendment might be viewed as a move
to

dii5 credit

the Assembly and its constitutional viewpoint.

The seeds of discord between the two groups that were vying for

Rhee*s favor, however, were laid during the preparatory stage.

^The Korea Times . November 15. 1951, p. 1

The
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^oup outside

the Assenbl, insisted
on the direct election of
President

and the adoption of
a bicameral legislative system,
whereas the
Assembly ^ouo was singularly
opposed to such proposals.
^^^^

'

group went about its own
way to fou^d a party with a new
name: the
Assembly ^our announced the
founding of the Liberal Party(LF) on
December 13; the extranarliamentary
^rouD followed with the sai^ie
four days later. The
extraparliamentary group elevated ..hee as

•

Chairman of the new Liberal
Party and the vice chairmanship went
to
Yi B5m-s2Jk, r.hee's first
Prime Linister. and the head of
Jokch'^ng.
the neofascist youth cores.

The parliar-.entary Liberal Party left

the chairmanshit. of the
oarty's Central Committee vacant, sho^old

Rhee want it; and elected two
leading Assemblymen. Yi Kap-son^ and
Kim Ton^-sonr as Vice Chairman.
Some 93 members of the National

Assembly left their neprotiatin^^
groups to join the Liberal Party.
Other ^oups in the Assembly lined
up as follows: the DKT

,

39; the

People's Friends Club. 25; the independents.
18.

Although it was understood from the beginning
that the two
seoarate Liberal Party organizations
would come together, the issue

of the constitutional amendment still
pending in the

I^jational

Assembly

precluded such rossibility as the two groups were
sitting on the

opposite side^ of the fence on this issue.

On January 1^, 1952, in

his statement -o political parties, Rhee expressed
his satisfaction

62y
^
wan „1 =i=^su, Kankuk Chon.^dan^-sa
CA history of Korean Political
Parties), pr. Ii9-190.
,
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for establishing a party which was
based on Ilminism ^^ and. which

would pave the way for the realization
of democracy, "sovereignty

of the people." and prevent the "tyranny
of minority over the
majority."

6^

When the extraparliamentary party held
its first

National Party Convention^ March 30. 1952 and
reaffirmed the elevation
of Rhee to its chairmanship, Rhee

stated that his "life-long

dreazn has been realized."

Meanwhile the amendment bill on the floor of the
Assembly
provided a good test for the diagnosis of Rhee's strength
in the

parliamentary Liberal Party.

The motives behind the proposed

amendment were clear to all.

First. Rhee's reelection, which was

forthcoming in several months, would be guaranteed by such a move,
as the popular vote could be canvassed easily by the ubiquitous

police, the armed forces and the well known terrorist youth group,

Jokch'ong.

The second amendment was designed to dilute the strength

of the National Assembly under a bicameral system as it would be
possible to manipulate one house against another.

In its explanation

of the amendment, the government argued that the adoption of the
unicameral legislature as provided for in the 1948 Ckjnstitution

•^

Ilminism . translated as "One People Principle" represents
the core of Rhee's political thinking. Similar in some respects to
Sanminchui of Sun Yat-sen, this was rather a vague set of political
thinking. For detailed treatment of this, see Koh Kwang-il, In
Quest of Nat ional Unity and Power Poli-cical Ideas and hractice of
Syngman RheeT Unpublished Ph. D. dissertat.ion, Rutgers University,
1963).
;
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^

Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, Hankuk Chonran
Yinyon.ii (Two Years of the Korean Conflict) (Seoul: Ministry of
Defense, 195^), Section C, pp. 143-144.
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was dictated by the need to
expedite the parliamentary
procedures
in the face of tremendous pressing
tasks in the initial phase
of
the country. The advantages of
a bicameral system, it argued,
lies in its inherent ability to
avoid rash mistakes, and to
minimize
abuse of power by a majority party.
As for the direct election of
President, it is more in keeping
with the democratic principle of

popular sovereignty and the principle
of separation of powers.

The

forces opposed to the amendment led by
the DNP. on the other hand,

insisted that a bicameral legislature would
only succeed in dividing
the popular will, weaken the National Assembly
and delay the performance

Donation's business.

The direct election of President is not

suitable for the people with insufficient political
experience and

knowledge and only helps to aggravate partisan feelings
among the
people.

Rhee's fears were realized when most of the parliamentary

Liberal Party members voted with the opposition in defeating
the
proposed amendment in an overwhelmingly one-sided tally, 1^3 to
19

on January 18, 1952.

Rhee had no intention of having the Assembly

play the trump card.

He retaliated on February 16, when he declared:

- The presidential elections should be conducted by
the voting of the people... I believe our assemblymen
will come to understand where the will of the people

%an
Parties),

T'ae-su, Hankuk Chon,?dangsa (A History of Korean Political
pp. 121-122.
.

,

^^Quoted in Han T'ae-su, "A Review of Political Party Activities
in Korea: 1(1945-195^)" Korean Affairs . Vol. I. No. 4(1962), p. 426.
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lies and immediately and voluntarily
reverse their
previous decision and present a new bill
for the
°^ ^^"^ Constitution. Or if otherwise the
vnTiSc^voters in each electorate
decide by votes to call
back their representatives and notify the
National
Assembly of their decision, the legislative
body will
have to act in accordance with the
decision.

These were strong words.

In pointing out the possibility of

"recall" of defiant Assemblymen, he was clearly
overstepping the

bounds of the constitutional framework.

He seemed to be encouraging

extra-legal methods to change the minds of opposing
legislators.

On the morning of February 18, some 200 members of
the Jokch'ong,
first of the "political action groups
in a planned demonstration.

surrounded the Assembly hall

For forty minutes, they were heard to

shout: "Let us have a new election for the opponents
of the amendment

bill" and "Throw out those National Assemblymen who disregard
the

will and the fundamental rights of people. "^"^

The Assemblymen

immediately resolved to call Rhee to the session for an explanation,
but, two hours later, Rhee informed the A-^sembly that he was ill and

unable to attend.
That these demonstrations were undertaken under Rhee's blessing
was made evident in his written responses on February 26 to a list

of twelve questions the Assembly submitted to the President.

The

recall of the Assemblymen demanded by the demonstrators, Rhee
explalined^was "a genuine expression of the public will" to rectify

the opposition to the amendment bill which runs counter to the

^^The Dong-A Ilbo . February 18, 1952, p. 1.
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-spirit of Constitution.

He continued to state that no
one

could stop the recall of Assemblymen,
if the public

and that he v«>uld like to see the
amendment passed.

.

so demanded,

On February 29,

the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court in his testimony before the

National Assembly stated that while he
would like to avoid comment

on the overall issue due to its "complex
political implications,"
he believed that recall of legislators, to
be effected, must be

"clearly prescribed in the Constitution" and that
the detailed procedures should be defined by law.^^
The extraparl lament ary party in the mounting
crisis resolved
to support the government amendment proposal which
was reintroduced
in the Assembly on Hay 14, but it disclaimed any
connection with the

"recall" movement.

The parliamentary Liberal Party, however, was

now divided into two factions: the unity faction composed of
^3
members advocated accomodation with the extraparliamentary party;
the remaining 48 members opposed such move and joined the other

opposition forces to the amendment on April 1?.
The political crisis deteriorated when the Assembly had before
it for deliberation three bills on constitutional amendment.

The

government bill was essentially the same one that was defeated in

January earlier that year:

the Assembly bill introduced by 122

opposition legislators and others was for instituting a cabinet

"

wT
^
go
Quoted in Yun Ch'on-ju, "Kwonwijuijok Kwollyok Chochongkwa
Chongdang HyongsSng, "(The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the
Party Formation in Korea), Asea Mun.ie ( Journal of Asiatic Studies)
Vol. IV, No. 2, December, 196I, p. 72.

^9ibid.
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system; and the third bill was a
"compromise" plan introduced by

Prime Minister Chang T'aek-sang on May

The last bill, which was

claimed by 5ts author as/'eclectic" plan
called for an unlikely
combination of a bicameral legislature, direct
election of the

President and Vice President, and the provision
giving legislators

of the lower house the right to cast a vote of
non-confidence against
cabinet minis ters.^^

While the bills were being reported, the rallies and
demonstrations
in support of the government proposal continued outside
the Assembly
hall.

Rhee, on May 24. appointed Yi Bom-s2k. the head of
Jokch'ong

and Vice Chairman of the extraparliamentary Liberal Party.
Home
Minister, and on the following day proclaimed martial law under
the

pretext of anti-guerilla operations, which, the government
claimed,
was a "military exigency."*^71 That in proclaiming the martial
law

Rhee had designs on the defiant National Assembly soon became evident.

A series of arrests of Assemblymen was made under the various accusations of "murder" and "international conspiracy."

A warrant was

issued for former Prime Minister Chang Myon(John M. Chang) for having

conspired with Communists.

In the atmosphere of terror ruling the

day, many Assemblymen went into hiding.

Despite the UNCURK(The United

Nations Commission on Unification and Reconstruction of Korea) statement

70

For details of three amendment pioposals. see Han T'ae-su,
Hankuk Chongdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties),
pp. 129-131 and pp. 13^135'

For details of this period, see Haebang Yisipyinyon.ii (Twentytwo Years Since Liberation), pp. 325-328.
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on May 28 urging the lifting of martial
law and the release of
arrested Assemblymen. Rhee stated that the
on-going struggle was
"between the Assembly and the People" and
that he was not implicated
in it.

President Truman's and the United Nations
Secretary General

Lee's concern about the situation conveyed to
Rhee fell on deaf
ears.

Vice President Kim Song-su tendered his resignation
on May

29 in protest against Rhee's "assault on the Constitution,"
but
the defiant Assembly refused to accept it.

The power configuration

in the Assembly was as follows: the LP's unity
faction had 52

members; those elements of the LP which sided with the
opposition

DNP and the Peoples Friends Club bolted the LP to form the
Shinraho e
had 1^
(Shinra Club)^; the DNP had 39.

On June
proposal."

8,

Rhee indicated that he would accept a "compromise

If the Assembly would accept the two provisions of the

government proposal for the constitutional ainendment( direct election

of the President and a bicameral legislature), the Assembly "may
vote for whom it chooses as the next President" and Rhee would step

down "regardless of who may be chosen as my successor."

The next

day, Prime Minister Chang tried unsuccessfully to negotiate the

"compromise."

Rhee's position hardened on June 15.

that "if the Assembly does not pass the

t7rc>

Rhee announced

constitutional amendments

we have demanded, I may have to be obedient to the people and
declare the dissolution of the National Assembly."

question will be easily settled.

"And the

There will be a general election

6^

for a new Assembly."''^
Demonstrators, with or without Rhee's
urging, were now demanding
the dissolution of the National
Assembly. coupled with Rhee's threat
to "comply with the public will"
if a solution could not be found.

"Spontaneous" demonstrations continued.

A group of pro-Rhee

representatives from local assemblies, agitating
near the Assembly
hall, called for a hunger strike on June
23. and vowed to continue
tV«.

it untii^ President dissolved the Assembly.

It was reported on the

radio, heavily censored by the government, that
President Rhee tried
to calm them down but had "admitted" that "something
practical had
to be done." 73

On July 30, President Rhee informed the closing

Assembly session that action could not be postponed any longer.
After rounding up Assemblymen to achieve a quorum, the government
proposal for the amendment was passed on July 5 by a vote of 163 to
0 with three abstentions after a forty-eight hour session during

which no A'cssemblymen could leave the building.
The "compromise" bill, as a measure to pacify the Assemblymen,

also included provisions for the legislative confirmation of cabinet

appointments upon nomination by the Prime Minister and the power of

dissolution of the cabinet by a vote of non-confidence.
fought defiantly but against overwhelming odds.
seemed now virtually assured.

p. 595.

Rhee's election

There was no person in the Korean

"^The Voice of Korea . June 30, 1952, p. 591.

^Ibid..

The Assembly
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political arena who could match
Rhee's charisma and his massive
organization.

The election date was set for
August 5. and by a

government decree, the campaign
period was restricted to just nine
days before the election.
The extraparliamentary Liberal Party
nominated Rhee in its

convention on July 19 despite the latter's
"refusal" to run in
the presidential election.

Yi B^m-s^k. the party's Vice Chairman.

who nelped Rhee to weather the storm of
the so-called "Pusan
Political Crisis" in May and June, was nominated
as the vice

presidential candidate.

Rhee's designs on the Jokch'gng members

of the party soon became apparent.

By refusing to give support to

his party's vice-presidential nominee, he hoped
to hurt the chances

of Yi, who, two days before the balloting day, complained
of police
interference in his campaign.

Rhee's campaign statements and actions

indicated that he favored Ham T'ae-yong, another octogenerian as
his Vice President.

In the midst of war, Rhee and his favorite

running mate swept the elections.
The popularly elected President now urged his party to draft

the members of the Shinrahoe , formerly of the parliamentary Liberal

Party who opposed the constitutional amendment, into his party.
The question of drafting Chang T'aek-sang, the former Prime Minister,

fed additional powderkeg to the already uneasy relationship between
the Jokch'ong and Kukminhoe factions of the Liberal Party.

The

former faction saw Chang's entry into the party as a potential
threat to its hegemony in the party because Chang could certainly
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match Yi B^m-sSk's stature.

The latter faction wanted him for
the

obverse reasons.
Yi Ho rf the Kukitiinhoe convened a meeting
of the Korean Social

Organizations to criticize the Jokch'ong's
position on Chang's

entry into the party.

The meeting resolved to dismiss the
Jokch'ong

Chairman of the LP's Disciplinary Committee who
had announced
earlier that Chang's entry into the party would
be unwise.

While

Rhee watched the power struggle from the altar, the factional
disputes were brought out into the open.

The assault on the

Kukminhoe and other social organizations ancillary to the
Liberal

Party was finally undertaken by the Jokch'ong faction of the
party.

On May 10. 1953. during the party's second annual convention, the
latter maneuvered to dominate the central and provincial party

hierarchy by purging all anti-Jokch'ong members.

This maneuver

by the youth group members coincided with the statement made by
the anti-Jokch'ong members that the Jokch'ong was engaged in "anti-

party activities by reorganizing the party under its hegemony. "^^
Furthermore, the Jokch'ong faction was successful in maneuvering the

party convention to adopt a resolution that Chang T'aek-sang's
entry into the party would be harmful to the party.

Chang announced

on May 18 that he was going to sever his relations with the Liberal
Party.

Alarmed at Jokch'ong advances. Rhee proceeded to instruct the
reorganization of the party.
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The most important of these instructions

The Dong-A Ilbo. May 18, 1953. p.

1.
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was his order to disband the
Central Executive Committee and
the
Central Inspection Committee, which
was dominated by the Jokch'Sng
faction, and replace them by a
single Central Executive Committee.

Another innovation was the elimination
of the post of Vice Chairman
(held by Yi Bom-sok at the time). Finally,
the party's Central

Executive Committee was to be composed of
three members each from
the five ancillary organizations of the
party(the Kukminhoe . the

Korean Youth Corps, the Korean Women's Association,
the Korean
Farmers' Association and the Korean Labor Association).

These

instructions could not be enforced immediately,
however.

Under the

pretext of implementing Rhee's instructions, the
Jokch'ong faction
called another national convention of the party on August
20.

The

extent to which Rhee's instructions were circumvented was
evident

when the convention resolved to take away the party's SecretaryGeneral's post from Yi Ho of Kukminhoe .

Jokch'ong faction continued.

The maneuvering by the

When the Central Executive Committee

members were announced, most of them turned out to be Jokch'ong
sympathizers from the ancillary organizations.

Rhee retaliated with his statement on September 12 which
instructed all youth organizations to disband immediately.
evident to all that Rhee's target was the Jokch'ong: "^^
The Jokch'ong faction has been bent on expanding
its power ever since our Liberal Pa..'ty was established.

7*5

^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo . September 12, 1953,

p. 1.
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This runs counter to my idea
of administering the
party. Its factional activities
are not only
harmful to the party's unity but
it also threatens
the spirit of people's unity.
Although it may
take some time to purge these elements,
they must
be eliminated.
From now on the party must be
administered according to my stated intentions.

Rhee proceeded to act.

He dismissed two of his cabinet
members

who were known to have warm relations with
the faction in question.

Within the party a Committee for the Elimination
of the Jokch'^ng
Faction was organized^ the provincial party
chairman met to declare
null and void the decisions of the August 20
party convention; and
all party leaders finally submitted their
resignations.

The

emasculation of Yi Bom-sok, Rhee's friend and supporter
during the

American military occupation, his first Prime Minister, and
an
invaluable right-hand man during the political crisis in Pusan,
was

now complete.
On October 1?, the party elected a fifteen member Central
Committee according to the instructions given by Rhee in previous

May to organize it on the basis of three representatives each from
the five ancillary social organizations of the party. '''^ Not entirely
decided
satisfied with the selection, Rhee
on November 2 to appoint a

nine member committee which was given the task of reorganizing the
party.

The committee was headed by Yi Ki-bung, one-time Rhee's

Chief -Secretary and Defense Secretary,

running mate.

who later became his

By November 30, 1953 1 the reorganization of the party

Quoted in Han T*ae-su, Hankuk Chongdangsa(A History of
Korean Political Parties), p. 197.
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according to Rhee's wishes was realized.

Significant in the

reorganization was the three-member Executive
Committee ^which was
given the power to control the party through
Yi Ki-bung^who was

appointed to that Committee( other members were Yi
Kap-song and
Bae Un-hi).

This replacement of the previously existing
Central

Committee with the three-member Executive Committee had the
effect

of streamlining the party hierarchy, and making Rhee's
control of
the party possible by placing his right-hand man second
in command.

While the Liberal Party was going through the pains of reorganization, the Democratic National Party was similarly engaged
in

readjusting its party organization.

On November 28, I953, the party

abandoned the collective leadership structure in favor of a single
leader under Shin Ik-hi, the Speaker of the Kati^onal Assembly.

The

multiple Vice Chai rmanshlTsSwent to Choi Tu-son, Kim To-yon,

Kim Song-su, Paik Nam-un, Cho Byong-ok and So Sang-il,

Having no

grassroot support, the party organization was restricted entirely
to the Assembly notables.

By the end of 1953, its membership in

the Assembly was reduced to 20.

As the two parties prepared for the third general election,

another constitutional amendment issue loomed large on the political
scene.

The Liberal Party decided to adopt a nomination procedure

for legislators for the first timejand the winning of the nomination
was made contingent upon the support of the constitutional amendment,
the most important provision of which was to remove the constitutional
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barrier forbidding .ore than two
consecutive terns for the
incumbent
President.77
^^^^^^^
nomination was rather complex.

In each of the 203 electoral districts.
. nominating convention was
held.

The candidates selected by the
convention were screened by

the provincial and central party
headquajers.

Rhee. as Chairman of

the party, finally "approved" the
Assembly nominee.

In the general election held on Kay
10, 195^. the LP won an
overwhelming victory.

The party nominee won 99 seats in the
National

Assembly and there were several others who ran
under the LF banner,
but who failed to receive the party nomination.

by far the largest number of seats with Ilk.

Together, it had

The DNP. which failed

to bring together all opposition forces returned

only

fifteen.

The number of independents elected to the Assembly was
drastically

reduced in this election to
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By the unusually high number

of statements (thirteen) he made with regards to this election, Rhee
seemed deeply interested in this election.
voters to send as their representatives
the constitutional amendment.

«

He appealed to the
persons who would favor

The Liberal Party victory which gave

77

Other provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment
included, among others, a provision sanctioning national referandum
"concerning important matters pertaining to a national crisis which
might limit the sovereignty of Korea or cause a change in her
territory"^ a provision to elect half of the members of the House
of Councillors every three years and give that body the confirmation
power over the appointment of the Chief Justice and other government
officials; a provision to authorize non-confidence votes by the
House of Representatives against individual ministers; a provision
to abolish the office of Prime Minister and have the President
preside over the State Council. See nan T*ae-su, Hankuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Korean Political Parties),
pp. 139-1^«
^ ^okdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go Sanghwang (The Status of the past
National Assembly Elections), pp. 251-252.

.
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it Ilk seats was not sufficient
to pass the amendment bill.

The

party was successful, however,
in attracting many
independent
legislators, increasing their assembly
strength to I30 by the end
of June.
Public exchanges of arguments
between Rhee and the leaders of
the DNP were indicative of what was
to come. On October 22. four
days after the amendment bill was
introduced to the National Assembly,

Rhee stated that any person opposed to
the amendment bill was
tantamount to committing a "treasonous act
against the national
policy." 79 Vice Chairman Cho Byong-ok of the
DNP retorted by saying
that:

Within the context of democracy in which we are
a part, we are safeguarded in the freedom of
speech.
The basic tenets of democracy afford any one
of us the
right to speak against the proposed amendment,
if we
so desire. A person cannot be labelled patriotic
if
he favors the amendment and treasonous if he
opposses
xt
The amendment bill was put to a vote on November
27.

Having

received 135 votes in favor. Vice Speaker Choe Sun-ju, presiding
over the session, declared that the bill failed as the required
number was two-thirds of the Assembly membership^ or I36 votes.

Rhee did not accept the defeat.

On the following day, Yi Jae-hak,

the majority leader of the Assembly, objected to the

by the presiding officer on the previous day:

79

arithmetic used

He argued:

The Yonhap Shinmun . October 22, 195^, p. 1.

80

Cho Byong-ok, Mi.ju.juiwa Na( Democracy and I: Memoirs) (Seoul:
Yongshin Munhwasa, 1959), pp. 119-120.
81

The Dong-A Ilbo . November 28, 195^, p. 1.
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constitutional amendment as stipulated
in
A,.+^ T
Article
98. Paragraph ^ can be effected by
a twothirds vote of the Assembly.
This means that the
accurate number comes out to
135-333
Since
persons cannot be divided into
digits, the number
should be rounded to 135 which is
the nearest whole
number. The two- thirds required by
the Constitution
means therefore, not that it should
be more than
135, but 135 or more.

When Vice Speaker Choe returned to the Assembly
floor to "apologize"
for the arithmetic mistake

he made two days earlier, the floor

became a fist-wielding pandemonium.

With 60 members who voted

against the amendment boycotting the session,
Choe declared the
amendment bill passed.

Another one of Rhee's recurrent constitutional

maneuvers had succeeded.
The steam-roller tactic by the ruling party alienated
many

legislators including those members of the Liberal Party who^voted

for it.

On December 6, the first member to bolt the Liberal Party

criticized the irregular procedure employed and "the Liberal Party's

failure in respecting genuine party politics" as well as "its blind

submission to the administration's demands."

Three days later

twelve more legislators left the party en masse.

Due to this exodus,

the LP's Assembly membership was reduced to 123.

The controversial

passage of the amendment bill had the effect of completely bifurcating
the Assemblymen.

This bifurcation was an entirely new political

phenomenon up to that time.

In struggling against the ruling party's

steam-roller tactics on the floor, solideirity was achieved among the

82

Ibid .. December 6. 195^, p. 1.
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opposition forces.

On December 30. these opposition
groups came

together to form a new negotiating group
within the Assembly under
the banner o^ Commrades

•

Association for Safeguarding the
Constitution

(CASC) with a membership of 60.

For the first time in its five year

history, the Assembly was now made up
predominantly of two negotiating
groups.

The formation of CASC was described in political
circles

as a healthy harbinger

of:

a "two party system."

While introducing

censure motions against the Speaker and the Vice Speaker
of the

Assembly for the "illegal" proceedings, the CASC expedited the plan
to organize a "pan- national" political party.

There were initial roadblocks.

The principal disagreement

among the l8-men founding committee was the extent to which the
newly created party should accept progressive politicians as its
members.

The question of admitting Cho Bong-am as a member delayed

the founding of the party.

Cho, a former Communist and, then, the

leader of the Progressive Party, was considered by some of the

members of the committee as dangerous.

But, finally on September

19, 1955. a new party under the name of the Democratic Party(DP)

was born.

Despite the stated intention to draft all prominent

politicians, such well-known political figures as Cho Bong-am,

Yi Bom-sSk and Chang T'aek-sang were conspicuously missing from
the party list.

three groups.

The newly created party was basically a union of

The DNP was, of course, the core of the new party

movement; the Liberal Party defectors such as Min Kwan-sik, Hyon

Sok-ho and Yi T'ae-yong, formed another grouping; Chang Kyon and
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Chung Il.hyo^g, the former
.embers of the H^ingsadan. an
independence
club organized by men of north
Korea with Christian background
led
their followers into the new
party. ^3 v^^en the new slate
of officers
was announced, most of them were
former leaders of the DNP.
The

five-member Executive Committee
elected by the Central Committee w.s
composed of Shin Ik-hi. Cho Byong-ok.
Paik Nam-un. Kwak Sang-hun

and Char.g MySn.

Kwak was the organizer of the
CASC; Chang, a former

Hungsadan member who was instrumental
in bringing in the Liberal

Party defectors into the new party, was
a valuable addition in
enhancing the prestige of the new party.
'

As will be discussed

1-^

ter,

however, the new structure had in itself
the seeds of

discord.

When the two parties collided in the 1956
presidential
election, the opposition forces appeared to provide
a

stiff

competition to Rhee and the Liberal Party for the first
time in
the short history of the Republic.

Rhee, citing reasons of health

and his belief in "the democratic constitutional dictum
of limiting
Presidential terms as practised abroad."^ announced that he
would

not run in this election.
erupt

"Popular will," however, managed to
the
again and Rhee once again accepted /candidacy
He
chose

Yi Ki-bung as his running mate.

.

The Democratic Party nominated

Shin Ik-hi and Chang Myon as their presidential and vice presidential

^Mun Chang- ju, Hankuk Chongch iron ( Korean Politics),
309-310.
pp.
84
The Hankuk Ilbo, March 6, 1956, p. 1.
'
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candidates respectively.

Rhee's dictatorship,

m

Their campaign strategy was to
attack
the largest campaign rally in
the history

of JCorean elections. Shin told the
crowd that ;jLernment of Korea

is^one^

dictatorial rule." because Rhee

and the laws "as his own."^^

^^^^

regLed

the Constitution

Democratic Party was

sealed when its presidential candidate
died of cerebral hemorrage

on a train on May 5.
The results of the election showed that
Rhee's popularity had

waned considerably.

Despite Shin's death. Rhee was able to garner

slightly more than five million votes out of
nine-and-a-half million
voters.

Cho Bong-am of the Progressive Party, a minor party
candidate

won more than two million votes
void.

;

another two million votes were ruled

There was no question for whom this unusually high number of

invalidated votes were intended.

Another surprising result was the

election of Chang Myon as Vice President.

It was expected that

Yi Ki-bung would be an easy winner with Rhee's support and the benefit

of administrative power.
The two years following the 1956 Presidential Election were a

relatively calm period when the ruling and opposition parties seemed
to be finding the ways of accommodation.

That the two parties were

able to negotiate an election law revision prior to the I938 general

election in the prevailing mood of compromise is a case in point.
The law thus obtained contributed to a rather quiet and fair election

®^The Dong-A Ilbo . May 2, 1956, p. 1.
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in 1958.86

Political crisis enabled
the r.a;or

parties to look inward.

As for the Liberal Party,
factional

tendencies .ere Kent at mini.™
by Hhee-. presence at the
heL..
But the seeds of discord were
oresent ever since the
1954 general
election. By the ti™e of the
1954 election and the reorganization
thereafter, most of the Liberal
Party's leadership positions
went
to former bureaucrats- such
persons as Yi Ki-bung. Chang
KySng-kSn.
Yi Jae-hak and Kan Ki-sSk.
Op,^sing these bureaucratic
Politicians
were the lar.e contin.-ents of
ibsenbly^en who were leaders
of the
LP's ancillary or^-anizations such
as the Kukr.inhoe . the Youth
Corps,
the farmers' and lat»rers'
organizations. This .roup was led
by such
nersons as Cho KyJn,-ku. Yu Ji-won
and
Ki-ch'Sl. ^s early as
1956, this anti-naincurrent faction demanded
a restructuring of the
party, kfhen their demand for a
collective leadership structure

went anheeded, some of the members of
this faction bolted the party.
The DP was also engaged in a similar fracas
over its leadership.
The "old" faction, led by Cho BySne-ok and
his former

collided with Chang

l-iySn's

"new" faction {so

nair.ed

DtiF oollestues

because of their

recent exodus into the party) over the issue of
alleged fraudulent
voting maneuvers in the Aurust 1956 Democratic
Party Convention
held at Kwan-ju.

This was indicative

o.f

what was to come later

in the presidential nominating convention in November,
1959.
86

,

^

Kim Chon.e-hun, Hankuk Chonrdan?sa (A History of Korean
Political Parties), pd. 68-97.
'87

For details, see The Voice of Korea. August 29. 1958.
p. 929.

77

The nation went to the polls
on May 2. I958 to elect members

of the Fourth National Assembly.

The election took place in a

relative calm and reconciliatory
atmosphere between the two parties.
The Liberal Party won 126 seats,
five fewer than what it held
prior
to the election. The DP. on the other
hand, added 33 to its strength,
thus having altogether 79 members in the
new Assembly.

dents elected 2?.^^

The indepen-

The voting pattern of this election
reaffirmed

that of Che 1956 presidential election in
that the LP was strong in

rural districts whereas the DP's electoral
strength lay in the
cities.

The issue of Rhee's dictatorship continued
to win the

support of the urban dwellers for the opposition
party.

It now

seemed possible that in due time the opposition
party might be able
to wrest power away from the Liberal Party through
the ballot boxes.

The reconciliatory gestures of the government during the
I958

general election took another turn when the government submitted
a

National Security Law Revision bill in November of that year.

The

high-handed tactics the ruling party used to secure the passage of
the bill reaffirmed the general impression of the opposition

politicians and the public that the reconciliatory posture of the

government and ruling party was only temporary.

That this law was

intended only for the suppression of the government's political

opponents is subject to speculation.

88

These charges were of course

CEMC, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go San,?hwang ( The Status of the
past National Assembly Elections), pp. 32?-328.
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denied by the^Liberal Party
foliticianaS? and also by the
sponsors
of the bin.90 This bill,
introduo.1 on November
18. 1958,inoluded
far reaching provisions. 91

Fresh in the .e^ry of those
who opposed

the bill was the fate of the
Progressive Party and its leader
Cho Bong-am^less than a year
earlier when the party had its
license

taken away by the government and. Cho.
one-time presidential candidate,
received the death sentence under the
existing National Security Law.

After forming a Struggle Committee against
the Revision of the
National Security Law, the Democrats and
others labelled it "the

Liberal Party's strategy to prolong its
rule."^^
The Liberal Party railroaded the bill
out of the Legislation

and Judiciary Committee on December 19 without
the presence of its

six Democratic Party members.

Angry and stunned, the Democrats

89

See Yi Jae'hak's recollections in Sasilui jSnpurul
Kisulhand a
(Memoirs), pp. 15^-155.
90^
For comments by the drafter of the bill, 0 Je-do, see.
Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chongdangsa (A History of Korean
Political
Parties), pp. 99-100.
91

The provisions of the bill included, among other things:
capital punishment or life imprisonment for these who engage in
espionage or release state secrets; ten-year maximum sentence for
those who collect information on political, economic, cultural, or
military matters with the intention of benefiting the enemy; fiveyear maximum sentence for those who disturb the people and aid the
enemy by openly relating or diseminating false information or
distorted facts with the knowledge that they are false or purposely
distorted; ten-year maximum sentence for the defamation of President,
Speaker of the National Assembly and thf Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. For details and comments, see Chong T'ae-sop, "Kukka Poanpop"
(National Security Law). Sasangge January, 1959, pp. 81-91.
.

^^See

ibid., p. 82.
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countered with a sitdown strike
to prevent the passage
of the bill
on the main floor. Vice President
Chang, an odd partner and
completely ignored under Rhee's
shadow, visited the strikers
on
December 21 for a round of encouragement.
On the following day.
the State Council condemned Chang's
action as intensifying "political
strife" and paralyzing "the functions
of the administration." The

Vice President's action, the State
Council continued, "had greatly
undermined the authority of the Assembly,
which stands out as a
symbol of democracy.

"^-^

The Democrats' siege of the Assembly floor
continued until the

evening of December 24.

On that Christmas eve some three hundred

"security guards" entered the floor to bodily clear the
hall.^

On the following day, in the absence of opposition
legislators, the
Liberal Party Assemblymen passed the revision bill in
thirteen
minutes.

Throughout the day, the Liberals proceeded to pass twenty-

two bills to break a legislative record.

Among the bills so rushed

through were such important ones as the Local Autonomy Law bill,

House of Councillors Election bill, and the budget for 1959.

93

On

Quoted in The Hankuk Ilbo . December 22, 1958. p. 1.

94

Yi Jae'hak reports in his memoirs that the Liberal Party's
Executive Committee decided to use this tactic. "What was at
stake." Yi reminisced, was the "attitude of the opposition in the
National Assembly." "The Party'sfLP's^ decision was to change it."
See his memoirs in Sasilui Jonpurul Xisulhanda (All Truths Are
Told: Memoirs),
pp. 154-155.

95

This law made appointive by the central government all
officers to the lowest level of provincial administration.

the
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December 26. Vice President Chang
made a prophetic public re.ark:96
Ko matter what excuse he made
and no matter whn
begs excuse for it. the Liberals'
deeds

L^^ot

tfae

be

future,

public unease will grow day by
day and
the dxgnity of the Constitution^and
the pLoles^
reliance on the government will be

severely undermined.
^"5^
People.'^correSSS
°f once. In
«^t be made at
order to make c^rrection^!
tne House must convene soon so that
the ruling and
discuss again the passed bills
with the objective of correcting abnormal
and
undemocratic provisions.

As hostility between the two parties was
reaching

its

.

new

peak, the political atmosphere for the
forthcoming presidential

election was ominous.

President Rhee once again advocated a

constitutional amendment for adopting a
single-ticket system to

eliminate the "abnormality" of having"^President
and Vice President

from two different political parties. ^'^
alike faced difficult problems.

Both the LP and the DP

With Rhee's old age(&!+), the

qiiestion of succession loomed large within the
Liberal Party.

As

for the Denracrats, heartened by the advances they made
in the I958
General Election, were split badly on the selection of the
party's
presidential candidate.

The ranks of the Liberal Party were split between the

intransigents" and "moderates" as the party began preparations
for the election.

The former group insisted that the party should

9^
^Qiaoted in The Kankuk Ilbo . December 27, I958,

97In fact,
Rhee began his campaign much earlier.

p. 1.

August 13,
1959 1 lie explained to the effect that the presidential system
required a single-ticket system.
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take a

stance against the
Be^cratlc Party. t„th in
legislative
Uctics and electoral campaigns;
the moderates called
for .ore
accommodating gestures vis-a-vis
the opposition party.
IVhen

ri Ki-bung. Speaker of the
House and Chairman of the
party's
Executive Con^ittee. announced
the party line on the
occasion of
the Ninth National Convention
of the Liberal

Party, the intransigents

appeared to have gained an upper
hand.

Among other things, he

enphasized elimination of factional
feuds within the party: party
members' strict acceptance of party
policy and platform; resolute
implementation of party platform; and
termination of reconciliatory
and compromising gestures toward the
opposition party.'^ ahee

hlmselX did not hesitate to accept the
nomination of the party,

unlike in 1952 and 1956.

Ti Ki-bung, again became Rhee's rmming

mate by a unanimous vote of the convention.
The Denocrats, on the other hand, had an
agonizing selection

procedure for their presidential and
vice-presidential candidates.
"t^® question
AT«
X
i
Also entering into the picture was. whether the
second spot in the
.

Ucket ought

.

,

to be a candidate for a prime ministership's
or for the

vice-presidency in view of the fact that a constitutional
amendment
provided for a switch to a cabinet system and would abolish
the
vice-presidency.^^

98

Tth}

99

Long before the convention, the party virtually

Eankuk Ilbo, June 30, 1959, p.

1.

That this consideration emerged indicated the extent to
which the Deinocrats were hopeful of the victory in the forthcoming
election.
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split in two «ith almost
equal strength- the
"intransigents"
supporting Chang My5n and^^'Wderates"
Cho By^ng-ok.

were virtually equal in stature.

These two men

The intransigents argued
that

Chang, as Shin's successful
vice presidential candidate
in 1956. was
a logical and proven choice for
the presidency. Cho's
supporters,

more deeply rooted in the Democratic
Party than Chang's, as the
latter joined the party only after
the 1954 constitutional crisis,
insisted that Cho had a far more
impressive record as an anti-Japanese
and anti-Liberal, and that he was far

more popular among the electorate.

Eaving failed to settle the question of
no^mnation informally,
both factions agreed to be bound by the
decision of the November
convention.

Both factions exchanged accusations of
illegal activities

in manipulating the selection of
provincial party delegates to the

national convention.

On November 26, the party delegates elected

Cho as the presidential candidate by a slim margin
of three votes

(km

to 481). and on the following day. in reversal. Chang
won the

Chairmanship of the Supreme Committee by 70 votes.

This marked the

beginning of the Democratic tradition of separating its
presidential
candidate and the party head.

The strength of both factions was

reflected in the election of the six-member Supreme Committee.
Chang Kyon, Kwak Sang-hun. Pak Sun-ch'on of the "new" faction
intransigents and Cho Byong-ok. Paik Nam-hun and Yun Po-son of the
"old" faction moderates were elected to this committee. "'"^^

As a

For events surrounding the DP national convention, see
Autobiography of Kim To-yon, an "old" faction leader of the
Democratic Party, in Naui Insaeng; Faekso (Autobiography) (Seoul:
Sangsan Hoegorok Ch'ulpan Tongjijoe. 196?). pp. 325-331.
.
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prelude to the fateful election
in March. I96O. the
administration
introduced another constitutional
amendment bill for a single-ticket

system on which Rhee had pontificated
on several occasions.
the bill had
been defeated, the

After

Liberal Party took a retaliatory

measure by having the government

announce that the election was

going to be held in March, instead
of May as it originally had
been
scheduled. This was a tremendous blow
to the Democrats, as their

presidential candidate was in the United
States for a surgical
operation.

While the Democrats struggled to postpone
the election,

it was reported that candidate Cho had
died at a hospital in the

United States.

It was a fateful repeat of I956.

The attention was

now focussed on the choice of Vice-President:
the likelihood of
succession to the

year old President was in the consideration
of

both parties.

As it was revealed later, the Liberal Party
planned

to rig

the election to ensure the election of its
vice-presidential

candidate, Yi Ki-bung, who was defeated by his
Democratic rival by

200,000 votes four years earlier.

When the results of the election

vere announced, Rhee won by more than 6,^00,000 votes.

It was

then charged and later admitted by the Liberal Party leaders"^^^
that the party instructed the Interior Ministry to carry out
its

101

The Dong-A Ilbo, March 17, I96O. p. 1.

102
See Hankuk Kyokmyong Chaeo'ansa fA History of Revolutionary
Trials in Korea). (Seoul: Tong'a Sojokhoesa, 1963). This is a
complilation of court records in the early phase of the military
junta .

order to stuff the ballot boxes,
terrorize the Democratic Party
members, use oolice power to
ensure "correct" voting and
other
methods.^^^

A train of

events erupted one after another
which eventually

led to the demise of Rhee's twelve
year rule; demonstrations against
election rigging on Karch I5 which
resulted in the death of several
students; a series of student
demonstrations in all major cities
of
Korea in March and April, demanding
another election as the Democrats
had earlier demanded; /student march
on the presidential palace on

April 19 which resulted in the firing by
the police that led tc the
the
death of more than 100 students and/wounding
of many others; the
,

proclanation of martial law on the same day^^^^
^^^ommander remained
the
neutraj.j
the resignation of/Rhee cabinet on April
21; an important statement by the United States Secretary
of State

Christian Herter that the present disorder was a result
of oppressive
policies in the election and a disregard for the principles of
an
democracy; /announcement by Rhee on April 2^ that he had severed
an
his relationship with the Liberal Party; /announcement on the
26th
that Ti Ki-bung was dismissed from all public positionshe had held
and, that if it was the people's wish, Rhee himself would offer his

own resignation; the unanimous resolution by the National Assembly,

103

Those were the charges made by the Democratic Party and
reported two weeks before the election in The Dong-A Ilbo, Karch 3.
I960, p. 1. See also Sin Sang-ch'o, "Kongmyong Son'goyo
Annyonghi"
(Fairwell to Fare Election), Sasangge April, I96O, pp. 221-22?^
.
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the Liberals included, which
requested Rhee to resign.^^

if there

vas one genuine expression
of^"public will" of which Rhee
justified
many of his political decisions,
the

precisely that.^^^

Wvitable.

AprU

19 "Revolution" was

Finally on April 2?. Rhee succumbed
to the

In an one-sentence announcement
issued through the

Office of Public Information, he said.

"I.

Syngman Rhee. honoring

the resolution of the National Assembly, resign
as President

ar^d

wish to devote the rest of my life to the
nation and the people
as a private citizen.

""^^^

During the short twelve years of Rhee's
political domnance,
the rough roads treaded by political parties
were best indicated by
the scores of political parties that emerged
and disappeared in the

nation-building era.

In terms of the development of political

parties, the early years of the republic up to the
time of the
Kc^ean: War were marked by factionalism of top political
leaders.

For a detailed treatment of the events that led to
the
downfall of Rhee regime, see Eugene Kim and Ke-soo
Kim, "April
I960 Korean Student Movement," Western Political Quarterly.
^
^* Vol. VII
(March, 196^). pp. 83-92.

^^^The college students' statements on this day, issued by
"the Students' Association of Seoul National University. read in
part: Our wisdom and intelligence knows that this hopeless situation
in this nation is the result of the despotic rule disguised in
democracy and liberty. History of democracy is the history of
struggle for freedom. We know that all forms of despotic rule is
nothing but a 'paper tiger'. Our basic right to vote has been
deprived of by the officials who are supposed to uphold democracy
and serve the people as public servants. The freedom of speech,
assembly, association and belief are in danger of extinction by the
ignorant forces of despotic rules." Quoted in Lee Joung-sik, "Some
Characteristics of Korean Political Culture,"
p. 73.
,

*^°^Ihe Dong-A Ilbo, Special Edition, April 2?, I96O, p. 1.
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It was soon made evident
to Rhee and his supporters,
however, that
modern politics needed organizationa political party.

Of the

Regardless

„Uve

for the creation of the
Liberal Party, a new
party
vaa org«,ized to answer the
needs of the ruling elite.
Organization
Of the pro-^vernnent forces
into a relatively cohesive
group, on
the other hand, had the effect
of bringing together the
government's
foes as well, henoe the polarization
of the political arena,
trom
.t least the I956 general election
on to the time of the downfall

Liberal Party regime by the April I9
Student Uprising, a semblance
of a two party system both in form
and substance
Of.

was maintained.

Parties had gained legitimacy, regardless
of whether they were

performing their proper roles for the
political system.
The notable characteristic of the party
development in the

period was the role the political crisis
played in the birth,
maintenance and splintering of parties.

Rhee's continuing attempt

to perpetuate his power through constitutional
maneuvers and the

accompanying attempt to check such moves tended

to

political alignments into two large groupings.

At the same time,

stabilize the

the institutionalization of parties was adversely
affected by the

fact that within each party it was mainly personalities
rather than

policy commitment that held the membership together.
toppled, this basis of cohesion also disappeared.

When Rhee was

The geneology

of the Korean parties from 1945 to I96O may be described by the
following diagram (Diagram 1).

1
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The Second Republic and
Attempts at
Democracy, I96O-I96I

The last governmental decision
made by the outgoing President
was to appoint his Foreign
Minister and good friend h5
Chong to head
the caretaker government
.

The Democrats, having decided
not to

participate in the interim Government,
were now almost assure of
power at a later date, but there
was the immediate necessity
tc
fill the political vacuum created
by Rhee's downfall. The immediate
issue facing He's government was
the question of dissolving the
Assembly. It was decided to keep
it as a "penitent- National Assembly
and as a "committee for coping
with current political situation."

In the 113 days of the interim period,
the Ho government carried out
Its tasks with vigilance and in strict
political neutrality. Among
its acMevements were the orderly
adoption of a constitutional

amendment which established

>

a cabinet system, the neutralization

of police, and the holding in July 29 of a new
parliamentary election.
Since the students continued to take to the streets
to give vent to
their frustrations and demands^ and the newspapers urged
speedy
trials of those who were connected with the March
15 election rigging,
the task of the interim regime was to maintain public order
and ensure

fairness in the selection of representatives who would organize a

new government.

Ho, himself, stated that his difficulty was "to

bring about revolutionary political reforms through unrevolutionary

This succession procedure was prescribed in the Constitution,

Article 55.

"
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On June 15. the Second Republic
was born with the

passage and promulgation of the
Constitution^^ creating a
parliamentary cabinet system. A new
election was set for July
29
for the new House of Representatives
and the House of Councillors,
Any other system would have been
inconceivable. A system of cabinet
responsibility had been regarded by
the Democrats as a consulate
Standard of a democratic system.

While the careUker government was
preparing for the transition,
the tv«. major parties at the timethe Liberals and Democratsbegan preparations for the July
29 elections.

disintegrated rapidly.

The Liberal Party

Only men still identifying with
the Liberal

Party were Liberal members of the
penitent Assembly.

Among the

Liberals, two alternatives were being
debated: whether they should
purge the ranks and reorganize the party or
whether they should

dissolve the party altogether and organize a
new one in cooperation

4
D
Regime).
Chung 'ang

"Imchong Paekil"(One Hundred Days of Interim
.
July 1969. pp. 8^-86,

109

^'^^ ^^^^ provisions of the new constitution were as follows*u
the President, as the Chief of State, was not
made a head of the
administration: he was to be indirectly elected by the
House of
Representatives for a five year term; the Prime Minister
headed the
Jjtate Council
which all decision-making power was vested; in the
event of a non-confidence resolution by the lower house,
the cabinet
might decide to resign en bloc or it might dissolve the
House of
Representatives within 10 days. The formal powers and functions
of
the upper house, the House of Councillors, were narrowly
prescribed,
with the lower house having the authority to override the upper house's
objection to any of its bills by simply passing it once more. Local
autonomy was provided by Article 97, Para. 2 which stated that "at
least mayors and chiefs of towns and townships are to be directly
elected by the inhabitants concerned.

m

'
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with non-Liberal politicians.

On June 1. 102 Liberals
in the

Kational Assembly broke with
their negotiation group,
and its leader.
Cho K^ng-ky.. favored holding
a convention and changing
the party's

nane vith a view to political
survival. Forty-one of the
102
seceders broke formally with the
Liberal Party on June 14 and

registered with the Assembly Secretariat
next day as the Constitutional
Politics Society.

The Democrats split badly at the
prospect of holding power.
The split was along the line of "old"
and
"new" factions of the

party.

At the threshold of power, the factional
strife paralyzed

the party into impotence.

As one of the former leaders of
the party

reminisced regretfully, "failure to resolve
this conflict" amounted
to "a betrayal of popular expectation. "^^^

By holding a nominating

convention on June 25. the Democrats began their
preparation for the

new government.

Each faction of the party supported its own
adherents

vith campaign funds and implemented separate campaign
strategies.
The Democrats won a landslide victory with I70 seats
out of 231;

next came the independents with 5^.

It was the "old" faction of that party which advocated the
split of the party.

During the campaign, Yu Chin-san, a controversial

spokesman of the old guard, publicly stated that "it will mean another

dictatorship if only a single conservative party is allowed to wield

^°Yun Po-son in Sasilui Jonpurul Kisulhanda .
Told: Memoirs), p. 301.
.

(All Truths are
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an absolute majority within
the House of Representatives. "^^l
This trial balloon drew i^nediate
warning from Chang, the
nominal
head of the party and the
recognized leader of the new
faction.
Although such a split was not
desirable at the time. Chang
predicted
that "another conservative
opposition will grow up in time.^^^^
However, a new party movement by
the old faction seemed to
be

crystallizing after the Democrats'
overwhelming victory in the
election. On August if. the old guard
members of the party's

Supreme Committee issued a statement
explaining the desirability of
the split. They argued that under
the cabinet

responsibility system,

more than two parties are desirable
and that the Democratic Party,
which had "overgrown" to a more than
two-thirds majority in the

Assembly, "should be divided or run the
risk of becoming a one party
autocracy.
The old faction representatives
boycotted the party

caucus two days later, and. in a symbolic
gesture, visited the
graves of their former mentors. Kim 3ong-su.
Shin Ik-hi and Cho

Byong-ok to pay their respects.

Sharing the spoils of power under these unusual
circumstances
vas an agonizing process. Disagreement emerged first
on the question

of naming the next President and a Prime Minister, with the
new

^^The Dong-A

Ilbo. July 11. I96O, p. 1.

112

Ibid.. July 14. i960, p. 1. For a discussion of the split
of the Democratic Party, see the newspaper debate between Yu
Chin-san
and Chu Yo-han in The Hankuk Ilbo July 12. I96O. p. 1.
.

*^The Dong~A

Ilbo . August 4. I96O, p. 1.
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faction insisting that the more
ix,werful position of Prime
Minister
should be occupied by the leader of
the party
holding the majority

of seats

:.n

the House of Representatives.

election as Prime Minister.

This would ensure Chang's

The old faction members, however,

maintained that the party had a "collective
leadership structure."
that Chang, as the Chairman of the
Supreme Committee, was merely

presiding officer, and. therefore, the party
had no single official
head.

Hence, they argued that the post of
Prime Minister should go

to the head of whichever party faction
had the most seats in the

lower house.

These two viewpoints collided without the
prospect of their

ever being resolved.
The task of keeping the party together was left
to Kwak Sang-hun.
a moderate "new" faction Speaker of the
Penitent National Assembly.

He announced on July 11 that "it is not the
Democrats, but others
vho siK)uld be interested in or care about building
up another con-

servative party than the Democratic Party. "^^^

A few days after the

election, he stated that "the democratic landslide
victory will not

be in danger of deteriorating into a dictatorship,
but instead will
be a great help in implementing the party's promises to
the people."
and that the advocates of the split "will betray the people
who chose
them to realize the party program. "''^^

On August 9 and 10. Kwak

sponsored a three-men "summit" conferences (Chang of the new faction.

Tun Po-son of the old faction and Kwak himself) in an attempt to

^

Ibid .

115
-

.

July 11, I960,

p. 1.

^Ibid .. August 1, I960, p. 1.
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brin^ about a oompro-nise. but
this and other efforts
turned out
to be unproductive.

In the whirlpool of power struggle,
the joint session of
the
legislature overwhelrrdngly elected
Yun Fo-s^n as President
on

August 12.

One of the constitutional
prerogatives which he was

to exercise was the non^ination
of a Prime Minister to the
House of

Representatives for its approval.

On August 16. President Yun
in

a surprise rx^ve nominated
Kim To-yon of the old faction
for the
post.
Kim was removed from the Supreme
Cominittee in the party's

1959 national convention and replaced by Yun
himself.
him for the

TX)st,

In nominating

Yun was bypassin.: Chang Ky^n. who
had long made

it clear that he felt entitled to
that post as the head of the

Democratic Party.

The House, however, rejected Yun's
nominee on

the following day by a narrow margin
of 111 for and 112 against.

President Yun was now left with one more
choice to make.

If his

choice was again vetoed, the House would
elect a Prime Minister by
116^

,

Kwc.k,

.

^.

in his memoirs, accuses Yun of breaching?
oolitical
ethics by nominating Kim despite the previous
under standin^r
reached by the too leaders of the party to elect
a new faction
member as }rim.e Minister. See Sasilili JonourSl
Kisulhaada (All
Truths are Told: Memoirs), p. 1^3. Yun, on the
Zth^Fh^, had
written that he simply thou-ht Kim had m.ore votes
than Chan'^ at
Kim
302-304.
To-y6n,
•»
on
the other hand,
.^.^f"!:
stated
that he had "exoected" Yun's nomination. See his
recollections
in !aui Insa°npr ~aekso (p:v Life), dd. 36?-368.

—
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Imi-.ediately after the July 29 election, the strenjrth of
the new faction in the House was 83; figure for the old faction
was
84-

9^

itself,

on August

18. Yu.

Wd

to the inevitable by
nominating

Chang who von the approval of
the House again by a sli.
.argin. 117
to 107.
The burden now shifted to the
newly elected f^i^e Minister
to
announce his cabinet. Ke had

indicated earlier that he would
consider

at least five old-guard members
to his cabinet provided
that the
latter would not register as a
separate negotiation group in the

House, a consequence which would
be tantamount to a "de facto
party
split." The "old" faction welcomed
the idea of having five members

but insisted that Chang accept the
prospect of a separate negotiating
body and also announced its intention
to withdraw its five participating
cabinet appointees at any time. These
jx^sitions could not be reconciled
and the negotiations broke down on August 22. "^"^^

When the fourteen-men cabinet was announced
on August 23. it
consisted of only one old faction member and

two independents, the

rest being new faction members.

Immediate criticism was heard

not only from the old faction but also from
some elements of the

new faction which claimed that they had been betrayed
despite the

key role they played in the election of Chang.

Chang succumbed to

the mounting criticism on August 24, when he stated:
"These appoint-

ments are more or less temporary.

I am prepared to reshuffle

my

118^.

^
Tne Dong-A
Ilbo, August 22. I960,

p. 1.

Tiie younger elements of the new faction led by
Yi Ch'ol-sung
have in fact been very critical of Chang. They have maintained a
circle composed of younger new faction members for most of the
nine-Bx>nth Democratic rule.
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cabinet whenever it is needed to
bring about political stability^^O
The old faction retaliated.
Led by Kizn To-yo^n. the old guard
members attacked Chang in a newspaper
advertisement for "thinking

more about his personal friends
than about the nation."
31. MiiLludans

Wa

On August

Ton^ 1ihoe (The Society of Old
Faction Commrades
.

Association of the Democratic Party)
with 86 members in the House
of Representatives registered with the
House Secretariat. A statement
issued by this group said that the split
was necessary due to the

differences in "political thinking." and
insisted that the "old"

faction was democratic in organization while
the new faction was
high-handed and fascist, and that the old faction
put the nation
first and political power second while the new
faction placed its
thirst for political power above the state.^^

The formation of the

old faction negotiating group was followed almost
immediately by the
registration of another negotiation group, Min.iung Hoe (The
Peoples
Club)

.

Composed of ^8 independents . this club was a union of four

distinct groups:

a pro-new faction group led by li Jae-hyong; a

pro-old faction group led by So Kin-ho; a reformist group headed by
Yun Kil-jung; and independents like Chang T'aek-sang, Kim Jun-yon
and Yun Jae-kun.

Chang's attempt to keep the party together through reorganization

of his cabinet was to no avail.

120

121

On September 22, the old faction

The Dong-A Ilbo . August 2^, I960, p. 1.

The Dong-A Ilbo . August 31, I960, p. 1,

.
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members, caucus resolved to
fonn a new party.

On the following day.

the new faction members with
the strength of 95 legislators
finally
registered, as a separate group
with th. name Hinjudan^C the
Democratic

P^ty).

On September 24. the old faction
registered as ^Mnmindang

(The New Democratic Party).

The founding declaration of the
party

created by the old faction attacked
Chang's regime for "burying in
oblivion the tasks of the revolutionary
regime"
and "betraying the

people's expectation by inheriting the
evils and the corruption of
the old regime." If these practices
were allowed to continue, this

declaration said, "the nation's future portends
crisis.

While factional strife among the Democrats
was ruining their
party, the nation was in a state of chaos.
only- to the deadlock of government.

The chaos was not due

The legitimacy of the Democratic

rule, from the beginning, was on shaky grounds
because the downfall

of the Rhee regime was owed to the students.

The students continued

to take to the streets any grievances they had and
the regime demurred

on taking a strong action against the student excesses.

During the

nine-month rule of the Democrats, there were some 1.200
demonstrations
reported in various cities and this meant that, on the average,
there
were four demonstrations on each day of the Democratic

rule."'^-^

A

common joke current at the time was that "the sun rises with
122

Central Election Management Committee, Hankuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Korean Political Parties;, p. 69.

123
p.. 400..

Pak Mun-ok. Hankuk ChonfnJuron (A Study of Korean Government)

•
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demonstrations and sets with
demonstrations."

There was no question

that the students were the
most effioaoious group during
these
months.
The prevailing concern was no
longer that of police
suppression of the Rhee regime,
"but one of freely voiced
fears as
to whether the popular forces
unleashed by the revolution can

suocessfuUy be kept in check. "125

^^^^.^^^

^^.^^

^^^^^

to maintain order without the
politicians' sanctions and the
policemen

themselves were involved in demonstrations
for higher wages and
salaries.

In domestic politics, the Democrats in a
state of deadlock
could not effectively implement policies
to solve a host of urgent
problems.

The Democrats seemed to be in constant
bickering over

the power that escaped them for many years,
and once the "incorruptible"

Democrats let corruption flourish and the profiteers
were left
unpunished.

Various factions accused others of scandalous
profiteering

12^

The nature of the demands of the demonstrating
students
was varied. Among others, they demanded resignation
of their
principals ^-^^-negotiations with the North Korean counterpart
on
the question of unification on the basis of neutralization.
The
most widely reported and condemned was the demonstration by the
students who were wounded in the April 19 march on the Presidential
Residence. The students, while demanding severe punishment for
those responsible for the March 15 election rigging, stormed the
Assembly haill and occupied its rostrUm.

Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland. Vt.:
C.E. Tuttle Co., I960), p. 31^.
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activities.^6

^^^^

^^^^^

^^^^^

reshuffling

of cabinets which occurred
five times during the
nine-month period.
The people's conception of the
pe>-fonnance of the regime also

deteriorated.

There was no question but
that with the demise of th.
Rhee regime, it was expected
that the anomalies and
paradoxes that
had characterized the old regime
would disappear overnight
with
the coding of the Democratic
regime.
A public opinion poU
.

taken by the Hankuk Ilbo immediately
after the Chang cabinet was
organized, yielded the following results.
When asked whether they
supported the Chang regime, the responses
had been: 34.8 percent
"support"; 39.4 percent "will wait and
see"; 11.2 percent "oppose".

Some rive months later the resix)ndents
were asked whether they
thought Chang's performance was satisfactory.

Only 3.1 percent

thought so; 34.3 percent saw "no improvement";
42.8 percent, "will

wait and see";
TSie

ISA

percent, "don't know.""'^''

Second Republic of the Democrats was one
of open polity

in which genuine forces of democracy seemed
to operate.

Freed from

the autocratic rule of Rhee. the nation
experimented with democracy
126^,

The most spectacular scandal occurred in
February. 1961.
Labelled "Tungsten Affair." a high ranking old faction
member of
the AJsembly was charged by a new faction member
that the former
had taken a million dollar bribe for arranging a
consignment sale
contract for 4.000 tons of tungsten between a Japanese firm
and
the Korea Tungsten Company. For details, see Hankuk
Hyokmy^ng
Chaep'ansa(The History of Revolutionary Trials in Korea), Vol.
1*
pp. 230~242.

127 u
This newspaper poll did not indicate whether the respondents
were the sane individuals in both polls. See The Hankuk Ilbo
January 15, 1961, p. 1,
•

.
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including freedom of the
line ores-s
<
j
press Ar,H
and ti,.
the freedom
of political activities,
But this experiment ,ave
free
rein to forces that had
been kept in

Check during the

fthee regime.

The nation's leadership
defaulted

with the neKly obtained
folitical ^„er by engaging
i„ endless
factional maneuvers to keep

^„er.

Political power, which long

escaped the Democrats. v«s now
theirs, but they were not
ready to
exercise it."^®
The Third Republic: The Trials
and Hopes
of Party Politics, I96I-I969

Of the Second R:o::?Sc"o'r"thf
r^fio^^ara^^
for the performance of his

S^f ''f ''t
.olZlT Zi^M^U'lZ
slT
struggle against the Liberal

enga^red in the bloody
tte th,n ^
that promised to the people was
the absolute guarantee
'ulrantee
frl^t
ot freedom
of
and removal of tyranny. Thus we re^x-fi-^J

fJu

rwL^^

to px^wer.... Eve^thoJ^h t'h^^so:
e
r^^^^^
^-°-^-tions. the DP^,overn.ent couirno^violat^'^
its own pledge of freedom that
it made before coming ?o plwer
We could not betray the people under
the pretext of a ti^^ o?*;;;os
Of course, we could have declared a state
of emergency^ some
dubious pretext. But we believed in a
'true dem^cra?L order
than in a 'superficial order imposed
by
^nf.^H jT^^^^^'.^^^h^^
'"^^
-limited
f?2ld^^^r?L!*^d-;been longing for' was the
credo of the DP
^^i^^,;^
the people by time, instead of by
fHrJ^^f^V ^""^^ ^"
^^'^ °^ increasing chaos,
the meantime,
fio preparing some
w^^^ also
we were
plans for stern measures to prevent
degeneration of this social disorder reaching a
certain point
where it might endanger essential maintenance
of national security
and welfare." Sasilui Jonnurul Kisulhanda
(All Truths Are ToldMemoirs), pp. 390-391. Translated and quoted
in iC.b. Kim ojd. cit..

Z^Zl

>n

f

m
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In 1955. Shannon McCune
made a prophetic observation
of

the

Korean political scene

A relatively unknown but
potentially powerful
course l/Tui:;r^A'?i'o.r
clll^Ce

zeroise a decisive Influence.

In cart

beSSe

^rmy ana its tradition of
civilian control... (
it

aRcears that the army leaders
anti-democratic force.

wUl

of
)

no? ue an
IA

McCune's first observation turned
out to be amazingly accurate,
During the critical moments of
the students' assault on
Rhee and
his regime the Martial Law
Commander
and his troops remained

neutral and this helped to expedite
the collapse of the regime.
tioCune was somewhat wide of the
mark, however, on his second
point.

A group of young

Turks in the Korean Army led
by General Park

successfully staged a bloodless coup
in the early morning of

Kay 16. 196I.

This was completed with some
3,500 men and 250

officers within a 600.000-men army.

Seoul was captured in a

matter of hours, and the Military Revolutionary
Council announced

129
Shannon KcCune,

"The United States and Korea" in
The
rins+o^ |||tes ang the
Far East. 1st. ed..(New York: Prenti^
nan, ±956;, p. 93.
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six pledges to the nation.^^°

Four days after the coup, the
official explanation of the
ccmp was provided r"'--^-^

^

""^^^
because they just
not bear witnessing the country
f allLg Into
Communist domination. fhS,
^° ^^^^^
homeland and
^"
^^rl^
n
onr
people
from the Communist totalitarianism,
a new future for the establis^ent
of a
genuine democracy in the Republic
of Korea.

Sev^.

b^^g

On May
the

40^en

I9. the Revolutionary
Council transformed itself
into

Supreme Council for l^ational
Reconstruction(SCm);and

by legislating the "Law Regarding
Extraordinary Measures for
130
nninf

/^^^f^ ""^r^

S^^nt

"^^^ Anti-communism will be the
cardinal

anti-CoHMunist
^^^^
"^o^e than a matter of
^o^f^r
'"ere slogan, will be rearranged
and strengthened.
?h^^m
""^^ be observed and international agreements
i^l/S ?^1t^
carried out. The friendly ties with the
J^^'^^^
n
-i^cf
United
States
and other free world nations will be
further
strengthened. (3) All corruption and past evil
practices in
this country will be wiped out and fresh and
clean morality
will be pursued in order to redress the degenerated
national
morality and spirit. (^) The plight of the national
life which
xs on the brink of despair and starvation will
be quickly
ameliorated and all-out efforts will be made for the
recontruction
of a self-reliant national economy. (5) In order
to implement
the long cJierished national desire to reunify the
divided land,
all out efforts will be centered on making the nation
capable of
coping witli communism. (6) As soon as such talks are
accomplished,
we will ready ourselves to turn over the reigns of power
to new
and conscientious TX)liticians and return to our original
duties."
Quoted in. Park Chung-Kee, "what Has Made the Military Revolution
Successful, " Koreana Quarterly . Vol. II, Ko, l(Summer.
I96I),
I^r I8-I9.

m

i^^'^.^'j"?

•

''^''^

^

^-^"S'he

Secretariat, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction,

Kilitary Revolution in Xorea(Seoul: The SCMR, I96I),

p. 12.
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National Reconstruction." it
appropriated all executive,
legislative
and judicial powers unto itself.
Along with SCM. the Cabinet and
the CentrPl Intelligence Agency(CIA)
w^re established on the same
day.
The SCm moved swiftly to carry
out its pledges. In reorgani-

zation of the administration and
replacement of lower-level
bureaucrats, in apprehending and punishing
gangsters and pro-

Communist suspects, and in announcing
the five year economic plan,
the military government moved with
swiftness and determination, and
these policies were beginning to earn
the support of the people.

It was in the arena of politics'^ which the
military government had
to undergo a series of difficulties.

In accordance with its pledge, the

SCJIR

disbanded all political

parties(15) and social organi2ation(233) as a
first step.

On August

12, 1961. General Park confirmed the position of the coup
leaders

that the military rule would be terminated by the summer
of I963,

and the governmental power would be turned over\ civilian
administration.

With this target and blueprint, the

.junta

government enacted a

retroactive "Political Activities Purification

Law""*-^^

in March, I962

to pave legal grounds for banning "undesirable" former
politicians

from taking part in political activities until August. I968.

132
^ For the complete text of the Political Activities
Purification Law, see "Law for the Purification of Political
Activities" in Korean Affairs Vol. I, No. 2(May/june 1962),
General Park's statement concerning this law is
pp. 219-225.
found in Korean Affairs Vol. I, Mo. 2(Kay/june, I962), p. 21?.
.
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This law blacklisted more
than 4,000 persons,
persons

^

4.
i
including

Liberal

»nd Democratic politicians.
The r.ext step in the
transition t. the civUian
rule was the
^option of a new Constitution.
On July U, 1962, a
drafting
committee was organized and
after holding public
hearings from
August 23 to 30, a draft
constitution was put to a
national

on December 17.^34

^^^^

^^^^^^^

^

overwhelming
78.8 percent support from the
people, it was promulgated
on
December 26.135
,
^^^.^^^ le.iti.,,,,

^

to become useful later.

It was a return to the
presidential

system, and one significant
innovation was the inclusion of
an article
on political parties.136
p^„^,^,^^

^^.^.^^ ^^.^^

Some two-thirds of the blacklisted
persons aoolied fnr .nH

!ss|'~

as8*.ffi--

Article 7 reads: "The extablishment of
political oarties sh;,Tl
be free and the plural system shall
be guaranteS/ (ifoSnxzation
and activities of a political party
shall be democratic ani poliUc^
parties shall have necessary organizational
arrangements to Sable Se
people to participate in the formation of
public will.
(3) FolitLal
parties shall enjoy the protection of the
state. However if the
purposes or activities of political party are
contrary to the basic
democratic order the Executive shall bring an
action against it in
the Suprens Court for its dissolution o.nd
the political party shall be
dissolved :ui accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court." Ibid..
Art:^cle 6^(paragraph 3) and Article 36(paragraph
3) ruled
independent candidacies for txDth the presidential
and National Assembly
elections. Article 38 further states: "a person shall
loose his
membership in the National Assembly when he leaves or changes
his
party, or when his party is dissolved." Ibid .,
p. 13.
,

^

elaborated in the Political Party
Law which passed the SCm
on
December 31. 1962. The first
comprehensive law on political

parties

in Korea, it defined a political
party as "a voluntary
organization..,
which participates in the
formulation of political views
of the

people by promoting a responsible
political assertion or policy
and by nominating or supporting
a candidate in an election
for

public Office."

The law required that a party
should have district

chapters in more than one-third
of the total electoral districts
^or the National Assembly^and each
district Chapter was to be composed

of at least 80 members.

without fulfilling these and other

requirements, a political party could
not register with the Central
Election Management Committee(CEKC) which
.
was created to oversee

all activities related with political
parties and elections.

This

law further stipulated that parties could
enjoy freedom of activities

within the scope of the Constitution and laws;
a party could not be
financed by foreign governments, groups, individuals
or by state

or public organizations; a party must make public
its income and
expenditures once a year.

was clear.

The intention for the political party law

As Colonel Kil Jae-ho. the Chairman of the
Legislative-

Judiciary Committee of the

SCM

stated, the "requirements for

the formation of a party aim at preventing the emergence
of
137
Article 25 through 27, ibid., pp. 182-183. The amended
vers ion( January, I969) increased the number to one-half of the
election districts, and 100 members. The Korean Republic
December 20, I962, p. 1.
.
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aplinter and progressive parties,
and to establish a bipartisan
"^^^
system,

While these legislative measures
were undertaken, General
Park announced that all of
SCNR .embers

would participate in the

Civilian government by running as
civilians in the general election
slated for May. The announcement
was followed by a heated
debate
among the members of

SCM

as to whether they should
run in the

forthcoming general election in
uniform or retire from active
military duty and run as civilians.
A group of Supreme Councillors

insisted that there was no need to
shed the uniform as long as they
serve as the nation's legislators.
They insisted that military
officers were entitled to run in general
elections and retain their

military status.

This reasoning was overriden by the
majority of

Supreme Council members who feared that candidacy
in military
uniform would set a "bad precedent" for future
elections.

The

Supreme Council revised its own law to include
reservists among
its members.

This revision enabled the Supreme Councillors
to

shed their uniform in order to run in the forthcoming
election,

while retaining their seats in the Council.
13 s

The Korean Republic December 20, I962, p. 1. It
is
interesting to note that Yun Po-son, former President,
remarked a
few days later that such a law would be unnecessary. He
said;
"I understand the government is worried, over the
possible emergence
of too many splinter parties... I do not think a law is necessary
to check the minority parties because, in the past even without
such a law, small parties eventually merged into two major
parties."
See The Korean Republic December 22, 1962, p. 1. Yun. however,
supported the government's move to suppress the "left-wing"
political parties.
.

.
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The year I963 began with
concrete steps to turn
over f.wer
fro. the nalitary government
to a civilian one.
Cn February 18
General Park again reiterated
his
pled,e of "non-participation

a yet to be established
civilian government. "^39

he

Urted the ban on

L

On the same day

political activities for parties
and social

organizations and for some 3.000
persons.

That the junta council was badly
split over this transitional
Phase was evident by a series
of events whose details remain
unclear
up to the present time.

Kim Jong-p'il. the mastermind
of the coup.

.

and the organizer of the Democratic
Republican Party(DRF) suddenly
resigned as Chairman of the party
and several members of the
"maincurrent" members of the SCI^^resigned.

The plot for a military

counter-coup by Marine Commandant
Kim Tong-ha was discovered on
March 11 and the difficulties surrounding
the DRP reportedly help^
to convince Park to reverse his
decision to return to military

uniform.

His statement on March 16 stated
that he would prolong

the period of military rule for four
more years in order to "establish

139

his decision conditional upon acceptance
of the
following by ^'f^^
the civilian politicians.
(1) The newly elected
government should prove to uphold the soirit
of April 19 and
May 16 revolutions; (2) The recognition of the
justice of May 16
revolution and no reprisals against the military
officers;
(3) The
appointed by the military government were to be
retained;
/^J^^fi??'*^
Able reserve soldiers should be given preference
for party
positions wherever practicable. (5) All political
parties should
eliminate all traces of past evil and corruot politics;
and
(6; The neif civilian government should support the Korea-Japan
talks. See. Mun Chang- ju. Hankuk Chongch'iron (A
Study of Korean
Politics), p. 346.
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a polity that would
never invite another
revolution.
He would
put the question of extension
before a national refera„du„.
hut all

political activities would
be suspended once more.
the Civilian politicians,

united in opposition to
the extension

demonstrated against the military
government on Karch 20.
American
pressure was also reoorted to
be exerted on Fark.^'^l
Cn April 8.
Park a".nounc.d that the
referandum on the question of
whether to'

extend the military rule or to
hold a general election would
be
postpo-ed until September. On July
'^^^^^^'i
27, Park

face of these pressures and announced
the final

election dates.

tij.,e-table and

In accepting the DA?'s
presidential nomination on

August 30. Park resolved to
"continue and acconplish the task
of the
revolution for which he feels great
reponsibility.-l'*^

Among the
group of officers who were determine!
to participate in the
forthcoming
civilian government was a group of
young officers led by Kim Jong-p'il

For the conplete text of his statement,
see ibid., pn
Henderson writes that this reversal was
made ui^der

stJ^: pressure
KendersonrXorSr
'

The Po.Lotics
Pn'nt"""""
of Vortex

.

o.

S""^
186.

Ch'an--ju, Hankuk Chon£ch4ron(A Study of
Korean
President Kennedy, in an interview,
;
•f^"'^
to civilian
rule. On April 2, Kennedy's letter to
Park uT-?ed the sane. There were also unofficial
renorts that the
U.S. would review its oolicy toward Korea
should General hark extend

P^Tx. ,
^
ur^ed'th^.";
urged
the return

military

rxile.

1^2.
,
>^uoted
,

m
.

Central Election Kana^ement Committee, Taehaminkuk
_^
^
5on gosalA history of Korean Elections),
p. 38.
,
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and

^

„e.bers of the eighth
class of the Korean
Mlita., Acade^.
Although the De^cratic
Republican Party was
omcially organized
in February.. I963. the
organizing .or. began in
the strictest secrecy
as early as January,
1962. only six .onths after
the coup and a year
before Political activities
were permitted. ^'^3
That. CIA headed by Ki^
Jong-p-il funded and organized
the DRP

was an open secret.

Certain key CIA former
mUitary officers were

in Charge of the
new party project; they
recruited university professors
to help the™.
The procedure for the
establishment of the party
could only be speculated, and
the so-called "Kim Jong-p-ii
Plan" to

organize a new party, which would
transcend the military label,
and
provide the mechanism through
which the military could
participate
in civilian politics, had
become the blueprint for the
new party.
The organizing cor^ittee had
taken a form of a study group
composed

of CIA miUtary officers and
young political scientists.

That the

scholars participated in the organizing
committee became evident when
the party was officially established.
Kim

is said to have asked these

political scientists to study the pathology
of former Korean parties
'

^°^^0"nd

information on the organization of the DRP.
v v-"*
bee Kin
Yong-su, "Minju Konp:whadang Sajon Jojik"(The
Advance
Organization of the Democratic Republican Party),

Shindong'a
168-187. and Kang In-sop. "Yuksa P'alkisaeng"
/Su^S^"*:
(The Eighth Graduating class of the Korean Military
Academy)
Shindong'a , September. 1964. pp. I7O-I98. For another
interesting
account o." the activities by the organizer of the
new political
Recollections of Kim Jae-ch'un, the former CIA Director,
in ^Jaul H:/Dkmyong Jonfu"(Recollection to the
Days of Revolution).*
Chung'ang. May, I969, p. 118.
.

See Henderson, Korea

;

The Politics of Vortex , pp. 30^305
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ana develop a plan which

«ul.

transcend the™.

The brain-trust around

Ki. conde^ed the former
Korean parties as having
the following
pathologic: the constituency
organization had not been a
party

organization, but largely a
personal organization
centered around
the National Asse.bly»an;
the provincial party
organization with its
veak administrative capabilities
had not contributed .uch
to the
constituency organization; the
party national headquarters
was

dominated

by the national Assemblymen,
and there were no controlling
organization^
over these legislators. The
functions of the party had
been executed

through personal relations rather
than on an institutional
basis.^'^^

On the basis of

this analysis, the organizers
began to lay the

framework for a new party.

An important innovation was to
divide

the organization of the party
into representative, executive
and policy
organs. As a representative organ,
the national party headquarters
was to have a central coimittee: the
provincial or city party headquarters, a provincial or city
co«ittee; the constituency party,
a

constituency co,™ittee.

As an executive organ, the party
headquarters

at all levels were to be staffed with
paid party members
the executive functions of the party.

to perform

The legislators and the party

functionaries of the party were to jointly
perform the staffing function
of the party. The crux of this organizational
set up was to prevent

the doDunation of the constituency party
organization by the legislators.

n»D
UriP

Chc.e Tan-yong. "Kongwhadangkwa Kim
Jong-p'il Puraen "(The
^ Kim
and
Jong-p'il Flan), Sasangge, March,1963,
pp. 80-85.
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It also reoo^ended an
independent f»licy-.aking
organ vathin the
central party headquarters . "^^^
This blueprint for a new
political party was apparently
.ade
known to the members of the
SCtS, who had been kept in
the dark up
to that tir.e. Having
political ambitions of their
own. they began
to oppose the organizational
framework of the party. Their

opposition
was based on the reasoning
that the proposed framework
would r>ake
it possible for the party
functionaries to dominate the true
represen-

tatives Of the people.

Furthermore, they argued, a
maintenance of

a constituency party secretariat
would be a costly and unnecessary
innovation between elections.

Amid these differences, the new party
announced the formation
of an inauguration committee which
met on January 18.

In order to

transcend the military label the
inauguration committee included
civilians from various walks of life.

Also included were five SCMl

members and ten other reserve officers.
into being on February 26. I963.

in the open.

The party officially came

The discord was already coming out

General Song Yo-ch'an, former Premier and Park's
senior

in the army, charged on January 8. 1963 that it
was a betrayal of

public trust for the SCNR members to shed military
uniforms and enter
into politics.

Similiar charges by other SCKR followed suit.

early as January 21. Kim Tong-ha. a

SCm

As

member and a sponsoring

member of the party, declared that the DRP "centered around
Kim Jong-p'il,
146
Ibid ., pp. 81-82.

Ill

is not goin^ to the path
that a public party in a
democratic society
Should go,» and -because I cannot
correct the wrongs evident
in the

party. I am resigning from

aU

j^sitions.-^^^

The Supreme Council,

during two days of deliberation
on Kim Tong-ha's resignation,
reportedly
decided that Km Jong-p'il had shown
bad judgement and "improper

attitude" and demanded that the
party's functionary secretariat
system
at the constituency level be disbanded.
The Supreme Council members

seemed to have won the first round
when Kim Jong-p'il announced his
"intention" to resign from the party.

In February, he left the country

for a trip around the world.
to go abroad was reached

As he put it at the time, his
decision

"partly by myself and partly by others.-

As the situation deteriorated. Park
intervened
January 2?. the

SCM

to calm the storm.

On

members retracted their earlier demand
for

Kim Jong-p»il's resignation, and Park separated
the party and the
SCKR ty removing those who had connections
with the party.

The DRP

organizers in return asked Kim Tong-ha to retract
his resignation from
the party's inauguration committee.^^®

Now a new party was born, and

this was to provide the military officers a bridge
to power in the

forthcoming civilian government.

The founding declaration stated;

147

'^Ibid., p. 80.

In addition to this discord, there seemed to have been a
much more fundajnental kind of differences. Song Yo-ch'an, the first
head of Cabinet of the .junta government, demanded, for example, on
January 24, I963 that Park should reverse his intention to participate
in the civilian government. On February 14, Yu '-^on-sik, a former
SCKR member, demanded that the military should stay clear of the
civilian government yet to be established. See Kun Ch'ang-ju,
Hankuk Chonech'iron (A Study of Korean Politics), p. 345.
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are unlike the past political
parties in that we are a
'working,
political party rather than
merely a 'speaking- political
party. "^^9
The DRF ran into immediate
diff ic^olties . General
Park's oathtaking ceremony, at which he
declared his non-candidacy,
^..e

clouded the

future of the party.

Soon thereafter. General Park
urged formation

of a pan-national party that would
include all political forces
subscribing to the ideals of the
military revolution.
General

Ki.

Chae-ch'un. then the director of
CIA. immediately started to
organize
a new party, which later became the
Liberal Democratic Party(IDP).
He was able to recruit various groups
and individuals from existing

parties and from the DRP itself.

General Park's momentary decision

in favor of a pan-national party
threatened the DRP. but in May. I963,
Park ordered the merger of the two
parties by using a slightly modified
version of the existing DRP structure and
by equitably distributing

party posts between the two partisan
groupSin the merged party.

This

merger order brought another influx of
anti-Kim Jong-p'il politicians
into the party.

Although the negotiations for the merger proved

unsuccessful because the LDP demanded the dissolution
of the DRP's
secretariat organizations, this had the effect of
complicating the

facticnal picture of the future ruling party.
1^9

Quoted in Haebang Yisipyinvon ii ( Twenty- twn years since
liberation), p. 671.
'"^^The need for such political party is publicly exoressed
by
Yi Hu-rak's, later Park's Chief Secretary and then the Spokesman for
the SCm, See Yi Hu-rak. "Why is a Pan-national Party Necessary?,"
Koreana Quarterly . Vol. V, I^o. 2(Summer. I963), pp. 11-16.

The bulk of the LDP members chose to remain in within their
party when the merger negotiations proved unsuccessful; it later
turned against Park and joined the ranks of opposition forces.
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By the ti.e General

Parle

shed his military unifor.
and accepted

the presidential nomination
or the DEP. on August
30, 1963. factional
alignments in the DRP were
fluid due to the influx
of hetereogenous
groups into the party.
Broadly speaking, however,
there seemed to
have been
.ain groupings. The "mainstream
faction," so dubbed
the mass media at the time,
consisted of those party
members who
had participated in the creation
of the party and those who haa
commanded the control of the
secretariat structure of the party.

^

These were individuals that
gathered around Kim Jong-p'U.
despite
his absence in Korea at the ti:ne.
arri those who weathered
the storm
and challenge from the Liberal
Democratic Party during April and May

of 1963.

The "non-mainstream" faction consisted
of all others who

were not members of the inner circle
and who joined the party at
stages. These were those SCKR members

lat^

who were opposed to Kim Jong-p'il

and his plan for the DRP; those leaders
of the LDP who were pro-Park
and former members of the defunct
Liberal Party and other parties,

who all joined the DRP in time for the
I963 elections.
The civilian politicians hurriedly realigned
their forces to

challenge the rule by the former men in uniform
in the civilian
government, after the lifting of

January

1, 1963.

,ban

on political activities on

Their political activities were those of the "old"

politicians in merging and dispersing.

The group that seemed to show

the most v::ability was composed of those men who belonged
to the "old"

faction of the Democratic Party, which, toward the end of the Second

RepubXicspUt With the new
faction

to

To™

the New Be^oc.atio
Part.

Sucoe..f ul in recruiting
so.e elements of the
new faction of the
De.oc.at. and Liberal Party,
a new par ty- the Civil

Rule Party-

was launched on Kav
i'.ay

l'^
1-^.

anrf y.,„
and
Yun Po-son. former
President, became the

atandbearer of the party in
the forthcoming election.
This group
included other important names
such as Kim To-yon. ru
Chin-san. and
Kim Eyong-no.

Ihe old Democratic Party under
Chang KySn was revived
under the
same name and elected Madame
Pak
3un-ch'5n as its Chairman, but
lost

many of its former adherents to
Yun and other parties that
were
emerging. A similar disintegration
followed

a»ng

of President Rhee.

the former adherents

Yi B5m-s5k, the former Liberal
and the head of

the CKtroversial National Youth
Corps^ seemed at first to rally
Rhee's
cohorts, but a majority of his former
coUeagues found refuge in the
DRP. the Ho ChSng's New Politics
Party or the Liberal Democratic
Party,

which had the support of the anti-Kim
Jong-p'il faction in the DRP.152

15?

hv

development of organization of new
parties
Ch'ang-ju. Kankuk Chp-ngch-iron
Study or Korean Politics), pp. 367-385.

.<^iTr

U siSv^

^

f^^^^^"^
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In all, so^e twelve political
parties registered with
the
Central Election Management
Co^nittee. ^53

^^^^ ^^^^
the beginning that the real
contest was between Yun and
Park with
ChaJng a distant third.
An attempt was made to unite
the forces
of Yun. H« and Yi B6m-sSk under
the umbrella of the Party
of the
People( Kukminuidan.
), but without success.
Given only thirty days
to campaign, seven opposition
politicians registered as
presidential
candidates. The perennial inability
to unite hampered these men
once
again at the crucial moment and they
were no match against the DRF

^"^^

P^^^^^^
^^e time
were a coaUtion o?'nT^'°"vf
l^^^c^^^s in different combinations
at
1
lelst
fh^ leaaership
u
least on the
level. The

^

•

f

te^gzang Shipii( November

of the new party leadership.

^
^
Former
members of:

NDP

following table comtDiled bv thp
1. 1963) shows the foJ^er Se£a^ces
=^egiances

CRP

DP

(%)

(%)

(^)

67.7

91A

-

^-5

-

Kukminuidang
^

LDP

drP

3^

2

18

15.8

2

-

19

12.6

8

.

,

6.3

-

12.8

-

45

5,3

iq

KUitary

-

.

.

5^3

3^

Newcomers

6.5

8.6

16

I8.7

50

2

-

2

Unification
Party
Independents

ethers

.
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Which had prepared for the
election on October I5 for
so.e two years.
It was not until October
a
8,

week before the election
day. that the

opposition candidates were able
to present to the
electorate a united
front against candidate Park.
With h5 Chong and Song
Hyo-ch.an^^^

withdrawing their names from the
presidential race for the sake
of
opoosition imity, the contest was between
Park and Yvn ro-sJTn, the

presidential candidate of the Civil Rule
Party(The CRF- Kinchon.^dan. k
In a campaign marred by mutual exchanges
of mud-slinging and

attacks on personalities .^55 the DRF
candidate barely won the crucial
election by a mere 150,000 votes, winning l,?
Percent of the votes

cast.

That the organization of the DR?
was strong in the rural areas

was made evident when Park won
59 percent of the rural votes, whereas
Yirn gained only ^1 percent.
The urban voters,
however, gave their

overwhelming support to the opposition
candidate.

Distasteful kunin

chongch'i , "rule by men in uniform," seemed
to have been a motive
for the urbanites to sway onesidedly against
Park.

As compared with

154

General Song, who had been the military government's
first
Premier, and a severe critic of the .junta for its decision
to
particimte in civilian politics as a betrayal of the revolutionary
pledpre. was arrested by the CIA on August 11 on the
charf^es of
executing a subordinate officer durLng the Korean .jar and of allegedly
ordering troops to fire on students during the adtH Student
uprising
as the Martial Law Commander. Ke briefly cajioaigned from
a orison
cell in Seoul.

^^^Fark rediculed Yun Po-son's democratic rule as "disguised
democracy" and assetited that his formuj.a was liberal democracy
based
on nationalism. This prompted Yun to question the very loyalty
of
Park to the nation, div«fging the court martial record of Park
in
19^9 on cl-^rges of organizing a Gominunist Party in the South Korean
Army.
Park was reinstated at the outbreak of the Korean *var with a
suspension of the sentence. See Pak Son^-hwan, r 'ado nun :.aeildo
Ch'indaC Waves //ill Come Also Tomorrow) (Seoul: Tong'a Gh'ulo'ansa.
1965). pp. I85-I99.

11?

Yun's 63^percent of the urban
vote. Park was able to
garner only 27
percent.^^
In the .Yational Assembly

elections held on November
26.

the DRP once a.eain demonstrated
its organizational strength
by
returnin'T 110 out of xo
17S renrpcspn+^
+ i^r^o
representatives.

uj.

£-if-;hty-eight

of the

candidates nominated by the oarty were
elected directly with an
additional 22 seats on a proportional

representation scheme, incorporated

into the Constitution of the Third
Republic, thus ensuring a working

majority in the Assembly.

The defeat at the ballot-boxes was
not

accepted by Yun and his ooposition ooliticians.

They attacked what

they called "premeditated election rigging."
with Yun declarinr,

won the election in voting but lost
in vote coui^ting."

"I

The defeated

candidate filed two seoarate law suits with
the highest court in a

move to invalidate Park's election. "'^'^
The Sixth National Assembly convened on December
1? to inaugurate
Park as first President of the Third Republic
and to launch a civilian

government after two years-and-seven months' military
interim.
his State of the Nation Kessa^e in early

196^^.

In

President Park, in a

reconciliatory manner, appealed for the opposition's cooperation,

while vowing to do his part to "modify governinent policies in the
light of sound alternative program of the opposition parties

.

"'"^^

156
For an analysis of the I963 presidential election, see
C.I. Eugene Kiin, "Sirnif icance of the 1963 Korean Election."
A§ian Sur^e^^ Vol. IV. tio. 3(Karch. 1964). pp. 765-773- oee also
Kim Kyong-whai, "The Presidential Election in Korea. I963" Korean
Affairs Vol. 11(1963). op. 372-378.
157
^'See The Choson Ilbo Kovember 14. I963, d. 1.
.

The Kyonr^Viyang ohinmun

,

January 10, 1964,

p.

1.
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No such cooperation was
forthcoming fro. the opposition
parties.
The CRP.s Yun and DP's Madame
Pak Sun-ch'Sn. in the
polic, speeches
Of their respective parties,
opened fire on what they
called a

-proforma" civilian rule.

Yun even went so far as to
advocate

the over-throw of the present
government by force.^^^

In the political situation where
the very legitimacy of Park's
civilian government was seriously
questioned by the opposition

politicians and the substantial
portion of the electorate, it
needed
only a catalyst to drive the nation
into a political crisis. Such
catalyst was provided on the occasion
of the ratification of the

Korea^apan Normalization Treaty, most of which
was negotiated during
the military interim.^^°

The long, intense political struggle
from

March 196^ to the time of ratification on
September I965 drove the
nation into utter political chaos.

The campaign against the normal-

ization with Japan began on March 6. with the
organization of the

Pan-National Struggle Committee against Humiliating
Diplomacy with
Japan( henceforth known as the Struggle Committee).

Originated in

the Kational Assembly by the leaders of
opposition parties, this

159

For Yun's statement, see The Dong-A Ilbo January
14, 1964.
Madame Park's statement is found in The Hankuk Ilbo January
16. 1964.
Both of these statements are partially translated in K.
B. Kim,
.

.

0£. cit., p. 123.

For the historical background, the roots of opposition, the
content aiid the politics of rapprothemejit of this treaty, see
Chulsu Kin, Korean-Jar^anese Reiations . 1951-1965 A Study in the
Politics of RancrocheiT:ent unpublished K.A. thesis, the University
of Massachusetts 196?)
See also K. B. Kim, pp. cit., especially.
Chapters II-V.
:

(

,

.

U9
Struggle Co^ittee included
representatives from various
social
organizations as well as political
parties. The Struggle
Co^ittee
made a spoech-making tour
of ™ajor cities
from March I5

-.0

21.

Despite the snowballing of the
opf»sition forces. President Park
reiterated his determination to
conclude the
negotiations.

On March

23. Ki« Jong-p'il and the Japanese Foreign
Minister Ohira agreed in

Tokyo to conclude the talks by
early Kay of that year. This
prompted
some 5.000 students from the
major universities in Seoul
to take to
streets to protest the "humiliating
diplomacy" with Japan. Reconciliatory gestures by President Park
who called the student demonstrations "a patriotic act" restored
the political calm temporarily
and had the students returning to
their campuses throughout the

country.

Some 80.000 students by then had
participated in street

demonstrations.

In his determination

to conclude the talks at all cost.
President

Park reorganized the cabinet under Premier
Chung Il-kwon, who

immediately announced his determination to
conclude the negotiations

by the end of the year.

Demonstrations erupted again in Kay and June

climaxed by the bloody struggles between students
and the police on
June 3.

On that day martial law was decreed in the area of
Seoul;

all colleges and universities were forced to close
their doors for
the remainder of the semester; assembly was prohibited;
and the press

was censored.

For nearly two months, Seoul was under the control

of the military.

In the National Assembly the opposition forces

gave birth to a movement to unite them for more effectively opposing
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the

ratmcation or

the treaty.

Three

DP and^LDP. under the
leadership of

op^sUlon parti.,

the CHP. the

appointed a t„e„t.-one

»e»ber co.^ttee to ™a.e
plans for a .:ified
op.sition part..
Pak-s Democratic Party
.e.bers(„ith

.ada.e

13 members), however,
refused to

P«-ticipate in the proposed new
party due to differences
on the
organisation of the new partes
leadership. The new party
was organised
under the banner of the
existing Civil Rule Party in
late November.

Now a movement to unite the
two major opposition
parties, the CRP
and the DP. was launched in
the beginning of the new
year(1965).

The efforts at unification
proved difficult.

The negotiators

from both parties failed to
agree on some basic points,
the most
important of which were the designation
of the name of the proposed
party and how the leadership of the
party was to be organized.
After
five nonths of futile negotiations,
the two parties agreed, under
pressure from the rank and file of both
parties, to unite under the
in
accordance
with
^
name of the Mass Party and^the principle
of collective leadership.

When the new Kass Party(MP) was convened
on June

1^^

to select its

leaders, it appeared that the former CRP
elements suffered a setback.

Madame Pak was elected as the head of the
three-member Supreme Council.
unexpectedly defeating Yun.^^^

In a face-saving move, however, Yun
had
was made "Advisor,- after he^ refused a seat in
the Supreme Council.
The other two members were the durable Ho
ChSng and So Min-ho.

h'or account of this unification, see So Im-tuk, "Hankuk
Yadangui Kebowa Saengri"(The Geneology and Characteristics
of
Opposition Parties in Korea), Sedae, June, I971, pp. 106-108.

In
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the election or the
t«elve-.e.be. Leadership
Co>.oil. Xun's .roup
«s able to have only three of its

followers Join in this
powerful

co^ittee.

Bespite its having been
the largest opposition
bloc in
the National Assembly
before the unification

.ove. Tun's group
suffered

a decisive defeat at the
hands of Madame PaK-s
fo»er Democratic Party
members who were in alliance
with the Yu Chin-san elements
of the
CRP, whose growing hostility
toward Tun since the
1963 presidential

election

cade them

turn against their former
colleagues.

As

its predecessor opposition
parties had been, the MP was
a. uneasy

alliance of opposition politioans
and factions.

When the politicians stumbled
in the National Assembly
to form
a united front against the
ruling party,
the various groups outside

the National Assembly began a
series of demonstrations
under the
guidance of the Struggle Committee.
Massive rallies continued from

February through June when the
hard-pressed government ordered an
early summer vacation for colleges
and
universities and some high

schools which had taken the lead in
the demonstrations.

On June 22.

the treaty was signed in Tokyo, ending
the twenty years of technical
hostilities and some fourteen years of
negotiations.

The Straggle Committee immediately declared
it null and void
and publicly pledged its detennination
to struggle against ratification

of the "treacherous treaty." and the "sell-out
of the nation."

Amid

massive popular protest and scenes of violence
between the ruling

—For detail of Yun-Tu
see

Tlie

relationship and roots of hostility,
•"
Choson Ilbo . July 15. 1971. p. 4.
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and opposition party members
of the National Assembly.163
ratification bill was placed on
the agenda of the Assembly
on July
14. Because of fear of a head-on
collision, the session of
the
National Assembly was scuttled
only a week later,
a desperate
move to normalize the Assembly,
a leaders' meeting between
President
Park and Madame Pak Sun-ch'on
was prepared in secret and
held at the
presidential residence on July 20.
They agreed to suspend extreme

m

confrontation between their two parties
in order to maintain constitutional order in the nation. They
also agreed to close the Fifty-

first Assembly session on July 21 without
deliberating on the treaty.
This did not seem to have much effect
on the opposition strategy.
It began to insist on dissolution of
the National Assembly and on
the election of a new one with specific
instructions for dealing with
the important question of ratifying
the Korea-Japan Treaty,
a

m

desperate move, the opposition legislators
warned the ruling party
that they would resign from the National
Assembly en masse if they

failed to achieve the dissolution of the Assembly
or fail to block
the ratification bill.

The opposition KF^with complex factional alignments^ differed
sharply on the strategy the party should take vis-a-vis the ruling
153

The ruling party, in a surprise move, introduced
the
ratif rcation request to the plenary session where
a fist-wielding
pandemonium erupted between the ruling and opposition
legislators
around the Speaker's rostrum as well as on the floor. See
The
Korea Times, July 13 and July 14, 1965, p. 1. and The Korea
Herald.
July 13 and July 14, 1965. p. 1.
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party in its mission to block
ratif ication.^^

Yun Po-son and his

followers, who had Tailed to
win the hegemony of the
MP. took the
hard line by advocating that
the party be disbanded
as a first step.
The disbanding of the party
would mean under

Article 38 of the

Constitution^^^ that all opjx>sition
members would be disqualified
to sit in the National Assembly.
The moderate faction insisted
that

they Should debate and then resign
their seats in the National
Assembly
should the ruling party refuse to
yield and try to push the
ratification

through as the latter possessed the
required majority.

In a resolution

adopted by the MP's Central Standing
Committee on July 26. the principle
was adopted that "members will resign
their
seats in the National

Assembly" should forcible passage of the
ratification be foreseen."
and that the resignations be "complete and
"'•^^
irrevocable.

iS5
of events surrounding opposition
strategies,
c.o r>^/?see
Choe Yong-ch'ol and Pak 3un-je. "Shinmindang"
(ihe NDP),
Shindon?'a . Kay. I968, pp. 95-97.
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article provides that "A person shall lose his
membership
4« the Ivational
T^^*^
in
Assembly during his term when he leaves or changes
his party." For the motives of the militants and
moderates on
the choice of strategy, see- K. B. Kim. od. cit.,
pp. 2^3-251.
The moderates were as much opposed to the treaty as the
militants
were, but they were also preoccupied with preserving
their hegemony
of the party. The militants, on the other hand, saw little
chance
either for capturing party hegemony or for defeating the treaty
unless the party was disbanded and joined in demons trations on the
streets. On the streets, the militants could easily regain the
hegemony of the opposition in alliance with such extreme groups
as the students and the Struggling Committee. See, K. B. Kim,
ojD. cit., pp. 247-2^8.

^The Korea Herald . July 27, 1965, p. 1.
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This resolution was clearly
unacceptable to Yun and his
militants,
Yun suddenly submitted his
letter of resignation from
the party on

July 28

ar.d

other militants immediately

folW

suit.

In the face

Of the pressures from both
militant legislators and the
opposition
group outside the Assembly, the
party's Central Standing
Con^ittee
met again on August 4 and succumbed
to the militant line by
passing
another resolution that ordered
the MP's Assemblymen to
subnit their
letters of resignation from the
party by August 18.

of the opposition Assemblymen
demurred.

The majority

The party caucus in the

Assembly on August ? modified this
hard-line by resolving that it
should take advice" of the Central
Standing Committee "only when"

the DRP rejected the letters of
resignation from the National Assembly
(to be submitted to the National Assembly
as soon as the likelihood

of ratification became

By August

apparent).

9, only five members, including Yon. had submitted

letters of resignation from the partyj fifty-three
members had

submitted the letters of resignation from the
National Assembly.

Meanwhile the Fifty-Second Session was convened
on July 29.

The

Assembly immediately formed an ad hoc committee of
twenty-five
composed of seventeen DRP members, ten MP members and
one independent
for preliminary study of the treaty.

The majority faction of MP.

previousl]' committed to debate on the bill joined the ad
hoc committer,

but the mounting pressure from Yun and his militant faction
of MP

made the proper deliberation of the treaty in the ad hoc committee
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very ciirricult when it
convened its

Win.s

on August

>^en it
evident that the op^sition
.e.bers on the ad hoc
con^ittee
intended to TiUi^uster the
session, the ruling part.,
in a
move ,n the late hours of
August 11. forcibly concluded
the debate
was

n^e

hUt^

and won approval of the

co^ttee. sending

Of the National Assembly.

the bill to the .ain
floor

Stunned by what they regarded
as irregular

and ur^en^ocratic procedure,
fifty-one members of the
opposition party
infomed the Speaker of the Assembly
that they were resigning
fro.
the liational Assembly on the
following day. On August 1^..
in a

plenary session attended only by
Democratic Republican Party members
and one independent, the National
Assembly, which had 175 members,

ratified the treaty and the related
agreement by a vote of 110 to
none with one absention.

The steam-roller tactics by the ruling
party had the effect of
intensifying the internal strife in the
opposition camp. The MP
Assemblymen resigned en masse from the
National Assembly on August 12
in accordance with the resolution of
the party caucus of August 7.

Nevertheless, the moderates refused both to
resign from the party
and to dissolve the party when the DRP
declined to accept the letters
of resignation.

Caught between their previous pledge of resignation

under pressure from the militants and a strong
desire to remain in
the

NaUonal Assembly,

the moderates were indeed in a deep dilemma.

With the ttoderates now insisting that the first task of the Mass
Party
was to normalize the party organization in order to struggle against

th. ruling

p^ty

and to render the
ratification

the opposition ca.p was
badly divided.

MP's

nm

and void,

Ho ChSng. a »e.ber of
the

Suprce

Counoil. urged the Asse^bl^^en
to return to the National
Assembly, pointing out the
creation of the party was
not predicated
alone -on the blocking of
the Korea-Japan treaty....
but also in
realizing a viable two party
system."

The militants in a move to
purge H5 and other returnees
from
the party demanded, on Agust
18. a new natioal convention
and sought

forcibly to dissolve the returnees'
constituent party chapters so
as to rorce them to lose
theirAssembly seats. On September
17. the
moderates met to agree on the
principleSof return,in defiance
of the
militants' pressures. The militants,
in a disgraceful outburst
of

their dissatisfaction, forcibly
occupied the party headquarters on

September 21. destroying its furniture
and other properties.

It now

became apparent that the two factions of
the MP could not share the
same bed."^^''
iLfter the two months of single party
National Assembly, the

moderates along with those militants who
refused to resign from the

Assembly returned to the National Assembly.

Kadame Fak Sun-ch'on.

in an apology, made a self-criticism of her
party's disgraceful

perfomance in its attempt

to block ratification, blaming the party's

failure on Yun's reckless and misguided leadership
and promised that

167-

post-ratification feud in the MP, see Minjukongwhadang
\
(The IHP),
Chon.iinun Tangkwadopuro ( Prosnress V/ith the Party: A
Three
Year History of the CRP) (Seoul: The DRF Headquarters, I965),
trr^

pp.
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the KP would be a constructive
and loyal opposition.

With the
public image of the KP at its lowest
point, the fate of the party
had come a full circle as its
predecessors had done- the old

Democratic Party and the Party of the
People.

The return of the

moderates and the departure of the
intransigents brought the
turbulent career of the MP to an end
four month after the party was
born.

In sharp contrast

to the ailing opposition cainp
during the

ratification crisis, the Democratic Republican
Party since its
inception seemed to enjoy impressive solidarity.
rule the party with an iron hand.

Park appeared to

Underneath this seeming unity,

however, the seeds of discord that were sown
into the party from the

beginning slowly started to crack at the seams.

Surely the intraparty

maneuvering within the ruling party was less spectacular
and operated

within limits.

Nevertheless the transformations that were taking

place were significant ones and hence worthy of note.

As a result of the overwhelming victory in the Assembly elections
in 1963, some 110 DRP Assemblymen met to choose

December ?.

their leaders on

The power configuration in the Sixth National Assembly

was quite complex with some five factions vying for the leadership

positions in the National Assembly.

They were; (1) the mainstream

faction; (2) the secretariat faction which supported the mainstream
faction; (3) the May Commrades's Society faction, which after the

initial split with Kim Jong-p»il»s organizers of the DRP joined the
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part,

subse™,;

(.)

oM

Liberal Part. Taction;
(5) the

Democratic Party and the New
Democratic faction.^^S
For vhe speakership of the
newl. elected Asse.bl,

Of the mainstream Taction.
Chong Ku-yong. the
and run Ch'i-yong competed
but

Wr

two Asse.bly.en

Torrner Party President

President Park intervened
to have a

relatively unknown aging
university professor Yi
Hyo^sang. who was
yet to be identified with any
faction, elected to that
post.

vice^peakership went

The

to Chang l^^ng-sun.
the leader of the anti-Kim

Jong-p'il Kay Commrades Society.

The

Hoor leadership

'

was given to Kim Yong-fae who
was the right->nr^ man of
Kim Jong-p-il.
The chainnanships of the standing
con^ittees were distributed
according
to the factional strength of each
group, with six of the twelve
going
to the mainstream faction. This
factional distribution of key
posts
in the National Assembly reflected
Park's concern to check complete

domination

b;^-

the mainstream faction, which, in
alliance with the

secretariat faction, voted to control
all of them.

Despite the concession to other factions
in the National Assembly,
the mainstream faction nonetheless
controlled the party and the key

posts in the Assembly and was able to
dictate party policies and

strategies concerning legislation.

The non-maincurrent factions.

factional alignments in the beginning of the Sixth
V
National
Assembly, see Yu Hyok-in and Xi Chin-hi. " Kin.iukongwhadan^ "
(The Democratic Republican Party). Shindong'a
August, 1966. po. 90-95
See also Cnong Song-kwan, Minjukon^hadan^rui i\aemak"(The
Inside Story
or the DRP), Sedae. June. I906. pp. 109-110.
.
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havin, been eliminated fro.
the centers of ^wer
in the Assembly,
deeply resented the domination..,,
the mainstream Taction
and awaited
the first opportunity to
challenge the mainstream
faction. The
history Of the ruling party
from this time on may be
shown in terms
of the confrontation and the
gradual and eventual takeover
of the

anti...incurrent factions as the
main-current faction in the
party.
The first such opportunity was
provided when the Korea-Japan
Treaty
issue triggered widespread
student demonstrations in
Karch.
The mainstream faction and the
non-mainstream factions ostensibly

differed in their strategies in
dealing with the students- the
former favoring a hard line and
latter

compromise and peace with

students- but the hegemony of the party
was the real issue at

stake.

In several non-confidence motions
introduced from March to April in
1964 by the opposition against ministers, the
mainstream faction was

able to defeat them only by a slim margin
despite the overwhelming

plurality the ruling party had in the Assembly.

This was a clear

indication that the non-maincurrent members had
voted against the
ministers.

As a result of this incident, which has been dubbed
"the
rebellion by vote." the floor leadership of the
National Assembly
changed hands several times.

The non-mainstream factions were now

demanding that President Park retire Kim Jong-p'il from all party
posts in a move to pacify the students and the opposition.

The

non-mainstream faction's strategy seemed to have worked as Kim Jong-p'il
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was recalled fro. Tokyo
where he was negotiating
the treaty, and
later disndssed as Party Chairn^
and sent to the United
States on
his second "exile."
Ki^'s absence, the .ainstrea.
Taction .ade
the former party President
ChSng Ku-yo^ng as Acting
Party President,
but the non-mainstrea^ factions
were making deep inroads
into the

m

party apparatus as well,

m

the reorganization of the
powerful Party

Affairs Council, the non-mainstream
members had

^

come to occupy almost

the sa^e member of seats as the
mainstream counterparts.

President

Park, who needed the absolute
solidarity of the party to have
the

treaty ratified, ha d apparently given
in to the demands of the nonmainstream factions of the party. The
erosion of the maincurrent

faction culminated in the revision of the
party charter in February
25, 1965.

to

The anti-maincurrent factions spearheaded
the movement

attend the party constitution with the
objective of establishing

supremacy of the legislators over the party's
secretariat organs,
where they had little influence.

The revision of party charter was

aimed at dispersing financial and personnel powers
of the Director-

General and generally to shift those powers from the
Secretariat
to the Central Standing Committee. "'"^^
Cto

March 25, a non-confidence motion against Vice Premier.

Chang Ki-yong, was introduced by the mainstream faction of the
ruling
party.

Although this motion was defeated, it represented the first

169
For details of the revision, see Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-hi,
£2. ext., po. 111-112.

.

non-conn.ence vote

„
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.

^^^^^^^

^

^^^^

itself a.d reflected not
onl, the growin, 3ohls.
between the party
ar^ the administration
but also the .ainstrea.
^e^bers- discontent
over the increasing control
of ^utical f™ds by
the non-.ainstrea.
factions. The administration
-s ap^i„t.ents
were heavily influenced
by
Hu-rak. the Presidential
Chief Secretary who was
sympathetic

n

to the non-nainstream f
"'''^
actions.

After the Korea-Japan treaty
was ratified, the maincurrent
faction
tried to recover its weakened
position by reasserting the
old principle
of "party supremacy" over the
administration.
Chong Ku-y5ng. former

President of the party demanded that
President Park dismiss those
members of the administration who
had refused to work closely
with
the party.

The President's subsequent refusal
resulted in Chang's

resignation as the Acting Chairman of
the DRP, who expressed his deep
di^fapointment at the erosion of the original
ideals of the party.

On September 25, under pressure from the
secretariat members,
the Central Standing Committee urged
the return of Kim Jong-p'il from
the United States and his reappointment
as the party's Chairman

"^successful

non-confidence vote of Vice Premier Chang
iinpending need to achieve the unity of
party before the
ratification of the treaty prompted President Park
to issue the
Directive for Improving Organic Cooperation Between
the Party and
the Government on April 8. He instructed the
Cabinet to strengthen
mutual co".sultation with the party on matters of
aoDointment of key
+u

•

administrative posts and important government policies.
This gave
birth to the regular Joint Meeting of the Cabinet and the
Party
Affair Council members at the Presidential residence. For contents
of the directive, see Kin jukonghwadang( The DRP), ChSn.linun
DangkwadoDijrofA Three Year History of the DRP). pp. 3^-33.
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ostensibly on the grounds that

.e was the only .an who
could

revive the vitality of the party
and provide the necessary
leadership.
As a last resort the mainstream

faction attempted to purge
the leaders

of the non-»ainstream factions
in the reshuffling of the
Assembly
leadership.

In a test of strength, Lee
Hyo-sang and Chang Ky^ng-sun

of the non-mainstream factions, who
were the incumbent Speaker
and
Vice Speaker.barely defeated the
mainstream
faction's candidates,

ChSng Ku-yong and Min Kwan-sik. despite
President Park's pleas for
party solidarity behind Lee and Chang.
Had there been no support

from the opposition members who tended
to favor the moderate stand
of Lee and Chang, their reelection would

probably have been unattainable.

In what was then known

as the "disobedience incident."
the rebellion

hy the mainstream faction. Assemblymen Kim
Yong-fai and Min Kwan-sik
had their party previleges suspended for six
months and two others
were reprimanded by the party's Disciplinary
Committee on President
Park's order.
The DR? IJational Party Convention of December
2?. I965 elected

Kim Jong-p»il as Chairman, but it also registered the factional
strength of the non-mainstream groups.

Kil Chae-ho remained as the

Director-General of the Secretariat and so did Kim Song-kon as party's

Finance Coxnmittee Chairman, both of whom had been powerful figures
in the no i-mainstream faction.

Hence, as a result of the reorganization

of both the party and National Assembly leaderships in December.

I965.

the non-mainstream factions, had now replaced the mainstream faction
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as the majority faction.

A new set r.f
of +terminology was

coined.

The non-mainstream of
faction was now sometimes
referred to as the
-new" mainstream faction,
while the mainstream
faction was sometimes

being referred to as the
"old" mainstream faction.
The badly wrecked opposition

camp, having returned
to the divided

status before the Mass Party
was organized, continued
to have problems.
The five intransigent followers
of Yun Po-s^^n. including
big names

in the opposition camp,
had

resigned from the party, and
hence losing

their seats in the National Assembly,
were now preparing yet another
new "clean-cut opposition party."
They had denounced the KP
and the

returning Assemblymen as "elements
of the DRP rule" and condenmed
the crippled party as a "quasi-ruling

party" for its "dishonorable

cooperation" with the ruling party in
the ratification merry-go-around.
The five vacant seats were filled by
by-elections in which the DRP
chose not to participate in a reconciliatory
^''^
gesture.

The defectors met to organize a new
political party under the

banner of the New Korea Party(Shinhantanr)
amid little excitement

on Karch 30. I966. with Yun Po-s5n as its
President and simultaneously
its presidential candidate for the forthcoming
^"^^
I967 election.

Initially the new party(l^KP) was envisioned to recruit
members from

'''VxijijukonghwadangCThe DRP). Chon.iinun DangkwadoDuro(A Three
Year History of the DRP). p. I56.
172
Ksm Jae-hi, "Shinhantangui Kwonryok Kujo"(The Power Structure
of the New Korea Party), Sedae. June I966. pp. 115-121. As of
August, 1966, The Dong-A Ilbo stated that the New Korea Party
organized its party chapters in 76 election districts with a total
membership of 300,000.
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o he.

the

^o.ps sue.

Counen

,.up

or .etire. .ene.als

to Sa.e.«ara ..e
PatHerXan..

to .o...ate t.e

the

as t.e

o^Un,

..e.sel.es

But .u„.s p...,3a„s.
e„o.ts

o^t.-s Xea.e.Mp
^sUXons ana t.e Pa.t.
„o„,„ation

fortWn,

elections ™ade such a
union difficult to
achieve
The KP. „hose public i..a.e
deteriorated badly b. its
unsuccessful
^nd vacillatin. strateeies
to bloc, ratification,
had maintained its
position as the largest
opnosition part, in the
National Assembly
with 59 seats.
^.^ ^^^^

^

Virtual absence of a leader
who could ta.e the rei,„s
of the carty
and oeco.e the standard
bearer of the party, the
party, no. with a
membership of 520.000. selected
a renowned constitutional

scholar
and university president,
but a ^litical novice,
iu Chin-o^as its
leader on October 20.
accepting the party nomination.
Tu explained
that he did so because the
believed it to be in the
national interest
to bring about a constitutional
transfer of power in 1967.
The

m

transfer of power was needed.
Yu remarked in his acceptance
speech,
if a less corrupt administration
could be

secured, if a more equitable

distribution of income in what was
presently a "Zaibatsu Republic"
could be realized, if the abolition
of the
CIA as secret police

could be achieved, if local autonomy
stipulated in the Constitution
could be inplemented, if the build-up
of Korea'^foroes
A
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.

^-

-ang-hi, "I-'injun^dariFrui Seryok
Punp'o"(rhe Power
Configuration in the Lass, .arty), Sedai,
Junef
n

1966^ ^^^^2-127

in South Vietnam could
be enaed,
ended anrt
=
and if
if a
more positive approach
to
the problem of reunification
could be found.^^'^

I*e exigencies of the
forthcoming election once
again put pressure
on the opposition forces to
unite. Despite the many
difficulties,
.n attempt was made to bring
Yun's
and the MP together.
After
a painfully slow round of
eleventh
hour negotiations among
lun Po-s5n.'

ru Chin-o

ar.d

two other prominent
politicians, a new party under
the

name of the Kew Democratic Party
was created on February
only three montte remaining

7. 196?

before the presidential
election.

with

This

union was made successful by both
sides accepting the principle
that
Yun was to be the new party's
presidential candidate, with Yu as
the

head of the party.

The 1967 presidential election saw
the participation of the

socialists for the first time since the
Democratic rule, but attention
was focussed on two candidates. Park and
Yun. in a repeated confron-

tation of two archrivals in the I963 presidential
election.

The

ruling party ran its campaign on the achievement
of the First Five
Year Economic Plan and on the need to have
political stability to

continue with the Second Five Year Economic Plan
which promised
things

*

among other*^: (1) an annual economic growth rate
of 8.5 percent;
(2) self-sufficiency of food by 1971; and (3) a doubling of
personal

income.

Depicting candidate Park as the champion of Korean moderni-

zation, the DRP carefully laid out its campaign strategies
as early

174
See

The Choson Ilbo . October 21, I966.

136
a. .id-1966.

With its total part,
^e.bership re^.ted as
1.555 867 '
or ate.t 11 percent of the
eligible voters,
the

relied heavUy

on its quiat organizational
strength.^^5
nnli.e the I963 election in
which the opposition
p^t. conducted
its campaign mostly on the
issue of President
Parkas "illegal
seizure

Of pow^r." the KDP.S strategy
now seeded based

^r.

on policies.

The opposition attacked Park's
civilian regime as being a
dictatorship
and accused it of. a„ong
othe^j!,^?^!he abuse of
CIA power in politics
and the protection of a few
large business interests.
It criticized
the government policy for
making "the rich
richer and the poor
nan poorer." Its own platfon,
promised the guarantee of
freedom of
speech, the expansion of human
rights, and curbing of
presidential
power by increasing cabinet
responsibility, the neutralization
of
the police, the realization of the
local autonomy, the revision
of
the Korea-Japan Treaty, and the
withdrawal of Korean troops from

Vietnaa.

In the economic field, the opposition
platform called for

a "mass economic system" based on a balanced
growth between the
agrarian and industrial sectors. It promised

a 20 percent decrease

in overall tax. a 30 percent decrease in
fertilizer price and the
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«leotions. see Soon Sung Cho, "Korea:
1.
Janui-y. 1968.
o« Pq!?/^'^^
^'^^
Elections"
Pa;i?WffSs
Altairs. 1968.
£301112
M68"-nn'
60-70. See also Glenn D. Paige. "1966pp. L'"^n"^%"'^"?
Plo.t-i

^v'"

1967).^d!*Ii-3o!

Vol. VIII,

^SimS^Svei:, Vol. VII. „o. l(j^Zry.
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abolition or preferential
loans to large
busine^s.^^^
-e eleotion ret^ns s.o.e.

t.at Par.-s
.annate .or

tHe oo„in.
four yBars was
considerably increased
a, compared
^
with the 1963

Of the nost remarkable
tren* in this election
was the

3up»rt

Parte

^.
his fiasco

.ained in
-Hi the
one cities
Cities.

.

^

m

in 1963
.
1963, oeoul
gave only 30 2

percent of the rural
vote.

r

,

For FarV
-u
rark fv,^
the urban
areas were

the previous
election,

The Assembly mandate
for the

•

—
p^^p

t..=o
v.as

TO be exact, it had
130 seats whereas the

even greater.

-,,.P

Takin^ place

^"coeeded

Ll,

had only .5 seats

^0 part, in Korean history had
dominated the National
Assembly ^ith
such an Absolute
majority.
The char.es of
widespread eleotion

-e...ritie3

orxsxs.

on

in the .ational
Assembly elections and
the opposition

J^y u.

spontaneous demonstrations
of students erunted
Seoul and these soon
spread to provincial
towns.
The .o.ernment
-lied on the old tactic of
closin. the universities
and promised
to rectify t..e
situation by punishing
those where irre.^arities

-

i»

ror oorooarison of two

CMn^ian-aCA

Dartie=!'

Kisto:.y°of herein

r,i« +

<-
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were discovered,

with the op^sition
de,nandi„, the
nuUiTication
or the election, the
rulin, p^t.. on orders
of

President ParK, tried
to appease the
opposition ,y expelling
.ix of its partes
elected

A»se.bl:™en and b. relinquishing
one seat to a

candidate, but
the opposition was adamant
in demanding a new
election wit^ut which
the party «,^d scuttle
the forthcoming National
Asse.bly.177

Having failed to

noWi.e

the political situation,
the

mP

opened the tiational Assembly
without the opposition
.embers, thus
starting "one party National
Assembly."

The constitutional
provision

which prohibits one party National
Assembly^^S

circumvented by
the ruling party through an
ingeneous method of organizing
a

negotiation group under the name of

ChongW( Political

Friendship

Society).

The ruling party "dismissed"
thirteen legislators to
form a negotiation group in October

5. 196?, and its name was changed

to Ch^a^-uhoe on December
25, 1968.

The membership of this society

was stabilized to ten and was
to serve a useful purpose for
the ruling
party.
The hard line taken by the ruling
DRP opened another factional

wounds in the opposition camp.

The NDP was divided on the strategies

the party should adopt vis-a-vis the
ruling party.

The elected

members seemed to favor a compromise with
the DRP to normalize the

177
Sobs 266 election nullification suits were pending
in the
Supreme Court immediately after the election.
178

Cons titution( Chapter I. Article 7, paragraph
1) states:
The establishment of political parties shall be free
and the plural
party system shall be guaranteed." Secretariat, the
National
Assembly, Selected Laws Governing National Assembly of
rieoublic of
t
Korea , p. 8.

——

,

>»Xitical Situation; the.
de^nded „e„ elections only
wHe.e election
irreeuxarities had occu^ed.
The. also demanded a
change in election
la« With a View to
neutralization of the police
and
the government bureaucracy
and the punishment of
cabinet ministers
others Who were responsible
for the irregularities.

^teeing

^

A hard line

was adopted by those who
were defeated in the
elections: they were
demanding nothing less than
a new general
election.

were not satisfactorily

answered, the

mp

As their demands

kept its «,rds this

tl«e.

Until a protocol was signed
between the ruling and
opposition
parties on November 20.
1967. the WP Assemblymen stayed
out of the
Assembly.

The protocol called for a
"guarantee legislation" to

safeguard fair elections.
The representatives of the two
parties collided on a suitable
nechanism to solve the perennial problem
of fraudulent elections.
In drafting the Guarantee Legislation,
the two parties conferred on.
things
ainong other^: tl) speeding
up of election fraud litigation
procedure;
*

.

(2) prohibition of interference with elections
by bureaucrats;

(3) safeguarding against fraudulent balloting;
(^) fair campaign

procedure; and (5) redistricting.^79

^^^^^

negotiations

between the representatives of the two parties
was a much watered-down

version of what was originally contemplated by
the opposition party.
179
See, The Dong-A Ilbo, December 1?, I968.
p, 1 and 3.
For
Guarantee Legislation, see The Dong-A Ilbo, December
?n lyoo,
JO,
p. 1.
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Writing about the I967 elections
Cho Soon Sung stated:
eventually be seen as one of
political
llttlZ of
bisto.y
.Tr^'^t
Korea because the elections will
have
decisively charted the course of
future political
develop^.ent in the country.
President pSk/wS has
for'the last
l^Kt^^"
SIX
years, "^'"'f
cannot seek another term in I971
without
amending the Constitution. He
will be oniy fin?!
four years old then. But Korea
has not yet witnessed
governmental change through
constitutional
ine viability of a democratic
change of governm-nt will
upon the election outcome. ?hus,
the p^sldenti^
and_ National Assembly elections
of I967 are casting
tiieir long shadows beyond I971,
P^*"

+>>o

^ge

Despite the important problem of succession
to President Park,
the DRF had shown a remarkable tranquility

through Kay. I968 partly

due to President Park's order which forbade
any activity on the
question! of succession until at least 1970.

Then on May 30. I968,

the Chairman of the party, Kim Jong-p'il, suddenly
resigned from his

party post and as an Assemblyman.

It was clear to everyone that he

was doing so because of his disenchantment over the
matter of the
expulsion from the party on May 25 of Kim Yong-t»ai.
The latter had

been one of the former's proteges.
suggestive:

His departing remark was rather

"I am not going to return to politics.

I

may have an

opportunity to reveal the reasons sometimes in the future. "'"^^
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Soon Sung Cho. od. cit . p. 29, By I967 assembly elections,
the DRP had thirteen more seats than the two- thirds majority for a
cons t itut io nal amendment
.

Doner-k Ilbo,
p. 3.

December 30, I968,

"Political Statements of the Year,"

.

.

1^4-1

As it was revealed later

Km Ycs-fai

was purged by the DRF

Bi3ci=linary Co^ittee for havin,
carried out an a.ti-party
activity.
He was ch^,ed with factional
activity creating "a party
within the

party.

-

by recruiting atout 900 loyal
supporters . „ost of who.
were

core ner,bers of the present
and past party secretariats,
under a
cover organization known as
the Korean people's .velfare
.research

Institute.

A position paper published
by this "institute" reportedly
advocated that they would oppose
any fon, of constitutional
a.end.ent

that would nake President Park
eligible for a third-term. ^82

The

road to the first constitutional
amendment since Park took office
In 1953 treaded a rou* road and
hightened the emotiorfof the ruling

and o^TOSition politicians alike.

The original mainstream faction

of the party was against it as Kim Jong-p'il
seemed to have been the
only logical successor to President Park,
who was a husband of his

niece.

Having lost all power position in the
party, the Assembly

and the government to the non-mainstream
men and their sympathizers
the mainstream faction itself was divided
as to what their strategy

B. Kim,
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ot).

cit., d. 203.

The Txjsition of Director-Generalshic was held by
Kil Chae-ho*
the^Chairnianship of the Party Finance Coinnittee by
Kirn 5^n-kon, the'
ChairE^nsliar) of the Policy Committee by Faek Nam-ok;
the floor
leadershii) in the rational Assembly by Kim Chin-man;
the Speakership
of the x\ational Assembly by Lee Hyo-san?:; and the TX)st of
Chief
Presidential Secretary by Lee Hu-rak, All of these men, although
with Traryijig degrees of commitment, belonged to the non-mainstream

factions
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Should be.

ivesident Park himself
regained silent until
the
crucial moment.

In 1968. the prospects of
whether or not the government
would
introduce

an ax.end.ent bill allowing
a third term presidency

was a subject of wide speculation.

During the question-and-answer

proceedings in the National Assembly,
the opposition legislators
repeatedly questioned the government's
intention on this matter.^^

On December 19. the trial balloon
for a constitutional amendment
was first lifted by Yun Ch'i-ySng.
the acting party
Chairman, in his

speech at a provincial party headquarters.

Without naming what

provisions he had in mind. Yun declared
that, in a developing nation
"it is important, for the sake of
modernization, that one party

remains in power for an extended period
time."

He said further that

"the question of constitutional amendment
must be viewed in the

context of our international situation.

The year 1969 began with
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Prir-e Minister Chong Il-kwon in his answer
to the

National
Assembly stated on July 25, I968: "The thought of
amending the
constitution enabling three terms for the President has
nSt entered
my mind. I do not believe that it would be fruitful to discuss
this
matter since the Constitution stipulates a four-year term for

President." The Qon?-A Ilbo, "Statement of the Year." December
30,
1968. Yu Chin-o, the IJDP Chairman stated in an interview on July
5,
1968: "Since President has not answered our party's question with
regards to aaiending the Constitution in favor of three terms for
the President, we assume that the President is willing to abide by,
and respect, the Constitution." """"
Ibid.
"tQc
-The Dong-A Ilbo . December 20, 1968, p. 2.

leaders of the major parties
.aking contrasting
evaluations
of
the record of the government
in the 1960's.^'^
Meanwhile, the
Possibili.^ Of introducing a
constitutional amendment was
indicated
repeatedly by certain leaders
of the ruling
party.

On January

7. lun reiterated his belief that
the current situation

in Korea called for strong
leadership in order to achieve
the

"^dernization of our fatherland."
and that his party was looking
into the problems in the
Constitution, "including the
question of
amending the provision which
prescribes presidential terms. "^^^
a

day later Vice Chairman of the
party's Policy Committee. Kim
Chu-in.
echoed Yun's view by stating that
"it is imperative
to change the

constitutional provision which forbids a
third-presidential term"
in order for "a strong leader to guide
the nation when it is faced
with extraordinary challenges from Korth
""^^^
Korea.

ISo^

....
i^resident
Park in his ew ear message remarked:
"The
Sixties
Korea have been marked by the departure
from immobilism
and low posture and the progress toward
the modernization of
fatherland." Chairman of the KDP Yu Chin-o's
message struck on a
more pessimistic note. "The decade started
by the hope of April 19
Revolution has been overturned by the Military
Revolution, and we
have had the oeginning of the period of
non-presence of three thingsnon-presence of individuals dignity; non-presence
of freedom of
speech; and non-presence of ix)litics. To the burden
of corrupt
political power we were asked to endure sabotage." He went
on to
score "three enemies": excessive exercize of political power,
fraud
and corruption, and over-reaction to IJorth Korea's
aggressive activities
See The Dong-A Ilbo, January 7, I969. p. 3.
r»
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Tne Dong-A Ilbo . January 7, I969, p. 1.
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Ibid., January 8, I969.

The

ton

of events prompted an action
by the man whon the
proposed

amendment was to benefit.

In his press interview on
January 10.

President Park stated his belief
that -.he laws should not
be changed
without sufficient cause." He
expressed

the hope that the
Constitution

would not be amended during his
term of office.

Ee failed to settle

the matter, however, when he
added that "if constitutional
changes
are absolutely necessary, it should
be discussed toward the end
of
the year or at the beginning of
the next.-^®

^^^^^^^

^_

President specifically instructed his
party not to discuss the matter
of amendment.

But a flurry of activities in the camps
of both the ruling and
opposition parties continued. The NDP floor
leader. Kim long-sam.

flatly declared on January 9 that "we are
opposed to any form of
constitutional amendment."

The party proceeded to organize a
"Struggle

Committee to Defend the Constitution" and studied
the question of

whether or not the task at hand should be done in
cooperation with
other political groups.

The ruling party, on the other hand, in

disregard of Park's statement of January 10, proceeded
to take up
the issue of amendment.

Despite apparent opposition from the

mainstream faction, the party took the view that if public
opinion
was favorable to such a measure, it would not be necessary to
wait

until the end of the year or the beginning of the new year as Park
had suggested.
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^Ibid .

.

January 10, I969.

1^5

Xb«oretioal ar.^ents, both for
and against a third ter.
presidency
were reminiscent of those of
the 195^ constitutional
a.end.ent which
allowed President Rhee a life-long
car.didacy.^^O

^^.^^ ^^^^

argued that in underdeveloped
countries, strong leadership

is a
prereqx:isite to economic modernization,
without which there can be
no western style political order
and stability. "The present
situation

in Korea demands that President
Park should be given another
chance
to serve his nation." Yun stated,
and "the people of this country

should eliminate the constitutional
obstacles if it is necessary for
the good of the future of their country. "^^1
^^2
continued:

The call of the time must be answered
faithfully,
transfer of power can be made between
political
parties or between one leader and
another in the same
party. It is equally possible that one
man can
xn power for an extensive period if necessary. remain
^posed amendment is designed to answer the callIfofthe
tile times— raoid progress— then
it must be carried
out at all costs within the framework of democracy.

^e

The opposition argument proceeded from the premise
that the
proposed amendment ran counter to the principle
of constitutional

arguments in favor of the amendment, see Yun
Ch'i-yong.
.
"Chokukui Maeilul Wihae"(For Nation's Better Tomorrow)
Chung'an :^.
October, 1969. pp. 7^78, and also his "Constitutional
Amendment is
Necessitated" Koreana Quarterly . Vol. XI. No. 3(Autumn. I969)
pp. I-I3.
For arguments against, see Yu Chin-o. "Xaehonun Yoksaui
Kongjonida"
(The Constitutional Amendment is the Repetition of the
Shameful
History), Chung 'anp, October. I969. pp. 70-?^, and Kim Chae-kwang,
"Amendssent of the Constitution Lacks Logical Foundation." Koreana
Quarterly., Vol. XI, Nc 3(Autumn. I969). pp. 14-25.
ttnu

1

"Constitutional Amendment is Necessitated," p. 2.
"•-^^Ibid., p. 12.

I'if6

d^^oorac.

ru stated on January
1? that "it has been a
historical
lesson that the P„petuation
o.

^iitical ^„er in one party
eventually

ciegenerat.3 into a regime
of corruption, injustice
and dictatorship.. .'93

Ki™ Da«.jung, an opposition
Assembly™*, and later
President Parks'
foe in the 1971 presidential
election, insisted that the
third

presidency would be tantamount
to a second

..coup.'

te™

and the strange and

Illogical notion that, without Park.
Korea would not be able to
withstand Communist challenges and
bring about modernization is
a
"mere fiction that is reminiscent
of the attempts to justify

fthee's

political power...
The

He concluded: "Without Rhee.
Korea still stands.

mP.

having staked the party's fort^e
on blocking the constitutional
amendinent when it was proposed,
ordered the formation of a
Struggle
Committee to Defend the Constitution
in each of the party chapters

Of election districts as well as
in the provincial party chapters.
The
party started on its barnstorming
tour in May.

The DRP, with special instructions
from the President not to
discuss the matter of constitutional
amendment, was to have an

agonizing time to unify the party.

The ruling party had the necessary

two-thirds vote in the Assembly, but the possible
"revolf of the

back-benchers

and the mainstream faction required that the
party

proceed cautiously on this matter.

Some members of the mainstream
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^Thj Dong-A Ilbo . January 21. 19$9, p.
^'^'Ibid.
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faction had earlier expressed
the view that they

>«,uld oppose the

constitutional a.end.ent for the
sake of democracy, despite
the fact
that President Park had brought
to the nation unprecedented
prosperity
and pride.

A prelude

to the oncoming stonn was
provided on April 8,

1969. when some forty-five members of
the ruling party crossed
party
lines to pass a non-confidence
motion proposed by the opposition

against Education Kinister Kwon 0-byong
for his "disgraceful and
perjorative remark about the National Assembly."

The crossing of

party lines was made despite the fact that
both President Park and
the party apparatus had given stern warnings
and instructions to

defeat the motion.

Another "disobedience incidence" resulted in
the resignation
of the DRP's floor leadership and the purge
of five revolting
mainstream members from the party on orders by
President Park.

On

April 11. the President expressed his deep
disaappointment about the
division in the party, lamenting at the degeneration
of the DRP into
the pathologies of the past Korean parties.

He ordered the Party

Displinary Committee to deal with the rebels no matter how many
there
were. 195 On April 15, the Disciplinary Committee expelled
five
mainstream faction members of the Assembly in connection with this
incident.

All five of the expelled Assemblymen had been publicly

195
^For Park's statement, see The ronp-A Ilbo
p. 1.

.

April 11, 1969,

—
1^4-8

opposed to the proposed amendinent.^^^
Despite Park's discouragement,
the amendment issue could
not
escape public discussion. Kim
Jong-p-ii,

the heir apparent to
President

Park, broke his long silence
and came out in support of
the President
without specifically mentioning
the issue of amendment.
He stated
on April 19 that "in order to
guide this country to stability
and

prosperity." "it is absolutely necessary
to have President Park's
strong leadership. "197 On Kay
9. the spokesman of the Democratic

Republican Party urged the people to
consider the issue of amendment
"with sincerity." taking due consideration

of the "twin exigencies of

reconstruction and national defense. "^^^

m Kay and

June, the ruling

party went into a barnstorming tour of the
country drumming up support
for the amendment. The students erupting again
in campuses all over

the country; the Ministry of Education ordered
early vacations for

all schools.

While the New Democratic Party was taking the lead
in organizing
a pan-national Struggle Committee against the
amendment. President

Park issued a special statement to the press
indicating his plan to
hold a national referendum on the proposed amendment.

"In the event

196
On July 12, more expulsion followed. Ninety- three party
members including eleven Central Committee members and four chairmen
of district party chapters were expelled on that day. See The Dong-A
Ilbo, July 13, 1969, p. 1.
197
The Chosyn Ilbo. April 20, I969, p. 1.
198
^ Ibid . . Kay 10, I969, p. 1.

1^9

that the

«ent bill fails

in this referenda.,
the statement

continued. "I would regard
it as havin, received
non-confidence and
government and I win step
do«,."
the sa.e statement.
President
urged the rulin, party to
introduce the a.end.ent
bill at an earliest
possible date.^^

m

Having heard the final word
fro. the man for who. the
amendment
bill was proposed, the ruling
DRP Assemblymen spent
agonizing

seventeen
hours in caucus in the evening
and the early morning hours
of July 29
and 30 in an attempt to bring
the dissenting Assemblymen
into the

fold.

In this meeting, many
mainstream faction Assemblymen
were

reported to have spoken against
the proposed amendment,
but they
finally agreed to support the party
line on this crucial vote.

Meanwhile, despite the repeated
assurances by the KDF leader Yu
Chin-o
that he had sufficient votes(59) to
defeat the amendment bill, three

NDP Assemblymen came out on July 30 in
support of the amendment.

In

a legal maneuver to disqualify these three
Assemblymen, the party

decided to dissolve itself temporarily on
September 5-

Thirteen days

later, the party rescinded its action.

On September

9.

the amendment bill was introduced on
the floor

of the National Assembly.

After four days of discussion and having

determined that there was no chance to block the passage
of the bill.
199

Tb^ Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 1969. p.
Jiay 26. 1969, p. 1.

1. and The Choson Ilbo.
'

the opposition Assemblymen
forcibly occupied the rostrum
in a move
to interfere with the parliamentary
proceedings,
the late evening
hours of September 14, however,
the Speaker called the
National Assembly
into session in one of its annex
buildings. Present at the
session

m

were 122 DRP Assemblymen who favored
the bill,

m

six short minutes,

the bill was declared passed with
a vote of 122 votes to none.^^O

The oray DRP Assemblymen who spoke
against the bill to the end was
aging Chong Ku-y^ng. the first President
of the DRP. The KDP

immediately declared this extraordinary
parliamentary tactic as null
and void after an angry outburst
of
emotions.

As promised by President Park, the
amendment question was put
to a national referendum on October
1?.

m

a referendum marked by

a low voter turnout, some seven-and-a-half
million voters cast
affirr^ative votes; only three and a half
million votes were cast

against the amendment.

Only in Seoul did the majority of voters
vote

against the amendment.

Korean politics in the 1960's was marked by two
transfers of
governtment through unconstitutional means.

First, the Student

Uprisings on April 19, I960 brought down Rhee and the Liberal
Party
governzaent overnight.

The latter was replaced by the government of

Chang flyon and the Democrats, who, after having been relegated to
the role of perennial opposition, had come to find that the burdens

The Choson Ilbo, September 10, p. 1. and September 13,
p. 1.
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Of power were as great, ir not
greater than those of the
opposition.
At the prospect of power, the
Democrats split badly,
eventually

leading to the break-up of the
party in two. with almost
equal strength.
AS so^ argued then this division
could have been a health,phenomenon

at the time when the Democrats
had an overwhelming mandate
to rule
the country under the newly
adopted
cabinet system.

Unfortunately,

however, the Democrats' effort to
deal with the problems of open
polity and to manage political conflict
was abruptly terminated by

yet another extraordinary method of transfer
of power- a military
coup.

After a brief period of military rule,
the transition to civilian
rule was effected through the medium of the
Democratic Republican

Party to which flocked many former military
officers.

As a carefully

planned and well funded political party, the
DRP launched on an
ambitious road to realize party politics based
on policy commitments

transcending personality-centered political parties
of the past.

In election after election, the party displayed its
quiet organizational

stren^h with

its salaried party functionaries and unprecedented

effective central coordiantion.

Institutional ties were developed

in order to have party policies and platforms reflected in the
policies of the administration.

It

15 premature, however, to say that the DRP has completely

overccane the past ills of Korean parties.

The problem of factionalism
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manifested on several occasions
represents a .ajor cancer
of the party,
although thus far President Park
has prevented an open
split of the

party.

The original ideal of party
politics has been compromised
because the party secretariat
organization has relinquished
more ar.d
wore power to the party's National
Assemblymen.

The opposition parties, however,
have shown no internal
improvement.
The emergence of crisis brought the
opposition
politicians together

on occasion as during the Liberal Party
regime, but the party had
endure the perennial problem of factionalism,

to

the struggle for the

hegemony of the party, and even an open split
of the party.

An

ineffective collective leadership, one of the
notable characteristics

of the opposition party structure, continued
through most of the
1960's; the party's image deteriorated through a
series of bungling

and other poUtical errors; it failed to recruit
fresh blood to its
ranks.

The development of Korean parties in the 1960's is summarized
in the following geneological diagrain( Diagram

2).'

'
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CHAPTER

III

IDEOLOGY. OROANIZATIOK
AND LEADKiSHIP
OF MAJOR KOREAN PARTIES

Ideology

At the ti.e of

the liberation Korea
found herself divided
along

the thirty-eighth parallel
for the purpose of disarming
the Japanese
troops by the Allied forces.
This military expediency
had left a

fateful ir,print on the ideological
and political development
in
Korea and on the nature of party
politics.

This military division

developed into a political one, with
each of the two occupying
powers
sponsoring a regiine to its liking
when they could not agree on
the

method of unification.

The division was perpetuated
by the continuing

inability to agree on the method of
unification, by a brutal war,
and by frequent military provocations
from the North.

In the onrush of foreign ideologies
amidst the excitement of
liberation, the traditional Korean political
thought remained a

mere ineffectual echo.

Various imported ideologies competed
to win

the place of the dominant ideology of the
nation, but never were
these ideologies allowed to compete freely: the
adoption of liberal

democracy can be attributed more to the vicissitudes of
international
-to

politics than^any other factor in domestic politics.

In the era of

confrontation among Weltanschauung parties in the immediate postwar
era, there were four discernible policy differences.

The first of

these was represented by the Korean Democratic Party and the KARKI.

An analysis of the platforms and policies of these two groups would
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indicate that the. la. On
the extreme right
of the Korean
.Htical
spectn:m._^ Espousing the
ideology of liberal
democracy and the
freedo. or individual they
favored
^

.

a free economic
system, e.ual

opportunity for all. particularly
in the field of education.
as their policy of
unification was concerned,

As far

they advocated unification

under a democratic system
and through mediation by
the United Nations.
On the thorny issue of
land reform, they were in
favor of it.
although they insisted on
compensation for the distributed
land.^
To the Korean Independence Party,
the overriding ideology was
that of nationalism, through
which the party .ought
to solve
complex problems of the chaotic era.
it advocated unification
through the
efforts of the Koreans under a
republican form of
government. In economic policy,
it favored a planned economy
and

redistribution of land with compensation.
was free, compulsory education.

One of its notable social policies

Except for its emphasis on

nationalism, the KIP's platforms did not
differ much from the KDP's.

Of the two class parties, the Laboring
People's Party was
party of socialist inclination.

the

It advocated nationalization of the

nation's financial and industrial enterprises;
redistribution of land

without compensation and government ownership of
the land; and
liberation of laborers through the proclamation of a
laborers'

ror platforms and policies of theae parties, see Yi Ki-ha,
cit.,
and Han T'ae-su. Hankuk Chon^dangsa (A History of Korean
22'
Political Parties) and The Central Election Management Committee.
Taehanrninkuk Chon.^angsa (A History of Korean Political Parties).
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Charter.

In unification policy, the
party, as the KIP. called
for
a self-reliant unification
under
a democratic system.

The South

Co.^ist

Korean

Party, like all Co^u::ist
parties, proposed a radical
pro^ra. for the nation, the
contents of which were similar
to those

of the Laboring People's Party.

It naturally advocated
unification

under Communist auspices and
constantly supported the Russian
position
In the United States-USSR Joint
Conference.

Kever were these differences in
policies allowed to bloom in
the complex international and
domestic

situation to which the nation

was subjected in the postwar era.

Since her independence, the policy

of anti-Comrnunism was adopted and elevated
to the plane of national
policy.

This unalterable policy seems to have
prevented the development

of nationalism for. as one author has
put

it,

"if nationalism were

allowed to develop without ^governmental restraint,
it was apparent
that it could diminish the importance of an tiCommunism to the point

of constitutin/T a threat to the stability of the regime
in South

Korea."

2

The ideological wasteland thus created failed to
evoke

participation in politics.

2

K. W. Kim, "Ideology and Political Development in South Korea,"
P^c^f^c Affairs . Vol. 3^. Summer, 1965. p. 166. For the treatment

of^ideolori-cal problems in Korean politics, see Yi Yonr-il. "iiankuk
Chonpch'i <iasan;Tui Ketaborism"( The Metabolism of the Korean
Political
Thou^-ht). Sasanrvie. February, 196a. pp. 133-1^3, and So Jun--sok,
"Yinyon^C:\or-danrun Tabuinka?"(Are Ideological Parties Taboo?),
Chonrrkyonrr Yon

Vu

.

December, I969, pp. 97-10^.

Fro. the point of view of
party clitics, the
consequences of
anti-Communism may be viewed in
ter^ of.
first, the complete

domination of the political scene
by the right wing conservative
parties and the resultant
elimination

of the socialist parties,
and.

second, by the restriction of party
programs and activities to
a
narrow, cleaxly defined political
framework. Here, the
conservatism
of Korean parties does not mean
that the parties adhere
to the status
quo and rejection of the change
of it.

They are conservative in the

sense that they aim at gradual
evolutionary process of equalizing
political, social, economic, educational
opportunities under the

banner of liberal democracy without
advocating a revolutionary change
of the status quo. Also, they are so
called because their platforms

and oolicies advocate those which are in
direct opposition to the

position of the North Korean Communists.

The Rhee government was from the outset beset by
increasing
Communist agitation and violence.

It outlawed the Communist Party

and allowed the arrests of Communists and their "fellow
travelers."
This law has been subsequently strengthened by several
amendments.

A similar anti-Communist law was enacted in July.
196I by the military
regime to strengthen the anti-Communist posture of the
nation.

Often,

this anti-Communist legislation was flagrantly abused by
the government
to suppre<^s its political opposition, vocal students, and the press.

In the arena of international politics, an advocacy of even a

neutralism has been regarded by the succeeding regimes as dangerous
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and as in violation of national
security legislation.

In domestic

politics, this absolute oo^it^ent
to anti-Co^unism as an
unalterable
policy nade the line very thin
bet«een democratic socialism
and
Communism*

It Is no wonder that in the absence
of a suitable ideology,
such near-ideology as Ilminchui, or
"One People Principle^' should
be introduced by Rhee and his lieutenants
in the 19^6-

period.

This "philosophy," a manifestation of
nationalism, elevated the

principle of national unity as a supreme goal.

"Our supreme objective

is to carry on our affairs by sacrificing
everything and uniting into

one."

"Special interests," which have been the bane
of the nation,

were said to deny the "true soul" of the nation,
transmitted through
heredity, which longed for unity of action and will.^

This ineffective

and poorly disseminated "philosophy" never caught fire among
the masses
and it became a mockery of the intellectuals.

At any rate, with Rhee's

election as President and the achievement of comparable unity,
this

philosophy was discarded.

In the absence of a symbol

to which party elites and the rank

and file members are bound, the only practicable way of holding a

party together was to make an all-out appeal to follow the charism.atic

3

See Koh Kwang-il, In Quest of National Unity and Power
Political Ideas and Practice of S.-'/nrrma'i £thee( Unpublished Ph. D
Disserta,tion: Rutgers University, 1963).
See alscCregory Henderson,
op . ext., p. 28^.
;
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ieader.

The first of the three
provisions of the oath of
the Liberal
Party, for example, stated:
"I uphold and whole-heartedly
support
Chair^n Knee's spirit of patriotism
and independence.'^ A
Liberal
Party doe^ent published just
prior to the I960 Student
Uprising,
expounded this non-ideology as
follows:^

0'^"5 to the brilliant guardianshio of
our President
^ihee] and wise leadership
of Speaker Yi^fif?
Cjpeaker of the National Assembly,

Coyn^an

?956ll960 a^d

rll^^

jade a steady orogress and has
come to emer^^as a
stable political force despite
insurmountable nattnn.i
problems and crisis. Without
the
leadeJshS
1'
the'a^t
e^^,
an a\To1refL'rt
a±±-out effort on
TM'^^'^:
the part of our

S^ant
^

members

''^^ p-^^'

t+

tSt n:uer/:ur

ri^L'"^could !;^"
nation
have preserved its identity.
i^liile

the ruling party appealed for
loyalty to the charismatic

leader, it authorized political
activity only to such political

assemblies or organizations that could
be considered to belong to
the conservative right. The ideologies
of the middle of the road,
such as democratic socialism, and the leftist
groups were not
permitted.

That anything approaching leftist ideas
was a taboo in

Korean politics can best be illustrated by the
fate of the Progressive
Party and its leader Cho 3ong-am.

The party was officially organized

on November 10. I956 after its leader Cho Bong-ain gained
more than

4

Jayudang(The Liberal Party), Jayudangui Op.iokkwa Sich'aek
(The Accor.plishments and Policies of the Liberal Party),
(SeoulJayudang, February. I960), p, 26?,
^Ibid,. p. 11.

two million votes in the
May presidential
xaj. election
exection th.f
that year. Though
a forrser Communist, Cho
renounced the party
partv in 192^.3
iqL^ and
. was
considered
an anti-Communist thereafter.

m

The Progressive Party and its
leading members including
Cho
were implicated in an espionage
case
in January. 1958.

The claims

of an extensive contact with
the party leaders by
an indicted soy
pr^^pted the government to carry

out a mass arrest of party
leaders.

The ^J^erment elataed before
the court that the party's
platform
which ,
for the unification through
peaceful means was identical

With the North Korean slogan and
hence "jeopardized the
existence
of the Republic." It also considered

subversive an article w-itten

by Cho in the October,
1957 issue of the Progressive Party
magazine
Chunslang ChSn^ch'i because it supported
all-Korean elections as a

way of bringing about unification.

In addition to the charges of

illegal possession of a weapon, Cho was
held for accepting large
sums of money from Korth Korea for
use in his 1956 presidential

election campaign.
Vrithout waiting for the decision of the
court, the Office of

Public Information cancelled the publication
license of the Chung 'ang
Chon^ch'i on February 24, 1958. and on the following
day, it announced
the caxicellation of the formal registration of the
Progressive Party.
The Director of the Office of Public JrLformation declared
that the

action was taken on the basis that the Progressives "advocated
means

^
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Of Korea. uniTication «hich
are contrary to the la»
of Republic of
Korea and the resolution of
the

United r.ation="; that the
"constant

touch" beUeen the ft-ogressive
Party a,J the Co^unists
in North
Korea disqualified it as a legal

^litical party; and that the
party

had sought to elect converted
Cor»uni3ts

ai,d

their fellow travelers

to the National Asser,bly and
thus subvert democratic
institutions

in the republic.^

m the

court proceedings that began in
March, I958 and ended

in February. 1959. Cho was sentenced
to death on charges of
espionage,
violation of the National Security Law
and illegal possession of arms.

The outlawing of the Progressive Party
was to serve as a sober

reminder that the government would not
tolerate the advocacy of
programs and policies that diverged from
the officially set policy.

Since the Korean society lacks cleavages along
the lines of
social classes, the Korean parties may be described
as parties of
social integration, to use Sigmund Neumann's terminology.

In the

socio-economic milieu in which anything approaching leftist
inclinations

are not permitted, the existing conservative parties
paid lip service
to what a social democratic party elsewhere might
espouse.

—

Whatever

these conservative parties may say in their platforms
they were

z
The Dong-A Ilbo. February 25, 1958, p. 1.
For a brief history of the progressive movement and difficult ies
encountered by it, see Yi Sang-du, "Chesam Chongch'i Seryi^kui
Yokchong"(A History of the Third Political Force), Sasanr'^e. AuPiist.
1968, pp. 110-118.
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mostly exercises i„
political rhetoric.
nence the analysis
Hence
.
of the
party policies and
platforms does not offer
^'^^^'^
^ meaningful insight
,
,
,
into
Korean parti.-?s.
•

.

The non-issue contents
of partv
party i^in+f-^
platforms on campaign
pledges
are veil illustrated by
a comparison of
the 1950
xne
i960 campaign pledges
of the two ma.lor t>arti*»<!
+v,
t
"
''-'^
I960 presidential
8
,
election.
The Liberal Party promised,
among other things,
the
"elevation of public sense of
morality" ana
and the "d.
development of new
ethics" based on democratic
ideals:
establishm. . of. a self
J establishment
supporting
economy, improvement of Korea
Korea s international
payment position; encouragement of agriculture,
fisherv and
iishery
«nH forestry,
^
strengthening the
function of agricultural
coonerat
W^c=
cooperatives;
encouragement of small and
•

-r.

1

.

.

-e.iu..si.e. enterprises;
encouragement or consumption
o. ao.estic
products; readjustment of the
taxation system;

strengthening of
international .ends to establish
collective security; and
strengthening
Of economic diplomacy.
The Democratic Party, on
the other hand, presented
their pledges
in the following terms:
realization of a cabinet
responsibility

.yste. and abolition of authoritarianism,
revision of the new security

"A Re!ie:

orP^JtrcIr^L^rA^t^iirt"

Korean Affairs
Vol 2.
No
t
Park Hee-bura.-'poiriicli Pa^-t,
.

QqS^t

J

Koreana .uart^r^v^ ^^^r^:-^::!

.

--^l-^ fro™ „an T-ae-su.
" 318-330. " See(1955-1960 ),"
'

^

also

?sL!:r5ri96?:^=r ^39-i:3:"^^'"
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and local autonomy laws, removal
of political pressures
on labor,
agricultural, youth, women's and
other social organizations,
non- interference by the
executive branch in the affairs
of ^he
Judiciary, decentralization of
police, fair management of
elections,

remove of violence and

the social vices, abolition
of monopolization

of economic resources by a limited
and privileged class.
stabUization
Of agricultural and fishery economy,
fair taxation and the lowering

of taxes.
The ruling and the opposition parties
alike accepted liberal
democracy without apparently believing
in the values.

The ideology

of liberal democracy was a convenient
tool to combat Communism,

w'hen

necessary, however, the processes and the
values which liberal

democracy represented could be circumvented.

Almost an immediate

acceptance of the military coup in I96I. even
in the intellectual
circles, is an eloquent illustration of how
superficial the parties'

belief in liberal democracy had been.

Highly visible and emotional

struggles between the parties have not been lacking,
but rarely on

substantive issues.

This has occurred because the opposition
parties

have questioned the very legitimacy of the way in which
the ruling

party has cone to power and maintain it.

Eence the struggles

sometimes begin and end with matters of procedure without ever

reaching the matter of substantive policies.

In more recent years, the Democratic
Republican Party with
ideology of "nationalistic democracy"
(sometimes

its

called the Koreanized

democracy) tried to fill the gap in the
ideological wasteland.

The

concept was not given full elaboration
and the DRP's leaders
themselves
often disagreed
among themselves, but.
in its roughest form,

nationalistic democracy can be described as a
formula which combines
liberal democracy with nationalism for
modernization under the leadership
of a nationalist elite.

The principles of democracy, developed
in

the >/est, should not be imported to an Asian
nation like Korea
the time of modernization.

at

Liberal democracy, this ideology seems

to say, should be "Koreanized" to fit the
peculiarities of the

Korean society and must be based on constructive
nationalism.

Only

through this accomodation, Korea should be able
to recover

self-

consciousness(or self-identity)

.

iU

In order to do so, at this tran-

sitional period, a strong driving force imbued with a
nationalism
or modernization and dedicated to creating a liberal society
should
o
be secured.
The founding declaration of the Democratic Republican

Party in its elaboration of liberal democracy stated the following
The liberal democracy which we aim at is not a
unidemensional one. By readapting it to the
peculiarties of the Korean situation, we should be
able to escape from the retarded development of our

9-

isee X. B. Kim, oo. cit.
For President Park's
pp. 20^205.
political thinking, see Park Chung Hee, Our hat ion's Path ( Seoul;
Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), especially pp. 207-2^^?.
,

^S'Iinjukonghwadang(DR?), Min.j ukonrhwadan ? Sanyonsa (A Four Year

History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DA? Headquarters, 196?), pp. 32-33.
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society. .!/
^0^";ij^^^^,:f,,*^/2'i2 "'h*"^^*
^inciple that our trLi'So'^^alue
vaxue systems should
be recof^nized- nst-innoT
-i^

The Ke» Democratic Party,
on the other hand,
explained its
acceptance of liberal democracy
in the followin,
.a„„er in 1968=^

safe^S;S^lJ:,:,^,^\^j,ty'"^otT1
"esin? ItlT.

^^-^-^

Sra^tLT^hr^'-^'^

nation into a syndrome of
fear under' Se ^r
tex^"
^'^^^^^^
of anti-Comnunism. Our
partv ah<!oi„t=i„
such basic liberties as

frTloTlfllZrZ""''''

assembly, and elections.
Eelieving thafS*
develo™,ent of a healthy
parliamentary democracy
a^d the attainment of peaceful
transfer of »wer

^t^^"

"coeds'
the e^.?f.

the failurTor

d^^ocracy, we will struggle
to

While advocating the ideology
of liberal democracy, both
parties
have been placing a great emphasis
on social welfare policies.

In
its founding declaration,
the DR? stated that it will
"uplift the
people's standards of living by
adopting a free enterprise system

and by rational economic planning."^

The opposition

M:
„f
of A
OurParty) (Seoul: The

WP

stated

Dangul Klbon B--jt;ch'iM (The Easic
Policies
mp Headqua?t;;:Fn968) . p.

^linjukonghwadang, op. oit.,

p. 9.

in its policy paper that
the party "aiMs at the
development of an
•eoonony for the people-.
^^^.^^.^^
Jargon. i„ the policies of
toth parties is significant.
Factors
both internal and external
to toth ^ties
inhibited then, fron,

espousing radical welfare
policies.

A comparison of

the I967 presidential
election campaign pledges

of toth parties reveals that
the basic policies of
the ruling and
opposition parties had not had

a significant change
fro. the 1950.S.

alttough the emphasis had
shifted
elatorated.

and the policies were
better

The ruling DRP defended its
modernization program and

the Fi^st Five-Year Economic
Flan and emphasized the
need for having
r«>litical stability to carry
out the Second Five-Year
Economic Plan,

which promised.among other things,
a 8.5 percent annual economic
growth rate, self-suffiency of
food by 197I, doubling of
per

capita

income, creation of jobs for two
million by I971. and salary
increases
for r,ilitary personnel and public
officials. The opposition
program
was remarkably sinilar to that
of i960 discussed earlier.
It accused
the DRF regime of corruption,
dictatorship and abuse of power
by the
CIA
politics^and the protection of big
business which tended to
make the rich man richer and poor
man poorer. It called for the

m

"econo^ for the people" based on balanced
growth between
and industrial sectors.

the agrarian

The rest were familiar: the guarantee
of

Shinmindang, og. oit.. p. 11.
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freedom of speech, the expansion of
human rights, neutralization
of
the police, realization of local
autonomy,

the curbing of presidential

power, revision of the Korea-Japan
Norr.alization Treaty and the

withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam.

Organization

Organizational Fragility.

As Maurice Duverger stated, a
party

organization "constitutes the general setting
for the activity of
members, the forms imposed on their solidarity:
it determines the

machinery for the selection of leaders, and
decides their powers. "^^
The organizational structure of a political
party often explains
"the strength and efficiency of certain parties,
the weakness and

inefficiency of others. "^^

The absence of a strong organizational

base in Korean parties is one of the most widely condemned
features

of the structure of Korean parties.

For example, a student of

Korean political parties assessed the weakness of Korean parties in
the following terms. "^^

Korean parties^ are almost oblivious to their
orgarization. Subsequently, parties organize their
networks in consideration of the fame of their
candidates and their personal dignity as recognized
in local areas, and the candidates of their party

14
Maurice Duverger, 0£. cit.

^^o

,

p.

i^,

Yong-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism, Koreana

Quarterly , Vol. 9, No. 2(Summer. 196?),

p. 16.
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through h^aT^elSSfw^'l"^
-^""^^ Patrons
"ho, in a varying dllrll

authorityr

L

'•eputatlon
itlS sl^ft"'"
teve their oln
orga^LaSL T' f^i^^i^ "ho
the party headqwS"
that
is
T^
"

^

°'
i^ation based on r.t
organ=n .7°^"
"ith irifluential o^Jy
leaders ^f^h'""'
-^^^aers
in the oaDital
tbroueh nrpmnrio^r,' T
' "1?^^"/"^^*^°"=
thereby
WentiJ^'^^ith
'

^

in Which

oerson^ S;^itf'^"''^
ideology

S^rlLSattT^*^

The idea of cohesive
political '^^^^
parties
,
„„ the central and
on
local levels
is
"

.

-

the Korean ^litical
sense.

.ritv,
"^^'^

permanent organizations

,
a
rei = f
^ relatively
recent development

The introduction
of the Political

Party Lav in
1963 vhich required party
affiliation in
candi^tes for hoth the
presidential

ord^r/St""^^

and National .ssemhly
elections

helped to stabilize the
number of parties, but
previous to that
Korean parties were
characterized by intra party
split, one-man
political parties and
abundance of independent
politicians

without

party labels.

For example, in the 1948
general election some 48
parties
cor,pet«i for Assembly seats
and the astonishing fact
was that 25

parties

ran,

only one candidate each.

The sheer number of
parties

participating in the past Assembly
elections indicated in Table 3^7
is enough to show the
ephemeral nature of Korean
parties and party
~
Central
Election Kana=^ement Comrnittep yXi^Ho^ y
^
v^'J^®
^^Mae Kukhoewiwon
Son 'go 3an£hwan£(l967) (The Past fv^f inn =?T
u-f

1?

,

•

8

i6q

::rr'

----^

^

----

hUf

Of the n.ttonal
electorate cast their
votes for independent's,
1
.
.n4 33 per«„t or the
Asse.M.„e„ „ere independents.
Ta.le ,
4n4i§ates that Boli
ti'
r>i
ar,o
politicians jo.ned and
abandoned political
parties
All Of these data see„
to point to the
fact
^hat the Korean parties
<

•

lacked institutionalization.

I^^iiSnalis^

A „eaK part, organisation
inevitahl, ,i.es rise
to factionalism.
This appears to he
particularly true in
the opposition parties.
The reasons are not
too difficult
to find.
The ruling parties, hoth
the LP and the DRP. re-

sulted their „e«hers individually

and without regard to
the

latter-s previous party
affiliations.

Their party „e„hers were
»0,e easily united under the
centripetal force of governmental
pover.

-

The opposition parties

the DP and the .DP. were
for.ed

by splinter groups as a result nf of a consolidation process
in this
struggle against the ruling
party at the ti.e.
As one observer has
put It." an opposition party
in Korea is the product
of factional
power struggles and Is largely
Motivated by res Is t an ce "^^ Hence
.

1

ibi_d-. pp.

71. 1TJ+-75

.

252

,

328, kkS-hkg,

"""""'^ -^—'^
r*^
cZizittiLi: Ko:h^ar""-(;he°sf
't'''
^^^'^^
Nomination of Party
'
Candidate., ^^Tr^-.
V^U u! I^Tl" p? loSf''^ °^^"^^P^"'i^"t3). HankuK Chon.ch i ^Ha.

J

20

•

.

K»B. Kim>

ag_.

cit ,

,

p.

223,

Wh.
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Table 3.

^Jumber of Farf-i<=Q
^
^f^^ies Contesting
in National
•

Assembly Elections.

Contesting
Parties

Constituent Assembly

kQ

2nd National Assembly

39

3rd National Assembly

5th National Assembly
6th National Assembly

7th National Assembly

30

Ik

^th National Assembly

10

Ik

10

14

8

12

1

11

8th National Assembly

Table k.

Parties Having 10 or
less Candidates

1

6

Percentage of Seats and
Votes Won by
Independents in National
Assembly Elections.
1948-1960.

Won'hf
Won
by Independents

Percentage of Votes
won by Independents

42.5

40.3

q

62.9

33.4

47.9

^th National Assembly

11,6

21.7

5th National Assembly

2I.I

46.8

^"^'^

Constituent Assembly

2nd National Assembly
3rd National Assembly

Average

33.7

Average

43.9
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Table 5.

Party Crossing

m

the National
Assembly

From Party
to Party

Constituent Assembly

2nd National Assembly
3rd National Assembly

^th National Assembly
5th National Assembly
6th National Assembly
7th National Assembly

Party to
Independent

198

24

210

250

106

203

61

98

6

116

232

231
175
175

Independent

3

161
92

95

1

91

0

2

1

63

63

0

the previous ties of
the .e»bers of the newly
created opposition
party became the basis
of subsequent oleavages.
.aotionalis. i„ an
opposition party „ade it
difficult to have a single
leader, and
the p,rty often operated
under a supreme oo™,ittee
structure, which,'
nore or less registered the
factional strength of the
party. The

opposition practice of choosing
different .en

as

the party head and

the presidential candidate
is a reflection of the
factional maneuvering
for political rewards. On a
slightly lower level, the
Political Affairs

CounciK previously the Leadership
Council) had a similar practice
of taking note of the factional
strength of the party.^^

P=.t

,'J°i

""-so^ffions of factional ali-nments in the
IS"

"Sh^tangnrhe

New Democratic Party).

see

^S^^nlS, ty:T9X'pp.

82-103,
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As we bave seen earlier,
the ruling
D^P ^as
has .Tc
^-^S ^^^^
also experienced
r.=t™... Hoover.
case
.

econo^e leverages which

-IpuXate.

the top leadership
of the part, can

xt has also .een c.r.e.
to a considerate
decree
presence of the part, leader
who see^s

the

to have a passionate
disli.

for such tendency.

President Park Chung Hee
expounds! on the need
to have a strong discipline
a.ong the ranks of party
.embers, especially
on the level oX party elites.
In his speech to the
DRP-s National
Party Convention on Dece,nfcer
27, I965. President Park
en^erated

ideology, policy and leadership
as prerequisites^"'^ a
"™,dern"
political party and stated that
"if any one or more of
these pre-

requisites are missing, „e cannot
call it a party, and it
cannot
perform the function of a political
party."

While he believed that

party had fulfilled the first two
conditions marvelously. he
stated that the DfiF lacked discipline.

One should quote hi. at some

length on this point.^^
The question of discipline in the
party still
remains in the dark. Since a political
party is an
organization made up of many persons, it
is imperative
to have discipline in order to
maintain order
and to

22

W

Pom-sik, Chungdariian{^ni;.n.-^n Sferi
Ha.llmothanda
president Park Chimg Hee)
cS?Sd
^qS?'
1968) p. 223. For another appeal by President
Park
discipline and to el:lminate middle-level
bosses
:
f
occasion of his instruction to ourge the
di<?;^n^-^'' i^.P
dissenting
Assemblymen, see The Dong>A Ilto, Aoril
11, 1969 p 1

(Cnllf^J^^^^

S ^L^Tll

^

t^

I^^-.-H^
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Sscim':

S

l^Tfe'oT'°"-

"

=^

^^i^ that

"°
exaggeration to say that it iJ if
i
pa:-ty nember muS
foUo^ tS P^t^
™r?fguidelines
and obey the orrani,,*5
stage, Jll
^e^be'S^L^'^a'tiS
^
F«rty policy is dete™inS!

A

f

"""^

hCSylr^aU-.e^S"'
this policy? ^his^S

le^"
democracy and a democratic
c»litioal
if political party can stani
fir^Jv

r^L

w^

k

in the «>st Visible te™s.
the organizational
fragility of the
Korean parties
be sho«,

^y

by the 1969 fig^es
for the number of

party offices, general
party members, and the
district party m«t«rs.23
As the following table
indlcatss ,^-!tv,
indicates,
with iu
the exception of

the incumbent
DRP. not a single party
was able to maintain
its district offices
in all of the con3tituencies(142).
although the m? came
close to
having this number.

Partz gembershin .

Despite the fact that about
I5 percent of the

eligible voters in 1972 are
registered as members of
political parties,
the concept of party membership
in Korea is a baffling
phenomenon.

Each party has set up an elaborate
procedure for acquiring party
membership, but these procedures

are for the most part paper
require-

ments only.

Given the unwillingness of many
Koreans to openly

the ;,entral
•cne
Centr?l"T»;!?;
ileotion

—

^''^^

^""^

Management Comaiittee.

^^S^^^ ^re compiled
ujr
f <=u by

Table 6.

District Party Offices and
Memberships of Parties, 1969

Number of
District
Offices

Democratic Republican Party

Average
District
Membership

132

1.334 8Q?

y,^oi

48

9f t 'J^n
(j^

162

42

7.00'^

loy

67

^97,541

7,425

55

24,218

440

Unified Socialist Party

46

10,885

237

Liberal Democratic

46

3,026

66

71

28,254

398

New D^nocratic Party

121

158,785

1,312

Ibtal

658

2,072,356

3,248

Unification Korean Party
JTiJstice

Party

Kass Party
People's Party

i-arty

Democratic Party

identify with a political party,^^ research on
party membership has

been a most frustrating task.^^

m one

24
See Eim Kyu-t'aek, od. cit..
25

—

survey of party membership

p. 9.

The Korean voters themselves appear to be baffled
by the
concept of party membership. One survey asked the
question:
»^o
are the party members?" The results are as follows:
A person who filed an application for membership(34.5
percent)
A person who pays party dues (5.5 per cent)
A person who agrees with the objectives and policies
of a
particular party(38.6 percent)
A person who is obliged to vote for party nominees(12.2
percent)
^"0^9.2 percent). See Cho Il-mun and lun Kyong-u, o£. cit..
67

p.

.

^^^^^

dxfferenee beWeen the
D.P and the

Party member

elicribil

,J)P

^^^^^^^^^^^

^e.bers.^^

i

^= determined by the
Folitical
-^-^i-Lcai
.
Articl*^ 17 Of this
+v,17
law defines the
qualification of a
party xnember as "any
cersnn ^rhr.
'
to vote for the

Party Law.

-

election
of members or the
National Assembly, "2?
but
cut, party
n..f membership
v
^»
is

t^rohibited to public
official
uixiciais, officers u_
of Lne
the state-run
<^fs +
v.
corporations
c.

and a., othe. ...ersons
whose politioal
activities are prohibited
b.
an. other law or decree.
The latter provision
diso,anfies students
and the nation's school
teachers to beco.e
.art. „e.bers.

xhe le.al

barriers set for these
,ro.ps are conde^ed b.
so.e as unr.cessar.
and ha^f^ restrictions
that should be softened
considerably.

One

political scientist has argued
as follows:^^

~::^^r ;ooSL"ST??
those Who

26

ar^-ttt lUtlllTTtZ'tyTorT

Cho Il-mun, od. cit.,
p.

—

Selecte^''r:s'^1e;nS^
p. 180,

have

1^23.

"S^"^ ^'f
^

"^'^
"^^P^^^^^
^orea.
°f
^iiional >u,sembly
of .lepublic of Korea.

28

Fu.ctions^'^;:?^,;2S':^
Yon'^u,
^.

IJo.
i^o.

25

p y^, onofpH
quoted
p.

C^r^dan^i Kinungkwa

Yokkinu^."(The
^-^^^^J/^^l^tical Party). Chon.^ky^n..
"
Cho Il-mun, od. cit.,
p. 33^.

m

The ruling party claims to have
as its members ateut
one-tenth
of the total electorate, but the
indications are that a great

proportion of these have not actively
sought membership, but
passively
gave in to the pressure from various^
sources
At any rate, many of
.

these party "members" do not wish
to'ldentif ied as such in public.
Under these circumstances it is easy
to see how difficult the

recruitment of the opposition party members
might be.

As of 1969, the DRP registered
1.334.892 members with the Central
Election Management Committee and the KDP.
I58.785.
In terms of

activities carried out, the DRP also surpassed
the major opposition
party, but it should be noted that despite
the inferior numerical

strength, the

IJD?

had also carried out a fairly wide-ranging

activities which are summarized in the following table
compiled by
the Central Election Management Committee( Table 7).^^

The

mP.

The most notable characteristic of the DRP is
the well

developed organizational structure which no other party
in the past
could match.

As discussed in Chapter II, the DRP was launched

preenptively

before political activities were permitted by the

military government, in accordance with the "Kim Jong-p'il Plan."
This plan, prepared secretfcly by some leading political scientists

in Korea at the time called for a party that would be operated by
c^dre of

a statae, on-going party functionaries rather than by members of

29
Quoted in Cho Il-mun, oo. cit.,

p. 340.

177

Table 7.

Activities and Meetings of Major Parties,

'

1969.

DRP
1* Activities to strengthen
and reinforce party structure

I90

112

23

32

b. Standing committee meetings

206

7^

c« Subcommittee meetings

I53

i^i^

d. Party member unity meetings

772

11

228

90

1,52^

32

8?

32

287

211

28

2

148

67

2. Meetings:
a. Provincial party conventions

3. General activities:
a. Propaganda activities

b. Training of party members
c. Reports

d. Rallies on constitutional
amendment
e. Public opinion surveys

f . Service activities

the National Assembly as had been the case of so many previous parties,
The organizational ideas contained in the Kim Plan was compromised

with the passage of time but the basic features of the original
structure has remained up to the present time and the DR? organization

still remains a potent machine.

A text published for the
ne.bers of the ruling
part, stated
the party's organizational
principles as follo.ra.3°

and

rtfi:it'1rLThe\"So\:rSiL°nti'=

f^flT^°Vl

'""^

P-ty^-?

dfte™in:d1h;ou'?'

°'
1e.oorati=
proc^d^^eflL par^rLslnsur^'H
instituted representative
organs.

policies thus obtained
throu-h der-ooratio
"^^^
?:r:sr:;e

J*"^

StioT'

rer\L:~i

fulTill the expressed will
of the party rnerr.be^s
This executive oower extends
to ali party me'be;s
through the existing organs of
the party!

Of the two oreans- the
representative and
the original founders of the
DRF en^sioned.

.

the executive-

t.e latter°be the

operational headquarters of the
party that would control
not only
the party's local branches but
also its National Assemblyn^en
and

the government.

The Secretariat structure was
established on

March, 1963 with I.30O permanent
members.

Some 3OO paid party

members worked at the Party Headquarters,
20 to 30 at each of the
provincial or city branches, and 6 at
each of the I3I district

off ices. ^1

The Central Secretariat consisted
of four departments,

one board, one office, one bureau.'
which altogether had 48
sections.

30

^

Kirgukonsrhwadanc^CThe Democratic xlepiJblican Party)

Tangwon K^^bonC Manual for the Party Members)
hinjuKone:hwadancr, I970), d. I58.
B. Kim, op. cit., p. 186.

,

(Seoul-
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Soon thereafter, however, the Secretariat
membership was reduced
considerably.

This was brought ateut after the
disenchanted Assembly,

men In th^ non-mainstream faction had
criticized it.

It was originally

conceived that party personnel at
the center, provincial or
district
offices be recruited and staffed
entirely independently of the

National Assemblymen.

This single command structure
envisaged, for

example, that the district party
organization might be headed by a

person who was not necessarily a member
of the National Assembly or
a candidate for that body. Even if an
Assemblyman served as the

party chief in a district, he would be forbidden
to have appointive
and directive oower over party affairs and
personnel.

All matters

concerning the district party offices would be
directed and managed

by the Central Secretariat, and the Assemblymen's
function would be
merely that of representing his district in the Assembly.

The gradual

weakening of the central command structure culminated
in the charter
amendment of February. 1965 which gave more or less
a free hand to
the local district party head, usually the
Assemblyman from the

district, in the operation of local party offices.

The present charter of the Democratic Republican Party designates
the National Party Convention, held once every two years, as the

supreme governing body.-^32

32

Composed of a President, a Chairman.

The present charter amended^as of June 1?. I971 is found in
its entirety in Cho Il-mun, Sae Chongdangron (A Kew Theory of
Political Parties), pp. 58I-587. s^e also Minjukonghwadang( The
Democratic Republican Party), op. cit . . pp. 137-138.
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Party Affairs Council members,
the Party's national
Assemblymen, and
delegates from the party's district
offices, it elects the
party

President and approves the President's
.election of a party Chai^an.
It is also empowered to elect the
Central Committee, consisting
of

less than 1.800 members „ho,in
turn, elect the Central
Standing
Committee made up of 300 to 500 members.
The latter body functions
board
as a sounding
^ that approves the decision of the party's leadership.

The President of the party supervises
and controls all party
offices. Having the ultimate
decision-making power
all party
personnel, he can request reconsideration
of any decision made by
the Party Affairs Council. The Party
Chairman carries out day-to-

day affairs of the party on orders of
the President.

As a presiding

officer of the Party Affairs Council,
he nominates all important
party officers, subject to approval

by the President, including the

Director-General of the party's Central
Secretariat.

The most powerful decision-making organ
of the Democratic

Republican Party is the Party Affairs Council
composed of no more
than fifteen members.

Ex -officio members are the party Chairman,

the Chairman of the Policy Committee, the
Director-General of the

Central Secretariat, the Floor Leader of the party
in the National
Assembly, the party's Vice-Speaker of the National Assembly
and the

Minister without Portfolio.

Although its decision can be vetoed by

the party i^resident and needs technical approval of the Central

Standing Committee, all major party matters are determined by this
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Council.

Polic.

Its r^ior powers include
decisions on the party's
basic
finance and budget as well
as reco^endation
of party nominees

for the National Assembly
to the part, P^-esident
who .a.es the final
selection.

The Secretariat and its
Director-General attend to
administrative
.ffai« of the central party
headquarters and supervise
local party

secretariats.

InitiaUy, the Director-General
had the exclusive

power to appoint local party
cadres.

However, he lost this
power

as a result of the charter
amendment in February.
1965.
was assumed by the local party
chairmen.

This power

It also became a con^^n

practice after late

I9*

that the DRP Assemblymen
automatically became

the local chairmen of the party
apparatus.

Although considerably

weakened, the Director-General of the
central party still exercises
a considerable influence on local
party
organizations and cadres

whose salaries are distributed by
the Central Secretariat.

In order to realize the original aim
of making the DRP

a "party

of policy." the party charter provides
for an elaborate set up for
this purpose.

The Policy Committee, comprised of
key DSP Assemblymen,

the government ministers belonging
to the party, and party members

appointed by the party President, is
responsible for initiating party
policies and advising the Party Affairs CouncU as
well as other

party organs and the government.

Under the Policy Committee are

tV".

thirty-meiiber Policy Review Board andj^^folicy Research
Office, composed

of specialists.

The

or^Uation

of the Democratic
HepuUioan Party i.
ty the folloving
diagram(Diagram 3). 33

On ti. provincial level,
the party maintains

a Provincial

Cc»,ittee usually headed
by the .ost

Provi.ce an. a hranch of
the Central Party
Secretariat.
Of the electoral district,
the

On the level

supreme party organisation
is the

District Co^^ttee. headed
hy a .»„erf.l Assembly
hopeful or a
National Assemblyman
representing that district.

l„ the .ana,e.ent

Of the local secretariat,
the District Co^ittee
Chairman

^

is aided

a

Secretary-General who is \"
Vto-day manager of party affairs
and Who is directly
responsible to the District
Co^,ttee. In each
Of the Ss am 23^{to„n
and township), the party
organization is
headed by a lcHanriJan,(Supervisor).
who is in turn assisted

by multiple

jidoiang(Leader) on the li( village)
level; these Leaders are
in turn
assisted by :rultiple
hHaldonsjang(Functionaries).

of the local party hierarchy

The organization

is shown in Diagram 4.

As far as the policy-making
process in the party

is concerned,

the central role is played by
the Party Affairs Council,
which, in
turn, is dominated by its ex
-officio members. The Policy
Review
Board which .^intains
relatively well-equipped research
facilities
33~"

^'^^^^^

Kinjukonghwadang(The Democratic Reoublican
Partvl
Four Year History of the'DeLcr'ir^^'
Republican irart/)(5eoul: hinjukonghwadang Kihoek
Chosapu, I967},
Republican Farty.
Democratic
Reoublikn
^Irtv of
ol t^ Reoublic of Korea(3eoul: The
DRp-K^;d^e7rrmf^
K^r,.

I.
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euhnits its reco^endations
and supporting materials
to the Party
Affairs council for consideration.
The decision of the
Party

Affairs

Council then goes to the President
for final approval.
Ostensibly,
the Central Co^ittee has
the right of a^endnent
to the policy thu^

originated and the National Party
Congress has full powers
on party's
basic policies, but in actuality,
this power is .ore sy:ntolic
than

real^

The party decision to go ahead
with the constitutional
aaendnent
in 1969, for example, was
first reached by a conference
of the too
party personnel. After that
policy had been approved by
the President
himself, it vas officially
propx>sed in the Party Affairs
Council and
then was sent to the party caucus
in the I.ational Assembly
where
there was considerable dissent.
After much work of persuasion*
had
been done by the dissident members,
the amendment decision was
then

relayed to a Party-Government Joint
Meeting chaired by the Prime
Minister. Finally, the National Party
Convention approved the

decision in a unanimous show of support.

In this particular case, the party's Assembly
caucus played an
essential role because the mobilization
of the support of the party's

Assemblymen was indispensable to the ultimate
success of the amendment.
It was only after the amendment bill was
introduced on the floor of

the National Assembly that the party took,
up the matter with the

Party-Ctovernment Joint Meeting and the National
Party Convention.
The latter two organizations* role in the
amendment proceedings was

merely that of ratifying what the party leaders had
decided.

lap.

The perennial problem
of organisation in
the

mv and
its predecessor parties
have been to construct
an organisation that
can prevent the domination
of the part. b. one
and to accommodate
the leaders of the .ajor
factions in order to
maintain the unity of
the party. This, of
course, was necessitated
by the complexity of

^

factional alignments in the
party.

Until the

f.^P

„as organised, its

predecessor parties had relied
on the dual principles
of collective
leadership and factional
accomodation. The organisational

structure

that could be agreed on
was usually a cc»ittee
fo™. The Suoreme
Councils Of the past were
usually composed of thxee
men. who
were

the leaders of the three
largest factions within
the party.
the™ »as elected to be the
head of the Council, i. e..

One of

the nominal

head of the party.

Usually no single faction
in the past had an

absolute ^jority of the party's
Kattonal Party Convention
delegates
to control the key positions
of
the
wie party.
oartv

Thi« situation
This
necessitated

compromise among the leaders of the
party for distribution of key
party posts, both within and outside
the National Assembly.

Sometimes,

this endeavor had taken the form
of "position splitting," such as

Cho ByS-ng-ok and Chang Myon in
1959 and Yun ?o-son and Yu Chin-o in

1967, who in each case split the posts of
presidential candidate and
the head of the party. In a non-election
year, a powerful leader

was elevated to the post of "Advisor"
in order to prevent him from

bolting the party and organizing a new
one.

AS „e
in the top

^ve

state. ea.Uer. the
.aotionaZ strength

^Ucy

^^ga^s of the party.

.

Membership

.presented

^

the

Leadership CouncU and
the Political ^fairs
Council refleotea
the strength of each
faction at the
ti.e of the Kational
Part,

convention.

The .ainstrea. faction
whose leader heco.es
the head
Of the part, also usually
controls such .ey
co^nittees as discipline
and finance, and the
floor leadership of the
party in the National
Assembly. Sharing key party
posts has been the bane
of the opposition
party both at the present
and in the na^t
dna
past. c=<
Being preoccupied with
factional rivalries at the
center, the party has not
been able to
expend its energies on such
natters as presenting a
united front
against the incumbent party
or strengthening party
organizations at
the grassroots. As of
December. I967. the figure
registered with
the Central Election
Management Co»ittee for the
total membership

m

Of the party showed 381.500.

This figure seems to be
a grossly

exaggerated one and those party
functionaries who retain their
membership in a non-election
year ^estl^ted to be about

one-tenth

of that figure, with many of
its local branches staying
virtually
closed during off -election years.
Vhe current charter of the Kew Democratic
Party

is rather a

remarkable paper considering the past
charters of the opposition
parties. For the first time in party

history, it calls for a single

head of the party, unencumbered by
such past posts as the Supreme

CouncU and the plural Vice-Presidents.

The principle of collective
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leadership was eliminated for the
first time, at least on
paper.
Factional rivalry at the top was
replaced by that in the
Political

Affairs Council composed of twenty-five
men who are elected by
the
National Party Convention.

The Political Affairs Council, has
a great deal more power
than
the DRP's counterpart, the Party
Affairs

Council, in that it jx^ssesses

an exclusive power over the selection
of party candidates for the
National Assembly and the approval of the

elected local party chairmen.

The executive organ of the party is headed
by the Secretary-Ge^^ieral,

who controls six bureaus.

Compared with that of the DRP, the

Secretariat organization of the New Democratic
Party

machine with no weapons.

is an impotent

The organizational set up of the
opposition

party is shown in Diagram 5.-^

The organizations of major parties in the National
Assembly
as provided for in the Political Parties Law^^
markedly differ from

one aixjther.

The party caucus of the ruling DRP is considerably

weaker than the opposition NDP's.

The DRP organization

merely functions as a coordinator of members

'

,

for example,

floor activities and

does not participate in the party's decision-making process
including

legislative strategy.

The latter is determined by the Party Affairs

-'^Quoted in Cho Il-mun, oo. cit., p. 353.

35Article

29 of the x^olitical Party Law states in part: "A
Political Party shall, in order to maintain democratic internal
order, have... a general meeting of Assembly members, if there
are Assembly members affiliated with the political party."
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the
National Assembly.

The selection of the

floor leadership of the
party rests with the
partes President and
the latte-s selection
does not even require
approval of the party
caucus. By contrast, the
^P's party

caucus has the right to
approve

the floor leadership of
the National Assembly,
it has the right to
veto iry a t«o.thirds vote
a^ decisions „ade by the l.ational
Party

Convention, the Central Standing
Co^ittee or the Political Affairs
Council with regard to activities
in the National Assembly.

to the rulin, parties of the
present and the
stren^h of the parliamentary party

past, the relative

and the extraparlia„entary
party

varied inversely with the personal
power of the country's President.
During the early years of the Liberal

Party regime, the parliamentary

party had been subservient to the
party organization outside the
National Assembly. In the latter
years of the Liberal Party regime,
however, when President Rhee chose
to exercize his power through

Yi Ki-faung. the relative position
of the parliaiientary party
increased considerably. Generally

speaking, in the case of both the

LP and the DRF. where the initial
impetus for organization of the
party

cai.e

from outside the national Assembly, the
extraparliamentary

party originally exercized supremacy over
the parliamentary party.
The latter's position increased, however,
when the regime decided
to extend its rule beyond what was prescribed
in the Constitution.

Since the Assemblymen's votes were unexpendable

,

the party in the National Assembly was enhanced.

the position of
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Leadership

The prevalence of factionalism
and the organizational
fragility
of Korean parties have meant
the
corresponding importance of
the

role Of elites in Korean
politics,

it is, therefore, necessary
to

probe into the nature of party
leadership in Korea after
W5.
When Korea won independence
in 19^.8, there were basically
four
groups of individuals from which
the top leaders of the
government
and political parties could
be recruited.36 ^he
nationalist elite
that ^as based in Shanghai's
Korean Provisional Government
and other
parts of the Chinese continent
was one such group. As the
main
force of the nationalist movement
during the Japanese rule, these

men had a built-in support after the
liberation.

As revolutionaries,

however, they possessed neither the
political know-how nor adminis-

trative skills required as leaders of
a modern government.

Another

group was represented by the Western-educated
elite that was oriented
more to peaceful approaches to nationalism
through diplomacy and
propaganda.

Although there was also a widespred support
for this

group, they proved to be in the dark about
the Korean situation due
to their long absence from Korea.

^

Their Western-oriented value

system prevented them from having an effective
communication with
the general populace. The nationalists
in
Korea at the time of

36
See Chin Dok-kyu, "Erit Yironeuihan Kwonryokkujo"(The
Power

Structure Eased on Elite Theories), Sedae
pp. 116-12^.

.

July. I971. Ho, 96 '
^
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liberation were potentially a powerful
group as they had a solid
base inside Korea, but they lacked
a prominent leader to compete

with those of the above two groups.

Finally, the former bureaucrats

in the Japanese colonial administration
were men of good education
and possessed the administrative skills
needed.

However, because

of their collaboration with the Japanese,
they were clearly unacceptable
to fill the leadership positions either
in the U.S. Military Government
or in the early years of the Republic.
Their value as modern

administrators and their potential as a
political force became

manifest when President Rhee carried
out a wholesale recruitment of
these former bureaucrats in his
government
in the early 1950's.

In the U.S. Mlitary Goverr^ent. the
second of these groups,
the Western-educated elite was the
natural choice to advise the

Americans due to their natural affinity with
the foreign rulers.
Their power, however, was gradually eliminated
through Rhee's

maneuvering against the National Assembly in the years
following
independence.

Their position was replaced by the former bureaucrats.

Before the wholesale recruitment of bureaucrats into the party,
the

Liberal Party leadership at all levels was a rootless and
patternless
conglomeration of social, regional and associational groups whose
sole basis of cohesion lay in the simple spoils of power.

of disintegration were sawn in the nature of the party.

The seeds

Having

united under Rhee and his power, the leadership of the party disintegrated rapidly

v/hen

Rhee was overthrown.

The recruited bureaucrats
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were forraer ofncials of both the
central and local governments
of
the Japanese administration, "not
so high ranking
as to be termed

collaborators nor so low as to be
excused from any colonial disobedience."^? And as minor functionaries,
they carried with them
their previous habit and orientations"cautious and lacking in
initiative in every respect except deference
to authority and

guardianship against enemies. "^^
It appears that the men with bureaucratic
background had virtually
dominated the Liberal Party hiearchy by
I958.

Just prior to the

fourth National Assembly elections in I958,
eight of the ten top
positions of the party were occupied by
former bureaucrats.

The

only non-bureaucratic leaders were
President Rhee himself and
Yi Ki-bung, who as Speaker of the House,
held the Chairmanship of
the party's Central Committee.^^

^^.^^ National Assembly

(1954-1958). 28.8 percent of the legislators listed their
former

occupation as being government bureaucrats.

The virtual absence of

the opposition legislators with bureaucratic background
and the small

opposition contingent in the National Assembly suggest that the

Liberal Party was dominated by former bureaucrats.^^
The elites of the Democratic Party on the other hand were a

union of essentially two large groups.

37

Henderson, on. cit .

.

To the "old" Democrats,

p. 295.

^^Ibid.
39
Hahn-Been Lee, op. cit., p. 92.

The Dong-A Ilbo . December 9, 1970, p. 1.
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ccmposed largely of landed aristo.crats
based in

ChWa

Provinces,

a group of men from the Northeast
F'ySng'an Provinces was added.
The alliance of these two groups was
effected as a result of the

Liberal Party's assault against opposition
and its autocratic control.
Whereas these men from the Northeast,
principally
the members of the

HungsadanCThe Young Korea Academy) were a
welcome addition in improving
the conservative image of the opposition
party, the difficulty of
integration of these men into the new party was
evident from the
beginning.

As one student of Korean politics
has put it. "in religion,

in ties with the independence movement,
in class, in occupation and

sources of wealth, in region of origin,
in ties with the United States,
they (the "old" Democrats and the men
from the Northeast) were widely

diverse and even antagonistic."^^

In antagonism to Rhee. in desire

Hungsadan was am culture group, seeking to
inculcate the ideals
^
of independence, organized by an independence movement
leader An Ch'angwho, himself a man from, the P'yong'an Province, drew
men from that
area in its membership. An and Syngman Rhee had complex
exile roots
of antagonism which was carried over to independence politics,
althou^^h
"
An died before the liberation. This grouo, joining the Democrats
in
1952, was a natural antagonist to Rhee. See Henderson, oo. cit.,
p. 300.
The social characteristics of these men from the i\ortheast
are explained by Gregory Henderson as follows: "Their northern background had given them unusual sources of cohesion. They were not
used to deserting their region for the capital, since the tc had been
few officials from the province and very few ch'onmin
Favorable
location along the trade routes to the continent and the stimulus
of discrimination within the Yi system had given them ambition,
better distribution of wealth, and exceptional stimulus Tor economic
progress, modernization and change... he-.ice for education and
Christianity. Missionaries had found in this province one of the
single richest opportunities for propaganda anywhere in the world.
Through them, the P'yong'an middle class of the province developed
the closest educational ties with the U.S., the greatest entree to
democracy and its ideals of any Korean group." Ibid .
.

.
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^or a cabinet res^nsibiUty
system and in certain
prejudices in
favor Of the
of private property
and laissez-faire
the Old Democrats and
the now addition to
the party were
able to'
Share the same bed.

enco^ent

Table 8.

Occupational BackCTounds of
the
Seventh National Assemblymen.

DRP( Percent)

Politics

Military
Farmer

M)p(:

23.3

56.6

8.5

8.9

25.6

6.7

3.9

Commerce

Kedicine

Law
Education
Mass Kedia

Business

Others

1.5

2.2

3.9

2.2

6.2

^.4

9.3

2.2

3.9

8.9

10.8

2.2

3.1

2.2

The present leadership of the major
parties may be analyzed by

closely scrutinizing the Seventh iJational Assembly.

Table 8

summarizes the occupational backgrounds of the
Assemblymen.^^
k2

Cho Il-mun, oo. cit.

,

p. ^12.
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In terms of occupational backgrounds,
the Assen.bly is composed
of
men who belong to the upper strata of
the social pyramid. When
these figures are compared with the

occupation^ backgrounds of the

Constituent National Assembly which had

percent farmers, ? percent

white-collar workers and O.5 percent labor
unionists, one can see
that the political profession has become
the occupation of the
well-to-do.

The social profile of the party
leadership is shown in

the following table( Table 9).^^

Table 9.

Social Backgrounds of the Seventh
National Assemblymen

DRP Assemblymen

MDP Assemblymen

(^)
1.

Age
Above 50
Below 50

71.2

28.8

50
50

93.2
6.8

76.7
23 [3

63.5
22.2

13.8
2^.8
7O.5

2. Place of Birth

South Korea
North Korea
3. Characteristics of

Election District
Rural
Mixed
Urban

IZ1.3

U Byong-kyu, Yiopop Kwajongron(A Study of Legislative Process)
op » cit., pp. 63-80. This study is based on a structured questionaire
distributed to some 110 Assemblymen in the Seventh National Assembly.
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As the above table incidates, the
social backgrounds of the
ruling and the opposition party
leaderships in the Assembly show
a
marked diiference. The DRP Assemblymen
are younger, overwhelmingly

born in South Korea and tend to be elected
in rural districts.

In

political experience, the same study showed,
there was a similar
difference: the opposition legislators
tend to have served more terms
in the National Assembly, acquired interest
in politics at a

considerably yo^onger age. and participted in
political party activities
at an earlier age.

The attitudinal differences of these
two groups

of legislators will be discussed in Chapter
VI.
The leadership of the major parties are in
the hands of men with
ages

1^0

to 59.

Recently about 70 percent of the Assemblymen came

from this category.

Table 10 shows that the average age of the Assembly-

men has decreased considerably with each successive National Assembly.^^
The injection of new blood,

i.

e., the military men since the coup,

is primarily responsible for this change.

The Korean party elite

is a highly educated group and its educational level has shown
a

remarkable improvement with each successive regime as the following
table indicates (Table 11).^^

hh.

Ibid ., pp. 68-69.
^^The Central Election Management Committee, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon

Son 'go San^:hwanr ( The Status of the Fast National Assembly r.lections),
pp. 72. 17(>, 253-254, 329-330. 451, 628, 752, and 872(1971 edition).

46

Ibid ., pp. 73-74. 177, 254, 330. 452, 622, 752-753, 870-871
(1971 edition).
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Table 10.

Age Group

Age GrouDs in the National Assembly.

LP Regime
Constituent- 4th
Natio^l^ Assembly

DP Regime
5th National

DHP Regime
6th-8th
Kat ion^^ ^As s embly

Ass^^ly

25 - 39

23.2

18.5

16.8

40 - 49

31.6

40.3

49.6

50 - 59

27.6

26.6

22.6

7.8

14.7

10.4

60 and over

Table 11.

Educational Levels of National Assemblymen.

LP Regime

DP Regime
Constituent.5th Assembly
4th As s embly (^^)
{%)

DRP Regime
6th - 8th

Study of Chinese classics

2.4

Elementary school

8.3

7.3

1.1

Some middle school

3.7

4.3

0.2

6

1.3

12.4

7.3

14.7

14.6

8.9

4.7

10.3

6.9

4-year college

40.4

40.8

58.0

Graduate school

1.5

1.3

15.3

Kiddle school

19.1

High school

Some 2-year college
2-year college

Some 4-year college

.

3

2.3
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CHAPTER IV

GROUPS . VOTSIS

Am

PARTIJS

Major Groups in Politics
One of the most remarkable features of
Korean politics has been
the virtual elimination of middle groups
that aould cushion off and

mediate the extreme and militant struggles
between the ruling and

opposition parties.

The interest groups of associational
variety

exist on the national and local level but most
of them function as

support groups for the administration.
The most prominent interest groups in Korean
society are what

Gabriel Almond and James Coleman describe as
"institutional" interest
groups, such as the military and the bureaucracy,
and "anomic"

interest group such as the students.^

As a sign of political

underdevelopment, the weaknesses of the associational interest groups

should be probed with respect to their causes and manifestations.
Labor.

The suppression of^labor movement during the Japanese

era gave way to the establishment of many labor organizations in the
immediate post-war era.

That the labor movement at first was captured

by the leftist Chonp'yongrC The Korean Conference of Industrial Unions)
was a natural consequence of the labor movement being secretely

organized and led by socialists and Communists during the Japanese

^Almond and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas ( Princeton;
Princeton University Press, I960), pp. 33-3?.
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colonial period.2

The labor organizations, as one
of the very few

organized social force in the

iirinediate

postwar political chaos,

emphasized political struggles rather than
economic struggles during
the period in which all problems, social
ones included, had direct

bearing upon the political.

Organized in November,

WS,

Chonp'ygng

played a key role in the brief period of the
CPKI's ascendancy.

With the birth of the Taehan Koch 'ong ( The Korean
Federation of
Trade Unions— the KFTU). which came with the blessing
of American

military authorities in April, 19^6, disputes between rival
unions
took the form of bloody street battles, murder, sabotage,
strikes

and the ransacking of each other's offices.

Finally in March, 19^7,

the KFTU succeeded in capturing the labor movement with
the help of

the national police— the leftist labor organizations were
forced
to go underground.

After the achievement of national independence,

the KFTU fell under the control of government-appointees.

Rhee's

first Minister of Social Affairs, Chon Chin-han, was made chairman

of the labor organization.

From the very beginning, then, the labor

organization owed much of its existence to the government, and this
tie was to continue through most of the post-19^5 era.

2

For an excellent history of the Korean labor movement, see
Pak Hyon-ch'ae, "Haebanghu Eankuk Nodongundongui Chonkaekwachong"
(The DeveD.opTient of Labor Union Movement in Post-Liberation Korea),
Chisong, Vol. 2, No. 5. May, 1972, pp. 37-59.
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A student of the Korean labor movement
observed the following
relationship between the government and labor
unions:^
The government has kept a very close
watch over
union activities. Ko union could be
formed without
the advance approval of the government.
Nor could
trade union meetings be held without
giving prior
notice to the police, and the police
openly attended
any union meeting of any significance.
Unions were
not allowed to issue publications
without subnitting
advance copies to the governmental
authorities.
_

Governmental intervention was sanctioned
by the Labor Union
Law.

Article 32 of the document gave the
government the right to

"dissolve a labor union" when "it violates the
law or acts against

the public interest".

This provision was recently amended to read

that "if it is so deemed by the government that a
labor union violates
the laws governing labor union operations or if it acts
against the

public interest, the government may, with the approval of the
Labor

Committee order the dissolution of that labor union or call for
the

election of a new slate of officers for that union. "^

This all-

encompassing provision, clearly in violation of Article 29 of the
national Constitution,^ which ensures independent association by

3

Tak Eijun, "Sarly Trade Unions in Korea, I919-I950," Korean
Affairs, Vol. 1, Ko. 1 (February/Karch, I962), p. 79.

Quoted in Pak Chong-yol, "Kankuk Nodongundongui Kibon
Songkyokkwa ku Banghj^ang, "(The Basic Characteristics and Directions
of the Korean Labor Movement), Chongkyong Yon'gu February, 1971,
.

pp.

i4o-m.

^This article states: "Workers shall have the right of
independent association, collective bargaining and collective action
for the purpose of improving their working conditions ."( Fara. 1)
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workers, has the effect of outlawing
any political action by later
unions that are prejudicial to the
governinent.

As or 1968. th KFTU reported that

sc:ne

68 percent of the total

labor force had not been organized into
unions.^

m

the early years

of the Liberal Party regime, the .FTU
became an affiliated organization
of the Liberal Party. Aside fro. its
weakness in n^ber and organization,
the labor movement suffers from the
crippling effects of factionalism

of labor bosses and from governmental
manipulation.

Labor unions

have been operating under various legal
and administrative restrictions

which have prevented

ther;

and collective action.

from making a genuine collective bargaining

Significantly, the government decided in I965,

not to allow the XFTU to join the International Later
Organization

because it felt that it would be impossible to observe and enforce

Article 8? of the charter of the ILO, which enumerates laterers'
rights and privileges."^

In more recent years, the later group has tried to shed its
long dependence on and intervention by the government offices.

On

December 28, I969, the KFTU issued a public statement to the effect
that the government and the National Assembly

had.

been ignoring the

The Korean Federation of Trade Unions, r.ochongui Undon?rki.iowa
Hwaltonrban.?ch im ( The Basic Policies and Guidelines for the KFTU)
(Seoul: The KFrj Fieadquarters, I968), p. 55. This appears to be an
exaggerated figure. The Economic Planning Board gives a figure
of 7^.^ percent of the later force not organized into the XFTU as
of 1970. See The Choson lite . Octoter 2k, 1971, p. 3.
'

See K. B. Kim, 00. cit.

,

p. 266.
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laborers' interests and that it would
forthwith initiate strong and

autonomous political activities,

m October,

I97O, the KFTU reaffirmed

its stand of a year earlier, and its new
leadership established a

special Committee on Political Education in March,
1971.

Since then

the KFTU has been consistently pursuing this
basic policy on political

participation, but it has not gone beyond this.^

Despite these recent

attempts at politicization, the prospects of
establishing a meaningful
tie between labor unions and political parties
are slim.

The current

charter of the PO^TU severely limits the
political activities of labor
unions: no union can engage in an activity
to support a party or

candidate; no union can levy political funds
on its members; no union

can use its funds for political purjx^ses.^

The rationale behind the

severence of political ties between political parties and
lator unions
is to prevent parties, particularly the Communists, from
attempting

to manipulate labor unions.

Farmers.

Since the farming population still occupies a large

proportion of the total population"*"^ and since the farmers, more than

any other group in Korean society, have retained social and cultural
identity, they remain as the most powerful potential interest group.

g

See The Dong-A Ilbo . December 14, I97O and April 22, 1971,
Article 12 of the Labor Union Law.

p. 3,

9

^*^As of 1970, some 45 percent of total population lived in
rural areas;. About 40 percent of the G.
P. is derived from the
primary industries.
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Here again, governmental intervention
from the early years of the

Republic has made the farmers' organizations
semi-governmental
^institutions.

The National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation(NACF)

As presently the largest farmer organization

in Korea, with 10,000

full-time officials and 20,000 local branches
spread out to the

remotest Korean villages, allegedly serving the
interests of some
85 percent of the farmers.

From the beginning, this organization

has not been a voluntary organization of fanners
themselves.

All

high ranking officials of the KACF have been government
appointees;

most of the business it discharges are government sponsored
and
financed.

Since the KACF is a government sponsored and financed,
it cannot

be expected to function as a true interest group representing
the
farmers' interest. "^"^

It has rather functioned as an administrator

of the policies formulated largely by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry.

Under the Liberal Party government, the majority of

local heads of cooperatives were appointed from among local members

of the party.

Even today, the National Assemblyman has almost an

unlimited power of hiring and firing of local NACF branch officers.

Many of the important positions of the MCF are occupied by former
military men, and about a half of the local branches are headed by

^^o Yung-hi, "Kongch'onui Aproyktanch'e, "(The Pressure Groups
in the Farming Villages), Sedae, March, 1968, pp. 136-1^1.
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village chiefs, who are semi-government
bureaucrats.

The most
powerful agricultural cooperative in
the country, therefore,
is a
government sponsored and administered
agency and most of the farmers

view it as such, "if not as outright
subsidiaries of the ruling
party that provide jobs to its local

members and deliver farmers

•

votes to it."-'^

Business.

The most numerous and well-organized
interest groups

in Korea are those of business, industry
and commerce.

The ou^^^right

intervention by the government evident in the
laborers' and farmers'
organizations is not easily visible in these
organizations, but they
too have been suffering from the lack of independence
from the

government and the ruling party.

The Korean Business Association,

composed of big businessmen who virtually control the economy
of the
country, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
composed

of twenty-eight local chapters with 120,000 members, are
the most
active and powerful groups.

The employers' group, however, also

depend on the graces of government in obtaining bank loans,
governmentguaranteed foreign loans, government contracts, licenses, and
registration.

They are eager to please the high ranking government

and party officials through supplying of political funds, supporting
government positions, and sometimes delivering votes of employees

in elections.

K. B. Kim, og. cit.

,

pp. 266-26?.
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Lack of independence from government
evident in all of these

groups- labor, farmer and business-

is a consequence of the
all-

inclusive power that the government possesses
in these spheres.

Since the government

car.

easily change the status of any of
these

organizations, they are capable of taking any
action that does not

meet the government's approval.

Bureaucracy .

The obverse of the coin of weak associational
interest

groups has been the strength of the government
bureaucracy.

Numerous

legislative attempts to neutralize the bureaucracy
and the police
force have been unsuccessful thus far.

What has made the government

so powerful in relation to the interest
groups is the centralized

state structure.

Except for a brief period, the constitutionally

envisioned local autonony

has not been implemented.

The mayors of

Seoul and Pusan and all provincial governors are
appointed by the
President; mayors of other cities and county(kun) chiefs
are appointed

hy the Prime Minister; the national police
of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

is under the firm control

The finances of local governments

are heavily dependent upon national grants;

upward of 85 percent

of the county(kun) level budget, for example is dependent upon
national subsidies.

All of these ties induce the local officials

to be loyal to the government and the party in power.

Immediately after the liberation, a corps of lower-level
bureaucrats from the colonial administration existed but they were

20?

a politically unacceptable group to be
employed by the Korean

government.

The lack of any replacement group who
had experiences

in running the government, the exigencies
of the war in matters of

conscription, taxes and maintenance of civil
order required rehiring

of a great many of these colonial bureaucrats, their
Japanese ties
notwithstanding.

This way, the colonial legacies of an all
powerful

bureaucracy were transmitted to post-liberation
Korean politics.

Another reason for the ascendancy of the
bureaucracy was a political
one.

President Rhee's battles with the

I.'ational

Assembly prompted

him to unite the extraparliamentary forces in
the creation of the

Liberal Party in 1951.

Gradually, many former bureaucrats seized

leadership positions in the party.
The presence of so many bureaucrats of the Japanese era
in the

post-liberation government has helped to enhance the latter 's

authoritarian character.

The extensive network of the government

bureaucracy has also been abused by the ruling parties for political
ends.

The civil servants of the government have often degenerated

into the servants of the ruling party.

The politicization of the

bureaucracy in other developing countries has been noted.

For the

bureaucrats themselves, this politicization is helpful for self-

preservation

as well as for seeking advancemient in the

bureaucratic hierarchy. "^-^
13

For a condemnation of the bureaucracy's role as an agent of
the ruling party, see 6m Sang-sop, "hinjuchongdangkwa Kongmuwon"
(Democratic Political Parties and Civil Servants), Sasanpge
October, 195^, pp. 105-108.
.

\
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At any rate, the ties between the ruling
party and the
government bureaucracy have always been a close
one as one writer
^
14
has remarked:
The characteristic trait of Korean civil
servants

is their strong bond with [the rulin?]
political
party. Self- ores er vat ion and the short-cut
to
higher positions are dependent on the degree of

civil servant's cooperation and involvement in
politics on behalf of the ruling party, as
demonstrated during the past regimes of the
Liberal
Party and the Democratic Party. It has been
generally acknowledged by the general public that
the degree of cooperation between civil servants
and the party is directly in proportion to the
degree of the party's success in elections.
To the
civil servants, election times are the real
opportunities for flattering politicians, and this is
the
only way for them to stay or advance in the
hierarchy
of the government.

It could be flatly stated that the close collaboration
between
the government bureaucracy and the ruling party has been
one of the
the
major factors conducive to /continuation of the existing party in

power.

The opposition party has been making an issue of this reality

after every election, but such close ties are seen in the nature of
the system and the solutions to this problem

realm of legislation.

aire

well beyond the

Presently, all civil servants, including the

nation's school teachers are forbidden to join a political party or

campaign in elections, but this does not deter these men from taking

part in politics in a more indirect fashion.

14

^

^

No Chong-hyon, "Anatomy of the Korean Bureaucracy and Elections,"
Sasangge , April, 1966, p. 72, quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit..
pp. 152-153.
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The military .

Despite the long political tradition
in Korea that

men on horseback rarely intervened in
politics and government^^ the
military officers staged a cou^ in May,
I96I and many of them have
stayed on as politicians in a supposedly
civilian government.

In

fact, they have completely dominated
the political scene, holding
the

top positions in government, political
parties and society at large.
The military men's influence in the
Third Republic is evidenced

by the fact that they now hold 24 percent
of the ministerial portfolios
and 23 percent of the seats in the National
Assembly, in addition
to the Presidency, the I^rime Ministership,
the headship of the CIA,

the post of the Presidential Chief Secretary,
Chairmanship and the

Secretary-Generalship of the ruling party.

As of December, I970,

men of military background also served as heads of twenty out of
and as
fifty-five foreign missions/ heads of eighteen out of thirty-one

government cooperations. '^

It is, as a popular saying goes in

Korea, kunin sesang . "the age of military men."
The participation of the military in the politics of new
states

has

been variously explained.

Morris Janowitz has argued that the

military intervention is usually invited by the corruption of the
political elites and groups. 17

Arguing similarly. S. F. Finer sees

'"^or this tradition and a historian's reaction to it, see
Edward W. Wagner, 00. cit., p. 2?.
•^^The Dong-A Ilbo, December 9, 1970, p. 1.
17
'Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development
of New Nations (Chicago; University of Chicago I^ress, 1964), pp. 89-91.
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military intervention as inversely
proportional to the strength and
effectiveness of political parties, pressure

groups and the civilian

political institutions.^^

In addition, such possibility
increases

*8 the public empathy with the civilian regiine
is weak.

J. j. Johnson

has argued that the possibility of
military intervention is weakened

when there is a widespread active
participation by the public in
politics:

Edwin Liewen sees this development as
a result of the

increase in political terror- terror which
cannot be kept under

control by the police.^^

sa^uel Huntington, on the other hand,
sees

it as a result of a political decay
caused by the imbalance between

social mobility and political institutionality.

Political decay,

to use his terminology, invites
military intervention.^^

Almost all of these hypotheses seem to have
applicability in
the Korean situation.

But the ascendancy of the military in Korea

should also be viewed as a consequence of the steady
growth and
expansion from a small constabulary force of 65. 000 men at the
time

of the outbreak of the war in June. 1950 to a massive organization

S. F. Finer, Th§
p. 115.

on Horseback (Lew York: Praeger, 1962)

19

J. J. Johnson, "Latin American Military as a Politically
Competing Group in Traditional Society," in J, J. Johnson ed..
The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1962), p. 12?.
20^,
Edw:i.n Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin
America,"
in ibid., tp. 132-133.
•

21.
'Samuel Huntington,

pp. 386-430.

"Political Development and Decay,"
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Of 600.000 men at the ti.e of the
military coup.

During this process

of maturation, the Korean army had
developed a modern organization
modeled ai'ter the United States
army; it had achieved
ideological
unity, i. e., anti-Communism; it
had gained administrative
and

technical expertise not only in military
matters but also in areas
of civilian concern: it had become
a fairly cohesive army with
esprit de corns.

At the

tiir.e

of the military coup, an official
publication of

the junta government stated the army's
role in Korean society as

follows
... there is a universal acceptance
by the Korean
people of these facts: (1) the Anr.ed Forces,
hitherto
aloof from politics, were the only
remaining
organizations which retained the resoect of
the
people; (2) the Armed Forces, by virtue
of their
training in organizational matters, were
alone
capable of reorganizing the Government into
an
efficient body...; (3) The Armed Forces were
the
only force strong enough to elminate the
corrupt and
self-serving interests which had brought the
country
to the verge of disinteerration; (^) only the
Armed
Forces, in the existing emergency, were able to
stop
increasing Communist infiltration and subversion and
the growth of pro-Communism among some irresponsible
elements among the people.

Obviously, some of these claims were exaggerated.

Even in

relative isolation from the society and in possession of the most
22

For a short description of the development of the Korean
armed forces, see Kahn-Eeen Lee, on. cit.
pp. 1^152.
,

^^inistry of Foreign Affairs ( Korea )

The Kilitary .^evolution
in Korea CSeoul; kinistry of Foreign Affairs, 1961),
p.
.
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inodern organization, the military
also was beset with internal

dissension at the top.

The basis of promotion of generals
during

the Liberal Party regime was largely
rx)litical.

The military, too,

had not been free of corruption as
evidenced by the luxurious life
the top generals enjoyed.^^ The
military was a personal instrument

of President Rhee.

It was an open secret during his
regime that the

generals played an imt)ortant part in delivering
votes for his party

by installing ballot boxes within the compounds
of military barracks
in violation of the law, and where the opposition
was forbidden to

campaign and even denied the right to observe the
voting.
Wiereas the top ranking officers of the armed
forces were well

treated by Rhee and the other Liberal Party leaders,
there had been
growing discontent among the lower and middle grade
officers,

especially among the colonels.

In the absence of continued open

hostilities, the Korean military launched an ambitious
training
program.

This enabled many officers to go to the United States
on

various training programs and also to attend many follow-up
educational

institutions within Korea.

The effects of these educational programs

were not imjnediately felt, but the officer corps was becoming a
2^

For a discussion of dissention and other ills within the
military before the coup, see Paek I.'am-ju, K,yokr-von? Chido.ja
Pakchonghiron (On the Revolutionary Leader Park Chung-Hee)
(Seoul: Inmulkesa, I96I).
26
^See K. B. Kim. o£. cit.. p. 272.
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vell-educated, modernizing a^ent,.

Korean

V/ar as

The colonels participated in
the

junior rank officers, and the end
of war terminated

their war-time privile=:es and created
hardships among them.

salary scale for military officers was
pitifully low.

The

Their

promotional ladder was crowded, if not
folded, in the post-war

period as practically all the top military
ranks were filled with
very young generals, who were not atout
to retire to make room for
those working under them.
The military coup was staged by those
members of the Eighth

Graduating Class of the Korea llilitary
Academy whose prospects for
promotion looked bleak because of this situation.

Among the ninety-

four officers who participated in the coup, there
were some seventytwo colonels.

Significantly, the members of the Eighth Graduating

Glass contributed some thirty-six men.^^

The organization of the

ruling Democratic Republican Party, as noted earlier, was also
dominated by men of this class.
The figure for the proportion of former men in uniform in
the

Democratic Republican Party hierarchy is not available, but the
occupational background of the ?? founding members, compiled by

Lee Chong-sik is suggestive (Table
26

12)?"^

K. B. Kiin. OD. cit., p. 275«
5ee also Kang In-sop, "Yuksa
P'alkisaeng,"(The Sigth Graduating Class of the Korea Kilitary Academ.y),
Shindong-a pp. I7O-I93. Sohn Jae-souk basically sees the Korean
military coup as the consequence of an internal disorder of the
military organization. See Sohn Jae-souk, "The ^.ilitary in Korean
Politics." Retort, pp. ^64-466
27
Lee Chong-sik. "Political Parties in Korea" (Unpublished Mfjmeograph,
Philadelphia, April, I967), pp. 6O-6I. quoted in K. B. Kijn, op. cit., p. 190.
.
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Table 12.

Occupational Backgrounds of
the Founding Members of the
Democratic Republican Party

Occupation

Number

Military

20

Education

13

Politics

8

Press

7
7

Bureaucracy

7

Legal Profession

k

Banking

2

Medicine

1

Art

1

Total

70

Despite a conscious attempt to recruit men from outside the military,

military men dominated the Democratic Republican Party at its
inception.

In the ruling party as well as in the government, the military's
influence seems so great that it is difficult to imagine the present

government except in terms of the military.
The students .

The students as a group have been an active agent

in shaping the course of Korean politics si'ter 1945.

The April

the

Uprising in I960 eventually led to the downfall of Rhee Government;
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in the Second and Third Republics, ^he
active participation of
students in politics in the form of massive
rallies and demonstrations
made these students the most important
ar.omic interest group and

political force that had to be reckoned
with by the party in power.
The sense of political efficacy
acquire by the students continues
to play an important role in the
process of politics.

Student movements in Korea have always been
the vanguard of
popular movements in Korea, at least since the
colonial period.
Exposure to modern education motivated the
students to analyze the

contemporary political, social and economic ills, and relegated
to
themselves the role of national conscience and that of the
innovator.

During the Japanese period, the students served as the main vehicle
of the indigenous nationalist movement.

In the March 1 Movement in

1919, the June 10 Incident in 1926 and the Kwangju Student Incident

in January, 1929, students spearheaded the struggle against the

Japanese.

It is no wonder that the Japanese authorities discouraged

Koreans from receiving higher education.

Nationalism appears to be

one of the main, if not the main, ingredient of today's student

movement in Korea.
Since 19^5, the student population has grown at a spectacular
rate.

At the time of liberation, there were some 8,000 students in

seven colleges and universities in the South.

After some twenty

years, the number of colleges and universities increased to 110

where about 150,000 students are enrolled.

Such a tremendous rise

216

in student population presented a great
social problem by the 1960's.
Pouring some 30.000 students annually
into the labor market which

was already- flooded, this created a vast
enclave of frustrated
intellectuals and made the college campuses
a hotbed of discontent.

In an average year in the 1960's, atout
class^-^^-^e

two-thirds of the graduating

not ensured an appropriate employment
in society.

A

hypothesis about the dislocation of the
university students and the

university trained intellectuals is provided
by John Kautskyr^^
The key role of the intellectuals in the
colitics
of underdeveloped countries is largely due
to their
paradoxical oosition of being a product of
modernization
has reached or become widespread in their
own country.
In the universities, the intellectuals absorb the
professional knovrled^e and skills needed by an
industrial civilization.... When they return from
the universities, whether abroad or not, the
intellectuals find, all too often for their taste,
that in their societies the newly acquired skills
and knowledge are out of place.... During their
studies the intellectuals are likely to acquire
more than new knowledge. They also absorb the values
of an industrial civilization.... On their return,
they find that these values, too, are inappropriate
for the old society. To the extent, then', that a
native intellectual has substituted for the values
of their traditional society (with) those of an
industrial one
a process which need by no means
be complete in each case
he becomes an alien,
displaced person in his own society. V/hat could be
more natural for him than to want to change that
society to accord with his new needs and values, in
short, to industrialize and modernize it?

—

—

In political terms, such dislocation becomes manifest in what

John Kautsky, "Am Essay on Political Development," in
John Kautsky, ed.. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries
(New York: John V/iley, 1962), pp. k6~^7.
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Edward Shills

callc,

"oppositional mentality. "^^

The student movements

in Korea have a long tradition of rejecting
existing values and

institutions.

First, their target was against the
colonial rulers

and their suppression.

Then, it was against the leftist
student

organizations in the immediate postwar era.

The April Uprising

started out as a demonstration against illegal
election procedures.

Under the Democratic Republican Party regiine,
it sought repeal of
the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and the
status of forces

agreement with the United States.
constitutional amendment. 30

It also opposed the proposed

Such inclination to oppose is the

logical consequence of the student movement starting as an anti-

Japanese nationalist movement.

For nationalism to be effective,

enemies, real and imagined, had to be created.

Their denials of

the existing social order and the willingness to fight for its

rectification caused the student movement to merge with the opposition
party's campaigns against the government in the National Assembly.

For whatever degree of effectiveness the opposition party achieved
in its struggle against the ruling party, the party out of power had

devoted, energetic and sometimes violent colleagues in the street.

29

^Edv;ard Shills, Political Develoraient in the New States (The
Hague: Kouton & Co., 1966), op. 34-36.
30
For a critique of the Korea student movement, see
Nam Jae-hl, "Haksaeng Undoni^kwa Ch'ongnyon Munhwa"(The Student
Movements and Youth Culture), in Nam Jae-hi, ed., Kyondae Kankukui
Wich ixva Kwaje(The Present Situation and the Tasks of Korea)
(Seoul: Kyondae Sasangsa, 1970), pp. 283-299.
'
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The ruling^ party was careful from the beginning
not to arouse
the students.

Gestures of conciliation, public relations,
group

travel abroad have been used to conciliate and appease
the students.
In more recent years, however, the governments have
relied more on

punishment of student demonstrators by arrests, forced
induction
into the anny, expulsion from college, and criminal
prosecution

under the Anti-Communist Law.

The government, in addition, has

begun since 196^ to tighten its grip on the student movement
by
infiltrating the ranks of the students who are watched
by agents

from the CIA, the police, the Ministry of Education
and even the

Democratic Republican

Party.^"'-

This has

become a widely known fact.

On several occasions, the campuses of vocal universities were
raided
and occupied by men in uniform in the name of restoring law and
order.
The government evidently has lost its patience with the students.

In President Park's own words, the government was determined "to
exterminate the idea of students that they should act for politicians

on every issue and decision. "-^^
Despite the lack of a single cohesive nationwide organization

of students in Korea, the students have come to exercise a tremendous
influence on the nature of opposition politics in Korea.

Although

a strong tradition of academic activism is harnessed at the present

31

Thfcse. government activities on campus are exposed by Maeil
Shinmun (Taegu). September ^, 196^. See K. B. Kim, o£. cit., p. 28?.

32

Quoted in K. B. Kim, og. cit., p. 288.
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time through governmental intervention and
suppression, it is

definitely too early to predict its eventual doom.

The students

have a sense of historical responsibility and
some would risk their

future to challenge authorities for the grave problems
they see in
society.

The Korean Voter

What and how a voter perceives of his political universe
good yardstick of the viability of a democratic system.

is a

The nature

of the picture he carries in his head is affected not only
by his
status in society but also by his perception of how
the political

universe in which he is a part affects him.

In order to understand

this process, one must rely on opinion surveys that measure
people's

opinions and attitudes about politics.

Opinion surveying is rapidly

developing in Korea, but also beset with shortcomings in the area

of question wording, interviewing and analjrsis."^^
Views about institutions .

In order for the imported

sjrstem of

democracy to take root in Korea, it is important that the Koreans
themselves accept the system as the most acceptable and suitable for
As we have seen earlier, one is hard^jressed to trace democratic

them.

political tradition in Korea's past.

33

In this milieu, the Koreans

^^Ralphy Lewis and Helen M. Crossley deal with the development
and shortcomings of opinion surveying in Korea. See their "Cpinion
Surveying in Korea," The Public Opinion Quarterly . Vol. 28, No. 2
(Summer, 196^), pp. 2^7-272.
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have lived with democracy for nearly
three decades.

It is in this

context that we must ask the question
of how Koreans perceive democracy.
A recent sarvey asked the question. -Vhat do
you think is the meaning

of democracy?" to a national sample and
yielded the following results
Table 13 .

Understanding of Democracy by
Korean Voters

Responses

% Respondents

Don't know

53

Freedom, civil liberties, respect for
the individual

Majority rule, representative government
Equality

Z6
14

k

Rule of law, constitutionalism
Capitalism, private ownership

Others

.3

.2

5

Although it is extremely difficult to generalize from such an isolated
data, it could be said that Koreans have a rather sophisticated view

about democracy.

32J!

3

The "don't know" responses are most numerous, of

^

^

Yi Yong-ho, "Hankukminui Chongch4'<wan, "(The Political Views
of Koreans}, Shir.dong'a . March, 1970 quoted in fak 3ung-jae,
"Hankuk Minjujuiwa o5n'f5"( Korean Danocracy and Elections), Hankuk
Chongch'i Hakhoebo . Vol. 4(1971), p. 6?,

3

221

course, but of those who gave responses,
most of them seem to have
a good understanding of what democracy
is.

How the Korean voters view political
parties in Korea remains
a crucial question which may well
determine the development of
political parties in Korea.

Indications are that, through twenty-

five years of party politics, the
Korean voters seem to accept the

legitimacy of political parties as an
essential institution in the

Korean political system.

In a national survey taken in I971,
70

percent of the respondents replied that parties
are "necessary"
Another
_
„ ^
whereas only 7.2 percent thought them "unnecessary."
^^10.3 percent
,

felt, on the other hand, that it mattered to them
little whether

parties existed or not.^^

Among the reasons listed by those who

answered affirmatively, the reply that the parties represented
the
"foundation of democracy" was most numerous (21.8 percent)
followed

by "integration and management of people's will"(15.9
percent),
"formation of a stable political order"(l6.5 percent),
"prevention

of prolifieration of independent candidacies "(12. percent) and
9
"organization of the opposition forces"(7.3 percent).

Among those

who denied the necessity of political parties, the most frequently
given reason was that "it is amenable to political corruption "(2^.
percent).

Others felt that the parties "look after their own

35

^

Gho Il-mun and Tun Kyong-u, "Kankukinun Chongdangul Ottoke
Ponunka?"(Kow Do Korean People View Political Parties?), Sedae,
April, 1971, p. 58.

^^Ibid., p. 59.
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interests without due consideration
given for the interests of the
nation" and still others gave their reason
as "the failure of parties
to carry out the platforms and policies."-'^''
The Koreans, moreover, seem to favor
a two party system.

When

asked about the preferable number of
parties, a two party system
was favored by the majority of the
respondents (50. 4 percent), followed

by three parties(31.6 percent) and four
or more parties(6.5 percent).
In a survey of the rural population made
just prior to the 196?

elections, the question of whether the
people would consider joining
a political party was posed.

Only 22.3 percent of the respondents

felt that it is -all ri.^ht" to join: 26.5
percent replied that it
is "unnecessary" to join; 12 percent felt that
it was better not to

join. 39
•

•

Although the results indicated that the more highly educated

respondents showed greater inclination to join political parties
if

opportunities are offered, the fact that only one-fifths of the
respondents showed unreserved willingness to join might be interpreted
as a stumbling block to further institutionalization of political
parties in Korea.

The reason for such unwillingness to participate

-^"

^Ibid .. p. 60.

38

Ibid . . p. 59. It is interesting to note that the respondents
in the same survey felt that the Political Parties Law which
prohibits independent candidacies received the support of the
majority of res pendents (52.1 percent). See ibid ./ p. 6^.
39
Kim Kyu-t'aek, "Son'gowa T'up'yohaengt'ae, "(Elections and
Voting Behavior), (Seoul, Mimeographed), p. 9.

223

in the political process as a party member
is not difficult to find.

Their experiences taught them that it is wise
to keep anonymity as
far as parties are concerned— in the violent
political struggles
in the immediate post-liberation era, at the time
immediately after
the downfall of the Rhee regime, and in the period
after the fall

of the Democrats, affiliation with a political party,
especially with
the ruling party, proved to be an unwise venture
for their personal

well-being.

Another problem is how political parties affect
voting behavior?
That is. what criteria, if any. do voters use in
simplifying the
complex political universe about them and reach their
decision on

whom to vote for?

Table 1^ summarizes the responses to the question

in a national sample survey, "what criteria do you
use when you vote

for a certain candidate?":

The results of this survey indicate that

political parties have not been a major determinant of voting behavior.
The voters seem to give more weight to personalities in both

presidential and parliamentary elections.

This makes it doubly

difficult to predict an outcome of elections in Korea, where

membership in political parties are not encouraged as has been noted
earlier.

Whereas a reasonable percentage of the voters accept the

legitimacy of the political parties and many view them as a shortcut to voting decision, the Korean voters still tend to identify

"
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Table

li+.

Criteria for VotingkO

National Assembly
Election

Personality
Political Party

Campaign Pledges
Combination of
above three
Others

parties with the individual.

Presidential
Election

(%)

(%)

kl.k

42.5

13.3

12.6

7.1

6.9

36.7

36.1

1.5

1.9

When the party supporters were asked

about the basis of such support, the
most often given(58.9 percent)
answer was the "leading personality in
the party.

"

Next came such

reasons as: the achievements of the ruling
party or the opposition
party's history of struggle(13.4 percent);
policies and campaign

pledges(11.6 percent); the strata the party represents(8
percent);
and significantly, "because of having supported the
party for a long

40

Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyong-u. 00. cit..
Chong Ch'ol-su's
p. 6I-63.
survey used different categories and yielded the following results:
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
Party
20.1
19.5
ii+.6
14.7
Personality
52.8
57.7
67.9
63.2
Both of Above
23.6
8.6
16.2
6.7
See Chong Ch'ol-su, "T'yryohaengwie Kat'anan Chongch ikwan
(Political Thinking Reflected in the Voting Act), Asea July/August.
1969, p. 110, Table 10.
,

'

.
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time." only 3 percent,

when asked about whether one
should vote

for the same party in presidential
and parliamentary elections,
more respcndents preferred to jx^stpone
this judgment until election
time because the candidates are
important (37. 6 percent). Respondents

were almost evenly split between those
who replied one should vote
for the same party(23.5 percent) and those
who saw no necessity for
such(24 percent)
The urban-rural £ao.

As has been noted in Chapter I, despite
the

rigid social stratification that existed in
traditional Korea, it
has disintegrated as a result of rapid social
change both before and

after 1945.

Absence of ethnic, religious, linguistic cleavages
in

the nation further makes an analysis of the party
system along these

lines meaningless.

What then are the basis of the cleavages that

exist in Korean society and how are they translated
into party politics?

The answer first of all must be sought in the effects of

urbanization in Korea.

At least since the third A'ational Assembly

election in 1954. the Korean electorate has been divided along the

urban-rural continuum in their support of the ruling and opposition
parties.

That is. the more urban the constituency, the greater the

support for the opposition and vice-versa.

In the general election

of 1958. for example, fourteen opposition candidates were elected

41

The question asked was %"hen you support or oppxDse a political
party, on what basis do you do this?" Cho Il-raun and Yun Kyong-u.
op . cit . , p. 64.
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in Seoul compared with a single candidate
for the ruling Liberal
Party.

In the twenty-six other cities, the Democrats
led the Liberals

29 to 12 and in the semi-urban towns(up), the Democrats
also ran
ahead of the Liberals 63 to 56.

In the 98 village constituencies,

however, the Liberal Party won one-sidedly by
capturing 70 seats to
the Democratic Party's meager 16.^^

Such urban-rural voter alignment has been visible
in all
elections after 1954.

In the Assembly election of 1971. for example,

the ID? candidates won 57 percent of the total vote
in large cities,

compared with the DRF's 40.6 percent; in the medium sized cities,
the DRP garnered 5O.8 cercent to the M3F's 44.? percent; in the
rural

constituencies, the DHf ran 22.8 percent ahead of the MDF.^^

Compared

with the 1958 voting trend, there is a evidence of the ruling party
making a trememdous inroad into the oppositions base of strength,
but the urban-rural dichotemy in voter alignment is a reality with

which both parties are forced to contend in their election strategy.
The roots of the urban-rural cleavage in the Korean electorate

must be viewed from the point of view of differential social
development that has occurred since 1945.

42

V/

The sum of the social

Yun Ch*^?n-ju, KarJcuk Chonr:ch'i Ch' eke (The Korean Political
System), 00. cit.. Table 7, p. 73.
^
43
-^Cho Il-mun, Sae Ghon£-dangron (A New Theory on Political
Parties), oo. cit . , p. 426.
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changes can be shown by the Population
and Housing Census in I96O

(Table

15).^

Table I5.

Some Social Indicators by
Administrative Units

Average Number of Years
of Formal Schooling

Percentage Households
with Radio

Cities (Shi)

5.63

31.76

Towns(Up)

3.86

15.87

Villages (Myon)

2. 71

7.73

National Average

3.66

15.50

The urban-rural gap is also manifested in terms of the
levels

of political information, political involvement and political
opinionation.

The following three tables are compiled by long Ho L

based on his national survey taken in 1965( Table 16, 17, 18).^^

44

Yong Ho Lee, "Toward a Comparative Theory of Voting
Participation, "(Publication Draft, Mimeographed, 1970), p? I7.
45
'Yong Ho Lee, The Korean Political Culture Survey , quoted in
ibid., pp. 14-15. For persons thirteen years and older^ some 28
percent of the Korean population was illiterate in I96O. W'hen the
illiterate was further divided into urban and rural areas, the
figure comes out to 17 percent and 32 percent respectively. See
the KACF, Agricultural Yearbook , 1965 (Seoul: Headquarters, the
National Farmers Cooperative federation, I965), p. 253.
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Table 16.

The Levels of Political
Information

Urban Res^ndents

Rural Respondents

Could name one or more
political parties

77.0

59.0

Could name one or more
political leaders

59.0

48.5

Could name one or more
government ministries

61.0

42.1

Table 1?.

The Levels of Political
Involvement(;b)

Urban Respondents

Rural ResDondents
(<)

Donated m.oney

1.0

0.3

Influenced national
government

5.9

1.0

Influenced local
government

17.3

7.6

Attentive to
campaigns

26.2

12.4
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Table 18.

The Levels of Political
Opinionation(^^)

Urban Respondents

Rural Respondents

Have partisan oreference

30.9

19

Have opinion on the
DRP performance

^7.9

^1.3

Have opinion on proportional representation

30.1

14.2

A

The media through which the voters obtain their information

also markedly differ in urban and rural areas.

In a survey made in

Seoul and small villages in Kyongsang provinces in 1969,^^

some 84

percent of the respondents in Seoul replied that they had

obtained

their information on the election campaigns through various mass

media such as news papers (61. 2 percent), radio(l4 percent), movies
and television(5.3 percent), and pamphlets and magazines(4.2 percent).
Less than one percent of the same respondents replied that they

obtained their information thjrough members of his family or relatives.

In the rural villages, however, there is a marked lessened impact
of mass media.

Twenty-nine percent of the rural respondents obtained

their information from mass media

—

news papers (10. 7 percent), radio

(17.6 percent), movies and television(0.6 percent).

^^Chong Ch'61-su, OD. cit., p. 110, Table 10.
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of the family ties in the rural area is
demonstrated when 26.9 percent
of the respondents replied that they gathered
their information about
the electoral campaign from members of h^s family
or relatives.

Another interesting statistic is the role of party
campaign workers
in diseminating political information.

In the urban areas,

2i^.8

percent relied on the campaign workers to obtain information
on the
campaign.

'

The urban-rural cleavage seems to be expressed also
in terms

of the sense of political efficacy.

The same survey indicated that

51 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural voters share
the view that the voting act is the people's duty.

However, whereas

a significant pro portion( 40.5 percent) of the urban respondents

replied that they voted "in order to reflect my will in the national
policies," only 2k
category.

A

percent of the rural voters replied in the same

Some of the other inducements listed by the voters were

"encouragement of others or because of personal ties, "(6.5 percent)

and "because others do"(l4.5 percent).
If the urban and rural voters differ markedly in terms of socio-

economic variables and political awareness, how are they manifested

47

The newspaper as the most important source of political
information establishes that medi.um"as a determining factor in
voting behavior in Korean elections," as another study concluded.
See "Hankuk Ch'onsson'goe Itsoso Kascomui Hybkwa Ch'ukjong,"
(The Keaswurement of Mass Communication in General Elections)
(Research Institute on Newspapers and Eroadcasting, Chung'ang
University, Seoul), summarized in The Dong-A Ilbo, April 1, 1971,
Special Edition, p. 3*

Chong Ch'51-su, oo. cit., p. 105, Table 4.

)
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in terms of their voting behavior?

One curious and significant

manifestation is the fact that the voter turn-out and
the size of
comrnunity have shown inverse relationship as
the following table

indicates (Table 19).^^

Table 19.

Voter Participation in National
Assembly Elections by Size of
Community

1958

I960
{%)

Seoul

80.4

75.4

Cities electing two or
more A3sembl;>Tnen

85.9

78.3

Cities electing one
Assemblyman

88

A

84.6

Towns (up)

90.7

83.4

Towns hios ( myifn

93.3

87.1

One is hard put to explain such inverse relationship between
voter turn-out and the community size in view of the fact that in
developed countries of the West, voters with high socio-economic
status tend to have a higher rate of participation in elections than
those with low socio-economic status.

In Korea, the answer must be

sought in the nature of rural life and in the fact that the rural

^^CEf.C, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go Sanghwang ( 1968) (The
National Assembly Elections), pp. 357-439 and 279-324.
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voters can be more easily manipulated with
meager material inducements.

In the relative state of poverty, the farmers
have relied heavily

on the administration and its agents such as the Farmers'
Cooperative3
for distribution of fertilizers and other farming related
goods.
Their livelihood having been dependent upon the graces of
the

administration, the farriers have been much more vulnerable than
the

urban voters to administration's demands for compliance.

Lack of

mass communication facilities and the relatively widespread
illiteracy
in the farming areas means that what they hear about the
outside
,
severely, ...
<^o
world IS
limited.^
Through the speaker systems which pipe
,

.

out the programs of the national broadcasting system run
by the
government, and through the mouth-to-mouth dissemination of
information,
the rural voters are a great deal easier to be laanipulated and
made
to comply than the urbanites who are able to obtain information

more extensively and intensively.
As far as the urban voters are concerned, the lower rate of

participation can be viewed from two aspects.

First, it may be

hypothesized that they shy away from the polls as a result of

alienation from the arena of politics.

The pro-opposition proclivities

of the urbanites have already been mentioned,

arid

it may be stated

that they have not been awarded any "pay-back" for this perennial

The newspapers, for example, are heavily concentrated in
Seoul and large cities. As of 196?, there were some ^3 daily
newspapers in Seoul, out of which 20 were published in Seoul.
See Kim Un-t'ae, "1-Iascomkwa Kyondae Chongch'i"(Lass Communication
and Kodern Politics), Chongkyong Yon'gu . April, I969, p. 96.
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voting pattern, resulting in a kind of
resignation that the voting
act brings no substantial change to their
lives.

Second, unlike the

rural voters who can be easily manipulated and
mobilized to come to
the polls, the possibility that the same might
occur appears to be

Slim with the urban counterparts.

The combination of these two

factors— political alienation and the unlikelihood of
manipulation
and mobilization— seems to contribute to the low voting
participation
in urban areas.

^"^

The consequence of the urban-rural gap is expressed not only
in terms of voter participation in elections or the direction
of

vote, but also in other areas as well^as Table 20 suggests. -^^

What

Gregory Henderson has said about the Korean rural voters appears
to
have a grain of truth

Voting to a villager was little more than the
chance to reward a national or local worthy with a
personal avenue to power. Except for national

A Similar argument is made by Yi Yong-ho, "SSn*go Sowekamsoke
Chongch'iuisik,"( Political Awareness Midst Electoral Alienation),
Chung 'ang . Kay, 1971, pp. 90-91. Looking at the rate of voter
participation nation-wide, the following table summarizes its trend:
National Assembly Elections
Presidential Elections
Year
Turn-out(^)
Year
Turn-out(^)
95.2
88.0
1952
86.0
1952
1956
9^.^
195^
91.1
I960
95.0
1958
90.6
1963
85.
i960
8^.^
1967
83.6
1963
85.0
196?
76.1

W8

^^Ibid., p. 84.
53

"^•^Gregory Henderson, op. cit.

,

pp.

25^255.
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questions like agricultural orices and
the need
for expanded irrigation, localized
interests
rarely exerted influence on the daily
work of
the Assembly or served as basis for
groupings
parvies, programs or legislative compromise.
Once elections were over, communication
between
assemblymen and their districts tended to
cease
except for the performance of personal
favors
involving the bureaucracy....

Table 20.

Forms of Political Participation
Among Urban and Rural Voters

Kation(^)

Urban(;0

Rural(-/o)

Contributed funds to
parties or candidates

0.5

1.0

0.3

Try to change things
they were doins in the
national Assembly

2.5

5.9

1.0

Participated in party
activities or campaigns

4.0

6.9

2.7

Kembership in a
political party

4.4

3.7

4.6

.government

10.5

17.3

7.6

campaigns with
considerable interest

16.6

26.2

12.4

Discuss politics with
others

17.4

31.9

11.0

Read magazines

23.0

34.1

18.1

Read newspapers

26.0

51.9

16.0

Listen to radio

50.2

66.9

42.8

Try to change what
"they

were doing in local

"itfatch
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Regionalism in Korean elections .
the division of the electorate along

significaut development.

In the more recent elections,

regional lines has been a

The emergence of sectionalism as a factor

in Korean elections harks back to the sectional
bias that existed

long before the li Dynasty, as we have indicated
earlier, but it has
been a consequence also of the economic structure
of the regions
involved, and the real or imagined sense of maltreatment
of a region
in the distribution of national wealth and resources.

Illustration 1.

Sectionalism in Recent Presidential
Elections, 1963-1971.

The above illustration^ visuall^^ indicates the sectional split

in the three presidential elections.

^Adapted from The

It can be stated that Park who

Don,g-A Ilbo, April 29, 1971, p. ^»

.
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ran in all three elections was a kind of
"regional" candidate in
this context since he was identified with his
native province,

North Kyongsang Province.

This fact, combined with the opposition's

traditional strength in the Konam areas (Worth and
South Chonra
Provinces), might spell a modified "friends and
neighbors" effect

on voting behavior.

The roots of the problem seem to go deeper,

however

The problem of the regional gap has not grown acute
until in
recent years.

The industrialization program stai-ted in earnest

since the adoption of a series of Five Year Economic Flans
in the
Third Republic.

The Honam area, heavily dependent upon agriculture_^

did not lag behind other areas of Korea at the time when the nation's

econonic base still lay in agriculture.

The regional gap emerged

as a political issue when the Honam area began to lag behind in

regional development and in government investment.

This effect was

popularly known as the "maltreatment of Honam areas" by the government,
not only in matters of economic resources but also in the recruitment

policy of the government.

Of the ten provinces in Korea in I960,

the Korth and South Ch??nra Provinces ranked sixth and tenth

respectively in per capita

income.

In 1966, of the eleven, the

same provinces ranked tenth and eleventh in the same category.

Compared with a heavy government investment
textile and steel industries, and

in.

oil refineries,

construction of the nation's

^^These figures are quoted in U Byong-kyu, Yir?$p Kwa.jonpron
(A Study of Legislative Process) (Seoul: Iljokak, 1970), p. 422.
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longest super highways through the Yongnam
areas, the DRP government
created the impression that it was favoring
that region.

traveling through both of these regions

is left

Anyone

with an impression

that there has been a lopsided ^elopment in
favor of the Yongnara

areas, and this fact made the DRP government
vulnerable to the

charge that the Konam areas are indeed being
discriminated against.

Regardless of whether such charges are true, the
government has

failed to bring home to the people of the Honam
areas that their
regions are economically unfeasible or unsuitable
to bring in
industries.

At any rate, these factors tend to reinforce the

traditional prejudice complex of the people of the Honam
areas.
Thus the elimination of regional cleavages remains
one of the most

important tasks of Korean politics.

YT5ng-il, OP. crt.

,

pp. 32-33*
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CHAPTER V

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE 1971 FRESIDEA^TIAL ELECTION

The extent and the mode of competition in election
campaigns
is an important yardstick in measuring the
meaningfulness of any

democracy.

As Joseph Schumpeter put it, the "democratic method
is

that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means
of a

competitive struggle for the people's vote.""^
The major objective of a campaign is to marshall the resources

available to candidates and parties and to convert them into votes.

How well a candidate converts these resources will determine whether
he will become a decision-maker in government.

In trying to convert

these resources, candidates to some extent work with the political

circunstances or environments which are

"given'|^

with uncertain circumstances which he tries
marshal! to his favor.

and to some extent

to make predictable and

The resoijrces a candidate posesses and the

ways in which he develops strategies to convert these resources

differ from one candidate to another.

For conceptual purposes, one can consider the reasonably
predictable elements of an election campaign and the campaign
activities by parties and candidates separately.

The first we shall

call the "strategic environment," to use Folsby and Wildavsky's

^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism Socialism and Democracy
(New York: Harper and" Row, 19^2), p. 269.
,
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words.

2

By strategic environment, we mean the following: those

aspects of attitudes and habits and behavior of Korean voters
which
have become known to us through various, though somewhat disjointed,

opinion surveys conducted by various persons and institutions;
interest groups, both associational and institutional and their
loyalties, and other voting blocs; political parties, their organi-

zational and numerical strength, and their ideological and policy
commitments; the distribution of campaign funds, the control of

infomation and the control of government.
Other participants in the campaign are, of course, the candidates
themselves who are selected by the political parties.

The process

of their selection, the personalities and images they project are
one of those uncertainties which are superimposed on the strategic

environment.

Finally, the campaign activities themselves affect the

eventual outcome of an election.

The campaign might then be seen

as specific steps and activities taken by candidates and other

participants in order to convert all available resources into votes.
The Strategic Environment

According to the Central Election Management Committee,

Voters .

the number of eligible voters for the 1971 elections totaled
15tl78,l8l."^

Representing a 9*3 percent increase in voting population

Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsy, Presidential Elections
(New York Charles Scribner's, 1964), p. 5.
r

^The Dong-A Ilbo

.

February 23. 1971.

p.

1.

2^0

over four years ago. some three million young
voters were enfranchized
as a result of their reaching the voting
age of twenty.

Of the

total, some 31.7 percent were voters who were
below thirty years

of age.
The Korean voters in general show a remarkable interest
in
elections.

the
It now appears that the Korean voters regard /electoral

process as one of the vital institutional arrangements of democracy.

One recent survey eloquently shows the degree to which the Korean
voters are interested in elections (Table 21).^

As has been discussed in Chapter IV,

behavior pattern of the Korean voters

,

the most significant

is the degree to which the

urban and the rural voters differ not only in the direction of the
vote, but also in the mode and intensity of political participation,
the sources of political information and the level of political

Table 21.

The Level of Voter
Interest in Elections

Urban Voters

m

Rural Voters
ii)

Very Interested

26.2

Fairly interested

^5.7

Not Interested

Chong Ch'6l-su, oo. cit.,

11.6

p.

110, Table 15.

28.1

2kl

awareness.

The issues of regionalism are also a volatile
issue in

view of the historical and emotional cleavages between the
southeastern
and the southwestern provinces.

And the probability of the deep-

rooted antagonism to emerge into the open would be increased
if the

major presidential candidates came from these areas, as was the
case
in the 1971 presidential election.

Candidate Park Chung Hee, with

his southeastern roots, was pitted against Kim Dae-jung who came from

the South Ch^nra Province and who represented the city of Kokpo, a

southwestern port, in the National Assembly.
regional

c-aos

These urban-rural and

are a fact of tx^litical life with which the candidates

and their t>arties are forced to deal.

This meant, among other things,

that they have to develop strategies separately for each of these

regional pockets at a considerable risk of backlashing in other areas.
Interest groups and voting blocs

.

It has been noted earlier that

the conditions conducive to active and open participation in politics

by Korean associational interest groups such as farmer, labor and
business have not been present in the Korean context.

Monolithic

control of such social organizations by the government, often with
elaborate legal prescriptions, has been largely responsible for this
situation.

There have been signs of restlessness on the part of

these Frroups

—

especially that of labor^but it did not lead to

anti-goverment action in the 1971 presidential election.
Where farmer, labor and business associations remained silent
throughout the campaign, anomic participation of the urban intellectuals

2^1-2

and students occurred.

The National Consultative Conference
to

Safe^ard Democracy was organized

in March and officially began its

activities on the day of the eleventh anniversary
of the April 19

Student Uprising.

Comprised of some sixty prominent intellectuals

from the universities, the mass media, and
religious, legal and

literary circles, it issued a statement on April I9,
encouraging
the voters to play a meaningful role in the "revival
of democracy."

In particular, the statement stated: "we apoeal to the people to
shun
all temptations, resist all pressures and exercize people's sovereign

rights solemnly."^

The Conference also criticized the government's

"cruel ooriression" of the students, who were

military training on

campi;[S.

demonstrating against

Although not stated in so many words,

it was clear to anyone that it was a hasty gathering of pro-opposition

groups in the latter half of the presidential campaign.

It acted as

the command post for various student organizations which participated

in the final stages of the campaign as "election supervisors" in an

attempt to oversee the fairness of the balloting and ballot counting
throughout the country.

In addition to the several hastily drawn

organizations on various university campuses^

^e

Student League

for Safeguarding Democracy recruited some 1,300 students from 13
universities who volunteered to serve as election supervisors.
These sti:dent groups made themselves available to both parties through

^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo

,

April 19, 1971, P-

!

2^3

the Consultative Conference as election supervisors after the

Ministry of Education had ruled that such activity did not constitute
student participation in politics as prohibited by law.^
Tlhe

press, especially the prestigious newspapers, has had a

long tradition of being critical of government since independence.
It was an iinportant ally of the opposition along with the urban

intellectuals and the students since the

xlhee regime.

That the

editors and reporters of The Don^-A Ilbo, the Seoul daily newspaper

with the widest circulation, found it necessary to adopt a Declaration
of the Freedom of the Press during both elections indicated that the
goverrsnent had been putting pressure to bear on the press.

The tone

of the declaration expressed xirgency and disgust;

At the forefront of the freedom of the press, we
are in sad realization of the fact that the crisis in
the press has reached the limit, and we proclaim that
the freedom of the press which is the foundation of
democracy should not be assaulted by anyone.
The movement by The Dong-A Ilbo newspapermen spread to the Korean

Newspapermen's Association whose 3.000 members adopted a resolution

on the freedom of the press in April.

The government-owned radio and television networks have played
a significant role in supporting the ruling party.

party broadcasting ranged

from,

The pro-ruling

showing repeatedly on television

screens one of the campaign catchphrases of the DRF "Progress without

^bid
^Ibid

2^
Interruption" to tailoring the contents of the most popular programs
to favor the ruling party.

These prejudicial treatment5of the

contesting candidates and parties was visible to even a fairly
unsophisticated eye and it was carried out in clear violation of the
o

code of broadcasting ethic.

The government bureaucracy

The role of the government bureaucracy

.

becomes a vital one for the incumbent party whenever an election
approaches.

In the past, civil service personnel, high and low, openly

participated in the campaign for the ruling party, but recently the
participation of government officials occursAin a highly sophisticated

manner.

During the campaign under discussion, one newspaper reported,

an extraordinary number of vacations for high and low government
officials alike was allowed.

The heads of government ministries and

corporations often visited their native places under various pretexts.

Both of these tactics, this newspaper report complained, were used
to propagandize the achievements of the incumbent government.

was also during the electoral campaigns that an

9

It

extraordinary nuiiber

of opening ceremonies for the building of bridges, roads, schools
and factories took place.

Always present at such a ceremony were

the DSP provincial party chairman and the Assemblyman from the district.

These strategies were used to impress the people to the fact that the

projects under construction would have been impossible without the

^The Dong-A Ilbo , April 30, 1971, p.

^Ibid., April l6, 1971, p. 3.

5'

—
2^5

support of the incumbent party and its candidates.

In addition to

this "indirect display of influence," various new
promotional

associations and neighborhood ^oups were created, some defunct

associations were revived, and the existing ones strengthened in

order to revitalize the web of personal relationships leading to the

support of the incumbent party.

At their frequent meetings, the

achievements of the incumbent government were praised, government-

produced films were shown and voters were invited to make "study
trips'* at the expense of the campaign organizations.

It was known

to everyone, the rem.otest villager included, that the local government

took

extraordinary measures to please the local people.

Popularly

known as the "benevolent administration," the government at the
grassroots exhibits unusual sensitiveness to the residents* needs

and activities during the campaign . "^"^
Political parties

In terms of organizational strength, a

.

comparison of the two major parties may be analogous to Gulliver

and his midgets.

Throughout the campaign the performance of the

two party organizations showed a painfully striking difference

it was, in effect^ one between a well-oiled organizational machine

against an individual.
•^

4bid ., April

12

1?. 1971, p. 3-

"^For a condemnation of the "benevolent administration," see
The Choson Ilbo March 26, 1971, p. 2.
12
This section is based on personal observation of the campaign
by the author and his reading of newspapers, journals and booklets
published at the time of the election. See also Cho i\'am-cho and
Ko Jun, "Taet'ongnyong Son 'go Yangdang Funjonki, "(The Presidential
Election Campaigns of the Two Major Parties), Sedae, June, 1971, PP* 128-1^5,

Zk6

The separation of the post of the party leader and the

presidential nominee in the opposition ^DP seemed to have
created

disharmony at various points, not to mention the effort to
bring
together those party leaders— especially the mainstream leaders

grouped under party leader Yu Chin-san.

Outward unity was achieved,

but later developments proved that it was a false unity. '-^

It was

charged botn within and outside the party that the party head

Yu Chin-san and other factional leaders have waged a half-hearted
campaign for the presidential election.

Still complicating the

picture was the choice of Chong Il-hyong as the chief of the M)P's

The strains of the factional rivalry leading to the
presidential election finally exploded when Yi Jae-hyong, once the
Vice Chairman of the KDP, announced his withdrawal from the party
on February 8, 1971. He explained his reasons as follows: "I
reached this painful decision because I came to zhe sad conclusion
that the party has neither the will nor the ability nor the qualification
to effect a change of government. Instead of fighting to overthrow
the corrupt regime of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, the
NDP members are busy satisfying their parasitic appetite in futhering
their nersonal ambitions for the party leadership or a seat in the
National Assembly while off erring only lip service of oPTX)sition to
deceive the people and history . " The severity of Yi's condemnation
was unprecedented whether inside the party or out. He continues to
attack the party in the following manner: "The lower echelon members
of the party are becoming poorer and poorer while most of its leaders
are becoming richer and richer. The party posts, high and low, can
be purchased with money or by promises of votes and other favors.
The door is wide open to 'yes' men while honest, responsible members
are kicked out. It makes me mad to watch the leaders exhorting the
front members to wage war ap-ainst the DRP while behind the scene
they are preoccupied with how the leftovers of the battle can best
be seized
I have been aware of the onronic illness of the ^Or which
even the best doctor in the world cannot cure. " emphasis his.
Quoted in The Korea Herald, February 10, 1971, P- 3»
.

(

(

2^7

Election Headquarters.

Chong's support of Kim Dae-jung's presidential

candidacy at the nominating convention was critical in
swaying the
convention to support the darkhorse candidate.

Under the circumstances

where three different factional leaders, Yu, Ch^ng and
Kim^sought
the control of the campaign, one can easily see the roots
of discord

in the grand task to wrest the power away from the incumbents.

At the election district

level, the NDP claimed a membership

of 500,000 but it is said that the actual members who could be
counted
on to help out^the campaign was about half that number.

In many of

the district party chapters, even a party office could not be funded.
The party relied almost entirely on personal contacts— the district

party head and his subordinates made contacts through blood and
school ties.

As such the

l\iDF

faced a formidable foe in the DRP and its

extensive organization right down to the neighborhood level.

In

addition to the personal contacts the district chapter president(in

many cases, the Assemblyman from the district) had, the party could
boast a general membership of l,350|000^which constituted about
percent of the total electorate.

9

The party Secretariat extended

its arm through various administrative levels and to the natural

villages on the town(up) and towns hip( myon ) levels, in the form of
3,083 Supervisors kwanri.jang )

.

And 15.109 Vice Supervisors

were

given the task of overseeing the activities of youth and women at
the corresponding levels.

There were 60,180 Leaders

.jido.jan.? )

at

2^8

the village(li) or blo^ck(tong) level.

At the natural village

level, there were more than 180.000 male and
female functionaries
(hwaldon^.iang).

This hierarchy of party officials was under
the

firm control of the party chairman^ and his hold on
the party personnel
was all the more stronger if he happened to be the fetional
Assemblyman

from that district.

Whereas the

^IDP

trained some 500 party officials down to the

level of the district party Vice Chairmen and organization and
propaH-anda chiefs for only a few days before the campaign started,

since its inception in I965, the DRF's impressive training center
in Seoul had enrolled some 40,000 functionaries who were coeched

in party activities for two weeks.

At the center Candidate ?ark

had a firm control of the party as its President.

The Campaign

Headquarters was headed by Paek Kam-ok who coordinated the activities

of various parts of the party organization ^and its day-to-day
functions were under the direction of Kil Jae-ho, the party's
Secretary-General, who headed the campaign office.

The newspapers

in Seoul likened the campaign office of the incumbent party to

a battle operation room

full of maps, charts and telephones.

Distribution of campaign funds .

According to the law on campaign

funds promulgated in February, I965 and amended in January, I969,

any person or group can make contributions to the Central Election

Management Committee which in turn distributes 60 percent of the
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money thus raised to the majority party
and the rest to other parties
in proportion to the percentage of
seats in
the National Assembly.

Since the law was promulgated, the
CEMc](reported to have received
contributions amounting to 263.000,000 won.^^

This is a meager

amount compared with the actual amount spent
by presidential and

Assembly candidates in a single election year.

In the 196?

presidential election, for example, the CEMC set a limit
of 270,000,000

won as a sum each presidential candidate and his party could
spend
for electioneering puriDoses

."'^

It was estimated by observers both

within and outside the party that the legal limit set by the

CHi'.C

was several times short of the actual sum spent in that election,

particularly by the ruling party.

That the opposition party was beset with financial problems
was made evident when candidate kim of the

1<I)F

remarked that if his

party could afford to spend one-fifth of what the DRP did, he would

handily win the election.

The party has had a perennial record of

publicly appealing for campaign funds and the 1971 election was no
exception.

The pre-campaign plan for raising funds called for both

compulsory and voluntary donations from party members and the general
public.

The party leaders were subject to compulsory donation

ranging from 100,000 won to 10,000,000 won.

Besides these official

14

The Dong-A Ilbo March 19, 1971, p. 3. At the current
exchange rate(1972), this amount is equivalent to US $ 657f500.
.

^^The limit set by the Ca*iC for the 1971 election was
962,000,000 won(US ^ 2,155,000).

250

contributions of the party leaders and members,
party representative

Tu Chin-san and the presidential candidate -to
be were charged with
the responsibility of making up the shortage
of funds.

several leaders of the

m?

At any rate,

Campaign Headquarters visited the
Korean

Business Association on March 18 to request
that powerful group to
contribute funds to the CB<C.^^

On the other hand, the incumbent

party appeared to have no problem raising campaign
funds.

It wa?

reported that the oarty was able to distribute
some three to four

million won to each National Assembly constituency by
the beginning

of April.

While the actual sums spent by the ruling party and the

NDP remained a secret, it has been speculated that the

some 560,000,000 to DRP's 5.000.000

I.D?

spent

won."'-^

Selecting Candidates

On March

17, 1971, the Democratic Republican Party, at its

fifth National Party Convention, made official

t5:e

long expected

nomination of President Park Chung Kee as its presidential candidate

and adopted a 56-point election pledge.

By that time, the party

was able to patch up the old wounds in the party— especially that

of the maincurrent party dissidents who

h-ad

supported Kim

Jong-p'il

to becx)ne the party's nominee, although they never challenged Park's
-jz

The Dong~A Ilbo , Karch 19, 1971, p. 3-^"

^The Korea Times. April 11, 1971, p. 2.

^%ee

Cho Kam-cho and E6 Jun, op. cit.

,

p. 1^0.
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leadership openly.

The ostensible unity of the party was
achieved.

however, when Kim came out in

supirxDrt

of the constitutional amendment

in 1969 and then appointed "Advisor" to
President Park along with

Chong Il-kwKn and Yun Ch'i-yong shortly
thereafter.

At the nominating

convention, Kim became the party's Vice
President, a step which

necessitated an amendment to the party charter.
Through eight years as President and two additional years as
Chairman of the SCia, the DRP's nominee had been preoccupied with

bringing about modernization of the country.

This iron-willed

determination was well expressed in his inaugural speech in I967

when he stated that his "life-long dream has been to drive out
poverty..,**

19

Park's modernization program has resulted in a near

ten percent increase in gross national product every year during
his tenure as President.

Although his policies were often criticized

as being too drastic at times, he was above criticism as far as his

honesty and integrity were concerned.

His preoccupation with

modernization was accompanied by his determination to provide
political stability and strong leadership.

As head of the party

and the administration, he was in a strong position to enforce

discipline in the party.

Born and raised in a poor family of military background, he
becaine a professional soldier early in his youth having graduated

"^^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo . March 2^, 1971, p. ^.
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froin

the Kanchurian Kilitary Academy and Japanese
Military Academy

before the liberation and from the Korea Kilitary
Academy after
independence.

Having participated in the Korean War as a middle

rank officer, his rise in the military was less than spectacular.
He was reputed to be an extremely competent soldier who refused
to

compromise with political power.

At the time of the military coup

which he headed, he was second in command of the Second Army.

Aft-er

he became the sixth President of Korea, he seemingly stood above

politics: he projected a father image and that of a common man with

an empathy for poor farmers and their problems.

He often stated

that proverty to which he had been subjected as a youth and as a

young officer has been both his "teacher" and "benefactor."
Despite the widespread identification of the DRP as a party of
Piilitary men and big businessmen, he was credibly presented as a

champion of the common man.

The party that nominated Park elevated him to the status of
the creator of a "new Korea," whose people have rightfully begun
to have courage, pride and hope for the first time in her long

history.

As a military expert, he seemed best suited to lead South

Korea in the face of/^military threat from North Korea.

He had been

a leader with a vision on the unification of the country.

He had

also been an administrator par excellence who had responded to his

own call of modernization forcefully.'^^

20

For the DRF appraisal of its own nominee, see the statement
written by the party's Secretary General, Kil Jae-ho in The ChosSn
Ilbo . March 30, 1971, p. 3.
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\<hlle the ruling party presented
the electorate with an image

Of a unified party, the opposition

i\T)F

faced a series of crises

prior to the nomination of its presidential
candidate.
the party had suffered a

Soon after

one-sided defeat at the polls on a

constitutional amendment on October 1?,
1969. the race for the

next presidential nomination began.

On November

8,

the

i\DF

Whip

in the National Assembly, Kim Yong-sam, declared
his intention to

enter the race for presidential nomination.

In doing so, he also

advanced a theory that the only way to improve the
party's fortune
was to entrust the party leadership to the younger elements
of the

party and that a man in his forties should be chosen as the party's
presidential candidate in the forthcoming election.

This idea

received widespread support among the younger factional leaders of
the party such as Yi Ch'ol-sung and

the eventual winner, Kim Dae-jung,

In the plenary national convention held on January 26, 1970,

Yu Chin-san was selected as the head of the Party on the second
ballot defeating Chong Il-hyong and Yi Jae-hyong for that post.
Political Affairs Council members were to be chosen by consultation

among those three who vied for the top leadership of the party.

The

council structure of the NDP was again assured when the chairmanship

of the National Party Convention which had the crucial responsibility
of nominating the party's presidential candidate went to a nonmaincurrent member, Kim Hong-il, who won over Yu Chin-san 's choice.

25^

Yu. while opposing the theory
that a man in his forties should

be chosen as the party's presidential
candidate, declared his non-

candidacy on March 10, 197I.

Ke insisted that the three
presidential

hopefuls. Kim Y5ng-sam. Yi Ch'ol-sxJng
and Kim Dae-jung should work

out a compromise plan which would determine
the party nominee and
that should these three men fail to agree
on a nominee, he should

be empowered to make that decision himself.

The three youthful

a

presidential hoDefuls resisted such/proposal and vowed to make
a
fair comoetition for winning the party's endorsement.

Yu reversed his decision on September 21 when he declared a
"conditional" candidacy, stating

in

effect that he would not

"refuse the party's nomination should that be the party's decision."

He added, however, that he would withdraw his candidacy if the
three youthful candidates could unite behind a single candidate

before September

2^—

a possibility which Yu apparently discounted.

The three candidates persisted in vowing to support the winner at
the National Convention.

Yu again reversed his stand on the eve of

the nominating convention when he announced that he would support

Kim Yong-sam's candidacy.
When the nominating convention convened on September 29, the
race was narrowed down to Kim Yong-sam and Kim Dae-jung.

The former,

having received the avowed support of the maincurrent members and
their delegates and of the faction led by Yi Ch'ol-sung, was a heavy
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favorite.

Kim Bae-jun- could count on the support
of Chong Il-hy^ng

and his followers and aiDpeared to have the
support of the rank-andfile delegates to the convention.

V^ien the votes were counted,

however, Kim Dae-jung energed a surprise victor.

Kim Dae-juns: entered the presidential election as
a far less

well known personality than his foe, Park Chung Hee.

He nevertheless

represented the cream of the young intellectuals in the
party of old
politicians: in this respect, he brought with him a
"new image" of
the party.

Although he had a far less iiapressive credential than

Park, he entered the thick of politics long before
Park shed his

military uniform, as he often emphasized during the campaign,
a non-maincurrent leader of the party he had ably served
as a chief

of the opposition party's procaganda section.
The KD? nominee entered into politics early in his youth by

participating in student movements after the liberation.

After

repeated failure in the National Assembly elections, he was finally
elected to that body from, a rural Kangwon Province in I96I.

During

his term in the sixth and seventh National Assemblies, he earned a

reputation as a fine oratorical speaker and an economic theoretician.

What he called dae.iun?

k7/ong-.ie

,

or "an economy for the masses," was

adopted as the official econom.ic tenet of his party before he won

21

»/

On the first ballot, Kim Yong-sam gained 421 votes to
Kim Dae-jung's 3S2, with 86 invalid votes. v7ith no one winning the
majority of vote, Kim Dae-jung edged out Kim Yong-sam on the
second ballot.
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the presideiitial nomination.

As a pwlitical figure not well known

at the grassroots, he made a conscious effort to
project an image
as the defender of ordinary citizens from the
arbitrary exercise

of administrative power while strengthening his ties
with the urban
intellectuals and students with whom he had a great
deal in common.
The

W

praised him for his unwavering belief in democracy,
and

him
described /as an economic theoretician of a high order and a
statesman
with a will to act.^^
In addition to the candidates of the

tvro

major parties, five

more parties put uv their presidential candidates; Pak Ki-ch'ul of
the Democratic I.ationalist Farty(Di;p), Song Fo-kyong of the Kass

Party, Yi Chong-yun of the Liberal Democratic Party, Chin Fok-ki

of the Justice Party and Kim Ch'ol of the Unified Socialist Party.

Of these, Kim Ch'ol of the Unified Socialist Party made it clear
from the beginning that he offered himself as a candidate not to

win the election but to make the public conscious of the party's
platform during the election.

headed by Yun ?o-son,

whx)

Of the five minor parties, the

DI;P,

opposed President Park in I963 and I967

presidential elections, was the most serious challenger, but the
party's failure to come up with a strong candidate sealed any hope

22

1971,

For profiles of Kim Dae-jung, see The Dong-A Ilbo
5 and The Choson Ilbo March 30, 1971. p. 3-

T).

.

.

April 2^,
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of drawing a sizable vote.^^

On the eve of the election day, two

candidates of ninor parties withdrew their candidacy in
the name of

"opposition unity."

On April 24, Pak Ki-ch'ul of the DNP, however,

reversed his earlier announcement that he would give up his candidacy.
Throughout the campaign, the minor party candidates drew very little
attention.

The Campaign

In accordance with the election laws, the campaign could last

for thirty days prior to the election day.

The ruling party reportedly

took great pains to choose April 2? as the election day.

The choice

was made on the basis that the selected day would precede a busy

farming season and would therefore guarantee a maximum rural voter
participation in election.

It would also give little time for the

opposition to prepare for the campaign.

24

The law required that

the election must take place sometime between April 21 to May 20

23

DKP was organized by those former Civil Rule Party
members who broke away from the party. To this core element, the
party was able to recruit many politicians who were disenchanted
with the opposition party. Yun Fo-son declined the nomination of
the party. There. was even e talk of recruiting Yi Bom-sok to
became the standbearer of the party, but he showed no interest in
that possible offer. The DI.P finally nominated Pak Ki-ch'ul, a
former Assemblyman.
24
This section is based on the personal observation of the
author and the following: Cho Nam-cho and Eo Jun, od. cit..
An Ch'i-sun, "Chongch'i SonjSnkwa Sondonui Tekunik"( Political
Propaganda and the Technique of instigation), Sedae, June, 1971|
pp. 80-88, and Yi Kang-sik, "Dukpyo Jakch6n"( Vote Getting Operation),
Ch'a Ji-s5n,
Shindonp-'a , Kay, 1971t PP» 176-185. -^ee also
Taet 'onrmyonF T'ansaeng (The Birth of President) (Seoul: Shin Hj-'onsilsa,
1971).
-^The
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(70 to ^0 days before the presidential term ended on
June 31, I971).

Hence the official campaign began on Karch
2?.
Even before the official campaign began, however, the
two parties

began exchanging charges of irregularities.

of 1971, the

m?

Since the early months

stumping team ^including its presidential candidate^

had been making a nation-wide tour in a drive to collect signatures

from 500,000 voters to introduce an amendment bill rescinding the
constitutional amendment passed in I969 allowing a third- term
presidency.

The incumbent party charged that such activity constituted

a clear case of pre-election campaign prohibited by law since it would

involve canvassing individual households to collect signatures.

Cn

petition from the ruling party, the CQIC ruled that such activity

must be considered as constituting a campaign activity, hence unconstitutional .

On the other hand, on February 25, the

IflDP

representative

Yu Chin-san publicly accused the sxiministration of irregular activities
and challenged President Park to rectify these iminediately.

Among

other things, Yu attacked the use of administrative power in elections;

oppression of the press; interference in the judicial branch; use

of government-run radio and television stations soley for propagandizing
against the opposition party; formation of a government inspired
third party to disrupt the KD? and to seduce NDF members to desert
the party with offers of posts in the government.

^^The Choson Ilbo, February 26, 1971, p. 1.
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As far as the issues both parties raised
in the campaign, the
1971 presidential election was conducted in the
manner of the 196?
election in that the canpaign was waged
almost free of attacks on
personalities.

A relatively coherent set of policies
was advanced

by each of the two parties.

The grand strategies to power were

formulated one week prior to the official beginning
of the campaign.
The incumbent DRP was to emphasize the "inevitability"
of the

constitutional amendment for the third term presidency, the
need for

securing political stability midst dangers from Korth Korean
belligerence and uncertainties in the international arena.
election catchphrase was "Stability without Confusion."

on the other hand,

v;as

The

The DRF

hW,

to rely on the familiar issue of the danger

of long tenure of power and rampant political corruption
in the
incumbent regime.

Throughout the campaign, the policy confrontation of the two

major parties was a lively affair with the opposition initiating
the attack on the ruling party and its policies and the ruling party

providing the explanations and counterattack on the MDP stands.

As

far as the campaign issues were concerned, the ruling party was

clearly on the defensive

—

as all incumbent parties in democracies,

the burdens of power placed the incumbent party on the defensive.

The Dong-A Ilbo . Karch 19, 1971, p. 1.
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The two parties differed in six major areas. ^'^
The opposition party insisted that a "mood of peace"
was

prevailing throughout the world, pointing particularly
to the seeming

rapprochement between the United States and Communist China.

Under

the circumstances, Korth Korea would not attack South
Korea, nor

would it have the capability to do so in at least ten years.

The

four big power guarantee of peace proposed by candidate Kim was

envisioned to restrain North Korea from provoking war and ease

tension in Northeast Asia by making Japan and Communist China play
the role of the balancer in Asia while having the United States and
the Soviet Russia check one another.

It claimed that the ruling

party's persistent v/arnings against the possibility of another i\orth

Korean invasion was designed to cover up its scheme to retain political
power.

The ruling party, on the other hand, retorted that it was

irresponsible for the NDP to assert that

I'iorth

Korea would not provoke

another war for ten years, and it warned that r'yongyang had already

completed war preparations.

The four big power guarantee, contended

the ruling party, was a "dangerous illusion" which not only was

unrealistic but constituted a subservient diplomatic posture.

The

four years to follow would be critical for the current situation^ reSQnbling

27

the eve of the Korean War.

North Korea would try to take

The summary of the campaign issues are found in The Hankuk
Ilbo Acril 22, 1971, P. ^. See also Yu Kyong-hyon and Hwang Stfn-p'il,
^Son'go Ctiaengjom"( Election Issues), Shindong'a , July, 1971, PP« 90-101.
,
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advantage of the disorder that
might arise due to a transfer of
power in the south. The key to
national security at this critical
moment was to achieve stability through
economic growth, argued the

ruling party.
on
Another major issue that was capitalized/
by the opposition
was the question of tenure of power.

The Constitution, it claimed,

was sabotaged as a result of the ruling
party's scheme to enforce
a perpetual

rule.

Democracy, contended the opposition
party, means
the
that a person cannot retain/presidency
for more than two terms.
If

brought to power, the party would not only
rer^eal the amendment that
was oassed by the ruling oarty in I969,
but it would restore honor

and orestige to the constitutional government.

The opposition party

also charjred toward the end of the campaign that the ruling
party

was contemolating to install an institution of generalissimo for
candidate Park.

Should the DRP want to retain power for itself

rather than for Park, it could do so with another candidate,
suggested the opposition party.

The DRP argued, however, that there

was no point in wrangling over the m.atter of tenure of power for
candidate Park as the overwhelming majority voted in favor of it in
the 1969 national referandum.

A twelve-year tenure of power was the

minimum period necessary to guide the nation to a high stage of
economic development: such examoles had been provided by Japan and

West Germany where long tenure of power for one party under a strong
leader had helped bring about economic rehabilitation and development,
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As far as the economic policies of the two parties
were concerned,
the KDP proposed what its candidate called "an economy
for the masses."

Whereas the economic policies of the incumbent party had
abe4d
corruption and widened the gap between the rich and poor and between
various regions, and between different sectors of the economy, the

NDP policy was aim.ed at achieving balanced develorment between

apiculture and industry by promising to invest at least 20 percent
of the gross national product in the agricultural sector.
ffrain price

A dual

system and a system of taxation favoring the low income

grouns would be imolemented.

The DRP, on the other hand, insisted

that at the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Economic Plan, Korea

would join the ranks of the advanced countries by having a per
capita

income of 400 dollars.

The benefits of modernization would

be shared without discrimination.

The party also promised to create

two million new jobs so as to eradicate the unemployment problem in

the country.

Other issues that were presented by both parties were those of
corruption, graft and irregularities in governnent, the maintenance

of reserve forces and the military drill for students.

The M)F

charged that the corruotion in government was so widespread that
even President Park himself had admitted^

In addition to a system

of resristration of private property owned by

hic-h

ranking government

officials, candidate Kim pledged to make public his personal
properties and take the lead in eliminating corruption and
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irregularities.

The DA? argued that corruption would multiply,
if

the NDP was brought to power.

The DRP claimed that President Park

had a stringent and concrete plan to elipxinate
corruption and
irregularties

,

which had been by-products of development.

The opposition party attacked the Homeland Reserve Forces and

military drill for students as a violation of the Constitution^ as
they forced a dual military obligation on the people.

Evaders of

military service, stand-by service youths and the surplus manpower
beyond the annual conscription quota could be better used in other
ways than the cumbersome dual military system.

The ruling party

warned that the disbanding of Homeland Reserve Forces would create
too much of a military disparity with North Korea.

It therefore

insisted that these forces should not be disbanded regardless of

whoever might come to power.

It also stated that so long as North

Korea continued to make war preparations, military drills for college
students should not be abolished.

As the campaign wore on, each of these issues received differing
emphasis by the candidates and other party leaders.

It appears that

the opposition party was successful in pushing the DRP on the defensive

on almost all issues.

As far as presenting the issues to the

electorate was concerned, the opposition candidate possessed the

ability to criticize the ruling party's policies freely and sometimes

in exaggerated terms, whereas the incumbent
candidate was often

restrained by his official responsibilities.^^
Since such campaign techniques as door-to-door
canvassing were
prohibited by election laws, both parties relied heavily
on the
campaign rallies.

The two major parties staged altogether some

600 rallies throughout the country involving some
5,000,000 voters,

who constituted about one third of the total electorate.

Candidate

Park of the DR? appeared in only 9 rallies in provincial
capitals

and Seoul and Pusan.

The burden of the Dkl-'s sturring tour was

borne by Kim Jong-p'il who was popular among the people.

The team

headed by Kim held campaign rallies for a total of
75 times throughout
the country.

Other teams headed by the party chairman, Assembly

Speaker Yi Hyo-sang, and Advisor Chong Il-kwon toured the country
simultaneously in different sections of the country.

DRP rallies throughout the country numbered 296.

The combined

The bulk of the

opposition party campaign rallies was conducted by candidate Kim
himself.

110 times.

Compared with his DRP foe, Kim spoke to crowds at least

Other party leaders held rallies for another 155 times

for a combined total of 265 times.

In addition to the campaign

rallies where the candidates were exposed to the electorate along

with other party leaders

,

both parties published propaganda material

28

newspaper debates among party leaders on the major
campaign issues, see The Dong-A Ilbo February 15, 1971 » ?• 3,
April 8, 1971, p. 3, Aoril 1^, 1971, p. 3 and April 22, 1971, P.
Fo]'

,
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profusely.

At the height of the campaign, the
party organs- the

Kin.iukonc^hwano of the DR? and the
Kin.ju.lgnson of the

some 1,000.000 copies.

W

circulated

In case of the latter, the figure
represented

about ten times the normal size of
circulation.

Through a series

of speaking tours, each party had tried
to erase the "footsteps"
of the other party.

This was particularly true of the
opposition

party which seemed to rely almost entirely
on cajnpaign rallies to
create a "boom" for its candidate.

The DRP, on the other hand, seemed

to have a m.ore well ;)repared blueprint for
victory.

The DRP's Campaign Headquarters made triumph in Seoul as
one

of its objectives.

It established a special Seoul Planning Office

under the Central Secretariat and completed the training of some
600

party workers at the Central Party Training School by the start
of
the campaign.

Several days prior to the election day, the DAP staged

one of the most impressive campaign rallies ever held by a
ruling

party in the Capital City.

In the rural areas, a peculiar campaign

technique, known as the "Drawing Room Discussion Group," was used
to lend a more personal approach.

Taking place in the house of an

active party worker, this discussion group drew people from the

neighborhood to discuss all problems related to their lives, including
political ones.

Each of the party's district offices reportedly held

an average of 80 such meetings throughout the campaign.

In addition,

the party initiated campaigns to build village libraries and create
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scholarships with the objective of strengthening
the villagers'

affinity with the party.

The Results and Aftermaths

The nation went to the polls on April
2? in the midst,^relative
calm.

As many as 81

in this election.

A

percent of the eligible voters participated

Compared with the I963 and I967 voter
turnouts

there was some decline in the voting rate despite
the tremendous
interests generated in the campaign.

were 85 and 83.6 percent respectively.

The I963 and I967 figures
The two major parties polled

98 percent of the total votes cast; in both the I963 and I967 elections,
the minor parties polled as much as 8 percent of the total vote.^^
The incumbent candidate emerged victorious in a hard fought

battle polling 6,3^2,828 to Kim's 5,395,900 votes.

Park polled 54

percent of the votes cast for the two major candidates and had the

plurality of some 900,000 votes.

The results of the election are

summarized in the following table( Table 22).-^°
The voting pattern of the 1971 presidential election showed

once again that there was a tremendous gap between the urban and

rural areas in voting patterns.

Whereas Candidate Kim led Park

29

For an analysis of the 1971 presidential election returns,
see Yi Ycng-ho, "Saich'il Son'goui Chonf^ch'iuisik"( Political
Awareness of the April 27 Election), Shindon.^'a June, 1971,
.

pp. 86-96.

30

Compiled by the Central Election Management Committee.
The CEMC data are quoted in Chon~kyong Yon'gu . i.o. 76(Lay, 1971),
pp. 20-33.
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Table 22.

Provincial Breakdown of the Votes
Cast for the Two Major Parties in
the 1971 Presidential Election

Percentage the votes cast for the
two parties
Park(DRP)

Kiin(NDP)

Seoul

40

Pus an

56

Kyong^i Province

50

50

Kangwon Province

61

39

Ch'ungpuk Province

58

kZ

Ch'unp-nam Province

55

45

Chonpuk Province

37

63

Chonnam Province

35

65

Kyongbuk Province

76

2k

Kyongnam Province

7^

26

Cheju Province

58

42

Nation

5^

46

60

by the ratio of 54.6 to 45.4 percent in the nation's seven larger
cities, the incumbent overshadowed his opponent by the ratio of

58,6 to 41.4 percent in the rural constituencies.

However, it is

interestir.g to note that the DRP and Candidate Park have made

strong inroads in cities as well.

In the eleven medium-sized cities.
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Park was winner over Kim by the ratio of 53.1 to

-^f

6. 9 percent:

in

small cities, Park's percentage increased to 56.3 percent, whereas
his princioal opponent's percentage dropped to 43.?.

In this election, however, the urban-rural cleavage in voting

behavior was completely overshadowed by the regional gap between the

Yongnam and Honam areas.

In the Yongnam area, which included Pusan,

Kyongsang Namdo and ?:yongsang Pukdo, its "favorite son" had a
plurality of more than a million and half votes over Kim, who, in
turn, beat Park by a little more than 600,000 votes in the Konam

area of Chonra Pukdo and Chonra Namdo.

Despite the public pleas

made by both candidates to set aside regional sentiments, the sectional
vote concentration emerged as the most significajit voting pattern
In more visible terms. Park outcast Kim three to

in the election.

one in the

Yonpjiaan

the Honam area.

area, whereas Kim outclassed Park two to one in

The effects of the regional confrontation erasing

the urban-rural gap was naturally the greatest in these two areas

j,

and this was well illustrated by the fact that Kim as the opposition
candidate polled 62.1 percent of the rural vote in the Konam area

whereas Park won 62.8 percent of the urban vote in the Yongnam area.

31

Park's victory then can be attributed to the fact that his

native provinces which constituted the largest voting bloc in the

country gave an overwhelming support to their favorite son candidate.

^^Compiled by Yi Yong-ho, "Saich'il Son'goui Chongch'iuisik"
(Political Awareness Shown in the April 2? Election), p. 89.
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The same was true with Kim's area of strength.

But the low voter

turnout of ?? percent in Kim's area^^ combined
with the fact that
there were about a million and a half less voters
in the Honam region

than in the Yongnam area proved fatal for the

I^DP

candidate.

In

addition, the opposition candidate failed to win
in medium-sized and

small cities where his predecessors usually gained
plurality.
As soon as the ballots were counted, however, the two
parties

once again diverged widely on the fairness of the election.
they called "silent election frauds," Candidate Kim and
the

In what
i\D?

claimed that they were deprived of "millions of vote" through

manipulation by the ruling oarty and the administration."^-^

In sharp

contrast, the ruling oarty claimed that the election Just completed

was carried out in an atmosphere which even the advanced democracies
could envy,

While the foreign correspondents

'

dispatches generally

agreed with the ruling party's assessment of the way the campaign
was conducted, the observation team of the U1\CURK, which was asked
the
to observe the election at/request of the Central Election Kanagement
Committee, reported that it could not confirm the opposition charges

32

<^

Kyongsang Fukdo and Kyongsang l>;amdo had a voter turnout rate
of 85.4 percent and 83.2 percent respectively. Both figures were
well above the national average of 81.^ percent.
33

For the newspaper advertisement entitled "Silent Election
Frauds," tree The Done- A Il'oo Kay 1, 1971i , p. 7. It claimed that
the DRP illegally manipulated 3,000,000 votes.
.
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of irrecrularities and that the election was
carried out in calm and
in apparent fairness .-^^

Kim Dae-juns, in his after-election interview
on April 30, stated
that he regretted the fact that he was unable
to send congratulatory

flowers to the winner and stated his reasons why
the election was
a "fundamental fraud.

"-^^

The ruling party has used scores of times more
money than the^legally allowed 920 million won in
bribing the
members and buying votes, while the

WF

could not raise even half of the legal limit.

All out mobilization of administrative power
was used in the election.
Government funds were used for electioneering
purposes,

Innmerable pro-MDF voters were deprived of
the opportunity to vote whereas pro-D.iF voters
were rej^istered in the voters' list twice or
three times so that two or three votes could be
cast under a single name.

34

The assesment of elections by various individuals and groups,
domestic and foreign, are summarized in Kam Jae-hi, "Saich'il^Son'gS
ChJ5nhuui ChSngch'i Kaekrak"(A Campaign Sketch of the April
27
Election), Chonrkyon? Yon'gu . Uo. 76(Kay, 1971), pp. 98-112.

^%ee The Korea Times , April 30, 1971, p. 1. The National
Consultative Conference to Safeguard Democracy shared the liDP's
assessment of the election procedures. In its statement released
on April 30, the Conference charged that the "election irregularities
were manipulated by unprecedented exercize of money and administrative
power" and that such manipulation constituted an "assault on
democracy. " The association set out to boycott the May 25 Assembly
elections. For the statement of the Consultative Conference, see
The DonF-A Ilbo April 30, 1971, p. 1.
.

Proxy- voting, ballot inserting and replacing,
and expulsion of M)P supervisors at polling
places
have taken place.

The government disclosed voting results first
from pro- government party districts to give the
false impression that the DRF victory was only a
matter of time and then committed various irregularities as the KDF election supervisors were
discouraged.

.
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CHAPm

VI

THE PARTY IK THE GOVERN^SI.T

Since the holding of governmental power is
a raison d'etre of
a political party, it is important to
probe into the behavior of

party's representatives once they are elected
to office.

In terms

of organizational and financial support that
candidates receive
during Assembly elections, the present ruling
and opposition
Assemblymen markedly differ.^

Since these men owe varying degree

of graces from the party to which they are affiliated,
their perception

of the party's role in their election is one of the factors
affecting
the behavior of Assemblymen in the legislature.

In order to under-

stand the peculiar characteristics of the Korean legislative process,
it is important to discuss the attitudinal differences of the ruling

and opposition party Assem.blymen and probe into the sources of such
behavior
In a newspaper survey made immediately after the I967 Assembly

election of the successful and unsuccessful

DrtP

and KDP candidates,

it was revealed that they had a sharp difference in their estimation

of the role of parties played in their campaign.

As far as the

successful DRP candidates were concerned, their victory was owed to
their political party than to any other factor: party organization,
17.7 percent; support of the affiliated party, I5.6 percent; policies

and platforms, 10.^ percent; and the success of the constituency.

"'^ee

op . cit.,

The Hankuk Ilbo, June 9, 1970, p. 5» and U Byong-kyu,
t).

71.

6
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projects sponsored by the candidate. 1^.1 percent.

As far as the

successful roP candidates were concerned, only 9-^
percent replied
that they attributed their victory to the party
organization; 17.

percent to sur)nort of the affiliated party; 12 percent to
personal
ties; 17.3 percent to name recognitions.

indicate that the opposition candidates

These figures seem to
x^ere

definitely more on

their own than the DRP counterparts, and consequently tended to

exhibit more independent behavior as Assemblymen.^
The attitudinal differences

m.ay

also be ascertained by each

party member's perception of the internal order of the party to which

he

is

affiliated and

legislative process.

his

relationship vdth the party in the

Table 23 summarizes the Assemblymen's view of

the internal order of the party in the Seventh x\'ational Assembly."^

There was a less marked but still significant difference between

the DRP and KDP Assem.blymen on their perception of the role of party

organization, either within or outside the National Assembly on
their legislative voting ^as the following table indicates( Table 24).^

Although the majority of the members of both parties regard themselves
as bound to the party's decision in their legislative voting, such

2

The Kankuk Ilbo June 9, 1970» P» 5« In another survey made
on the Assemblymen, a similar result was obtained, oee U Byong-kyu,
This seems to indicate that there is a considerable
OP . cit
p. 71«
difference between the two parties as tc the hold of the parties
on their legislators.
,

. ,

-

^Ibid .

k

Ibid.

.

p. 31.

0

Table 23.

The Assemblymen's View of the
Internal Order of Their Party

(to)

Very democratic

5.3

Fairly democratic

30.0

Slightly democratic

33.3

Undemocratic

38.7

Severely undemocratic

Table 2^.

63.3

6.7

8,0

The National Assemblymen's rtelationship

with Their Party in Legislative Voting

DRP Assemblymen

ID? Assembl^inen

Vote according to
decision of the
party leadership

16.2

I3.3

Vote according to decision
of the party caucus

61. 3

60.

Vote according to personal
belief ^

I7.5

23.3

5«0

3.3

Vote according to public
opinion
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tendency was somewhat more evident in the
DRP.

Similarly, there was

also a marked difference between the Assemblymen
of the two major
parties in their estimation of party sanctions
when they voted against
the party decision on a bill.

About 7^ percent of the ruling DRP

members thought that it would be "stern." whereas
only

of the opposition legislators thought

percent

so.-^

Although the majority of the Korean legislators hold
to the
Burkean notion of representation.^ with a majority of
the Assemblymen
in the Seventh National Assembly having: felt that they
should represent

the whole nation, all available evidence seems to indicate that
there
is also a sifrnificant difference on this score between the DRF
and

the NDP law-makers.

In one survey, it was shovm that the DRP

legislators emphasized the need to behave according to their own
"beliefs" rather than according to public opinion.

The opposition

legislators, however, overwhelmingly endorsed the view that the

nation's elites should follow public opinion.*^
The attitudinal differences between the DRF and the KDF Assemblymen

did not cease on procedural matters discussed above.

5

In a recent

V
"Wonnae Ch'ongmuron"(On Party
February. 1971, p. 104.

^
U Byong-kyu and Kim Chong-rim,

Whip). Shindong'a .

Kim Chong-rim and U Eyong-kyu, "Taeui Chongch'iwa Kukhoewiwon"
(Representative Politics and the National Assemblymen). Ch^n.-rkyong
Y^n'gu . September. 1970, p. 25.
7

s/

v

Yi Yong-ho, "Hankukinui Kach'ikwan"( The Value Systems of
Koreans), Special Series No. 16, The Choson Ilbo , May 4, 1972, p. 4.
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extensive survey on the values systems of Koreans
and the K'ational

Assemblymen, it was discovered that there are major
differences on
substantive matters.

In ordering the nation's priorities, for

example, the opposition legislators tended to emphasize
political

stability

m.ore

often than their DRP counterparts, who tended to

identify economic problems as the urgent national issue.

Table 25

demonstrates this proclivities.^

On the liberal-conservative continuum, the opposition legislators
leaned consistently to the liberal side on such questions
as ecological
problems and the distribution of wealth.

The ruling party Assembly-

men tended to be more conservative than the national sample;
the
opposition law-makers were far more liberal than the national sample.

On the question of their preference between the two conflicting
values of the national priorities— economic growth on the one hand

and democracy and freedom on the other, it was discovered that the

DRP legislators are for more economic growth oriented than the
national sample; the KDP legislators, on the other hand, were fo^

more democracy oriented than the national sample.

On the question

of whether the agricultural sector or the industrial sector should

g

Ibid. This national survey is the most extensive study of
Korean value systems ever made. The study was made between
September and November, 1971.
9

Ibid .

.

Series No. 10, March 16, 1972, p.

^Ibid .

,

Series No. 1, January 1, 1972, p. 5.

^'

^^Ibid., Series No. 4, January 20, 1972, p. ^.
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Table

Issue Awareness of Korean Voters
and National Assembljnnen.

25..

Nation

Assemblymen

DRP

NDP

(%)

Unification

16

Corruption

8

15
J.

TO
iZ

Economic stability

2?

19

Rural develoment

11

3

J

J

Social stability-

7

9

6

12

Ethical stability

7

9

15

6

National integration

2

8

Q
7

<

17

10

21

Political stability
National security

6

5

9

2

Diplomacy

1

1

1

1

Education

3

3

4

3

Ik

2

1

3

Others

be emphasized in setting the nation's priorities, the results of the

survey showed a curious result in that the Assemblymen from the rural
electoral districts (which tended to be DRP Assemblymen) exhibited
a pro-industrial inclination; the lurban representative (which tended
to be NDP law-m.akers )

,

on the other hand, showed a proclivity for

the agricultural sector.

12

Ibid., Series No. 3» January 13, 1972, p. 4.

:
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How should one explain the differing attitudes of
the ruling
and opposition party members in the National Assembly
sketched above?
The answer should perhaps lie in the faci that
through long years

out of government, the opposition legislators have
internalized the
anti-government and the anti-ruling party complex.

At least since

the Third National Assembly, the nation's legislative
branch has been

dominated by the ruling party Assemblymen.

Having been relegated

to the role of permanent opposition, they apoear to have
acquired

a value system which dictated opposition for the sake of opposition.

Such ODpositionalism is explained by Ar is tide Zolberg in the following
terms

13

The incumbent leaders ^and3 challengers tend
to view conflict as an all-or nothing proposition...
(since 3 factors v/hich might make for the limitation
of issues are almost non-existent, whether it be.-ins
by asking for better wages or better prices, whether
it is dissatisfied v/ith the delimitation of
constituencies or with lack of consideration for
general claims, the opposition almost always ends up
challenging the entire order which the regime is
dedicated to build.

What makes for the militant posture of the opposition and the
ruling party Assemblymen is the fact that opposition members basically
13

Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order ( Chicago Rand NciVally,
1966), p. 75' Asoka Kehta argued similarly: "In colonial, as well as
ex-colonial countries the tradition of opposition goes deep.
Constructive aprroaches are limited; the debris of wrongs, real or
imagined, is littered all around. National movements usually achieve
negative solidarity thoup-h ooposition to alien rule, while positive
agreement remains vague. The posture of opposition tends to become
normal...." Asoka Kehta, "The Opposition in the New States," in
Democracy in the New States, ed.. Office for Asian Affairs of the
Congress for Cultural ?reedom(New Delhi, 1959) » PP. 86-&9.
:

,
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view the incimbent party as illegitimate since the latter
gained
power through manioulation and illegal means.

prominent

WP

leader remarked in I967

For example one

that:"'"^

Only when the ruling party and the opposition
recognized that the elections by which they were
elected to the l.ational Assembly were fair, would
the members of opposite parties have mutually
respected each other's political integrity and
recognized each other's existence. Only such a
National Assembly could be operated smoothly....
From the beginning of its admiriistration the DR?
government had been advocating political stability,
coooeration, and contest based on issues. But such
advocacy
had been in vain. The cause of the
failure lay in the irregular process through which
the DRP gained TOvrer.
Another IDF leader compared his party's tactics against the ruling

party with a soccer game.

Ke said that the "militant line" is

a "reaction to the unconstitutional means employed by the Park

government."

"Suppose," he continued, "the opponents in a soccer

game play the ball with both feet and hands, we should not be

unilaterally forced to observe the rule of the game by playing the
ball only with the

feet.""""^

Without any hope of unseating the incumbent party, the opposition
remains adamant to deal with the ruling party on its terms.
extreme tactics

—

Such

Assembly walk-out, demonstration in the streets.

Kim Yong-sam, Chongch'inun Kilgo Chon^IctTOnun Tchalrjta
(Politics and 'Government rower) (Seoul: Sasanggesa, 196?), p. 100.
Translates and quoted in K. B. Kim, 00. cit . p. I69.
,

Kim Su-han, quoted in The Choson Ilbo, October
26, 1965, Translated and quoted in K. 3. Kim, og. cit., p. I7I.
-"^Statement of
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physical violence on the floor of the National
Assembly and caustic
public condemnation of the government and the
ruling party— have

invited militant reaction from the ruling party.
extremism.

Extremism begets

For the opposition legislators, the struggle
against

the ruling party is deemed a patriotic

duty—

"the more extreme the

struggle, the more patriotic the struggle for democracy
in the
country. "'^

One consequence of such extreme style of opposition

has resulted in the ascendancy of the militant
factions in each of

the parties.

The Legislative Party

Since the middle of the Sixth National Assembly, the autonomy
of the Assembly has been a subject of wide debate in the country and
among the Assemblymen themselves.

The degeneration of the legislative

branch into a "handsmaid" to the executive branch has stemmed from
a host of factors.

Except for the nine-month period during which

a cabinet system operated, Korea has operated under a presidential

system which tends to give the executive branch a superior constitutional
status.

Under the present Constitution, for example, the President,

who is elected directly by the people, is not accountable to the

Assembly except in case of impeachment as stipulated in Article 6l.
The National Assembly has no power to

•^

^Ibid .. p. 170.

paF-s

non-confidence motions
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against the government as a whole except
for individual motions

asainst the Prime Minister and the Kembers
of the State Council.

Except for the nomination of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court
and the Chairman of the Board of Audit
which requires the approval
of the Assembly, the President can freely
appoint all government

officials including the Prime Minister.

The executive branch can

participate in the legislative process by exercising its
power to
introduce bills(Article ^8) and the power to issue
ordinances in

emergency situations (Article 73 and 7^).

The President also has

the power to return bills passed by the Assembly for reconsideration;
he can participate in the Assembly sessions to state opinions
and

answer questions(Article 56).

Moreover, the constitutional requirement

that a candidate for the Assembly must first secure endorsement from

a political party(Article 36) and the stipulation that a member of
the Assembly shall automatically lose his seat if he changes or leaves
his party(Article 38), have further strengthened the President's

position in relation to those members of the Assembly who belong to
his party.

On the other hand, the Assembly

is empowered to enact laws to

pass on government budgets, to inspect the Administration(Article 57),
to impeach the President(Article 61), to cast non-confidence votes

against the Prime Minister and the members of the State Council, to
require the attendance of the Prime Minister and the members of the
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State Council at its sessions for the purpose of
answering questions
from the Assemblymen,

l^rhen

the relative constitutional status and

powers are weighed, the executive branch appears to
have an upperhand.
This would be r^articularly so if the President is the
leader of the

ruling party as is presently the case.

The ruling party's unchallengea-

ble majority in the Assembly has also encouraged the
government to

treat the legislative branch in a cavalier fashion. The
Political
has
Party Law, too,
been utilized to control the Assemblymen. Among
the non- institutional factors contributing to the wanin,^
of legislative

authority is the recent em.phasis on policy output in the name of
development, which has had the effect to cause the process of conflict

and dialogue in the Assembly to recede into the background, as it
is believed to be a waste of time.

The impotence of the legislative branch can also be considered from
the point of view of the cross-pressures that are exerted upon the

Assemblymen in regard to their voting in the National Assembly.

The

Assemblymen themselves do notseem to feel/^great necessity to have
a close communication with either the interest groups or his constituents.

The constituents seem to view their representatives as persons

who could do favors for them at the center.

It rarely occurs that

a voter would take the trouble to either support or oppose certain

policy positions that his representative has taken or the way he has
voted on the floor.

Hence the constituency pressure on legislative
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a
voting is kept at/minimum.

It is significant to note that about
70

percent of the DRF Assemblymen thought that
^^^^oting in the Assembly

would have little or no relationship
to^^^^'^reelection.
percent of the

Some ^5

counterparts answered similarly. 17

I'D?

Such a lack of communication is demonstrated
between the
legislators and the interest groups as well.
the DRF and the

m?

The majority of both

law-makers in the Seventh ^.ational Assembly

reported that they had either not been approached
by any interest
groups or had been approached by a few interest
groups on very few

occasions.

Among the very few interest groups that were
reported

to have contacted some Assemblymen were the
Korean Business Association

and the Korean Chamber of Commerce.

were included in this list.^^

1:0

farmer or later organizations

The majority of the Assemblymen in

the Seventh National Assembly thought that the interest groups
in

Korea exercized no influence on the legislative branch, though many

of them saw the desirability of pressure group activities in the
Assembly.

19

The reason why the interest groups do not seek frequent

contact with the legislative branch is not very difficult to find.
As

have seen in Chapter IV, much of their well-being depends

vre

upon the graces of the administration.

They would obtain their

desired results more rapidly if they go to the high levels of

17
-"•

U By^ng-kyu, op. cit., p. 33.

^Ibid ., o. 37.

^^Ibid., p. 238.

•

28^

administration rather than the Assembly.
Given the situation where the channels of communication between
the legislature and both the electorate and the interest groups
are

closed and remain largely ineffectual, the only possible non-official
channel is that of mass media, especially the daily newspapers.

Although several surve^^ indicated that newspapers exert pressure
upon the Assemblymen, and hence affect their behavior in the Assembly,
their effectiveness in communicating with the legislative branch has
also been beset with difficulties

—

the most serious of which has

been the lack of autonomy from political power in every aspect of
their activities.

21

Kewspapers in Korea have had a venerable tradition

of dissent since the time of the Japanese colonial rule and the
tradition had been kept alive since the independence.

Other channels

of communications having been virtually closed, the newspapert has
remained a potent "potential" interest group.

The successive Korean

governments, except the short-lived Democratic administration in I960,

have tried to

cuirb

the potential influence of newspapers through

various means, including the issuance of administrative orders to
close their doors, but the newspapers today remain as a powerful

20
21

Ibid., p. 335*

For the role of newspapers in the Korean political process,
see Bonr-p-i Kim., A Brief History of the ;lorean Press (Seoul: Korean
Information Service, I965), and Choe Chun, "-olitics and Fress in
Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. 3(December, 196^), po. 296-303. A
good summary of the oroblems encountered by the Korean newspapers
is found in U Byong-kyn, oo. cit., pp. 3^9-355
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potential interest group in the context of Korean politics.
Because the ooposition party in the Assembly rarely quarrels

with the ruling party on substantive legislative matters, the
legislative program of the Assembly is always originated, directed

and managed by the top leadership of the ruling party in consulation
with high government officials.
government-sponsored

and.

Table 26 shows the status of

individual member-sponsored bills in the

National Assembly since 1948.

22

The table clearly reveals that both

in term of number of legislative proposals and the number of bills

enacted into law, government proposed bills had a^upperhand compared
to the bills proposed by individual AssenblyTien.

It is also significant

that goverrxment bills had a far greater chance of passing the National

Assembly than the bills proposed by individual members.

V/ith the

exception of the Third and Fourth "National Assemblies, government
proposed bills showed a consistently higher rate of passage in the
National Assembly than individual Assemblymen's bills.

As has been

noted by a student of the Korean legislative process a great
percentage of the bills proposed by individual Assemblymen are
cleared in advance with the appropriate government ministries.

23

This is particularly true under the present ruling party, which, in

coordination with the administration, often first drafts a bill in

22

———

^

Comoiled and adooted from the data presented by Kan Chong-il,
Hankuk Ghon?ch'i Haengchongron (A Study on Korean Politics and
Adjninistration) (Seoul: rakyongsa, 1972), pp. 62-86.
^^Ibid., p. 94.
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Table 26,

Bills Proposed and Passed in the
National Assembly

Government Bills
No.
Ko. passed

Constituent Assembly
Ko. of bills
passed

1/4-5

—
73.1

106

_

-1

'to

Assemble/men's Hills
I.o.

I^o.

89

passed

lV\

'

/^gO

Second Assembly
No. of bills

216

% passed

63

Third Assembly
Ko. of bills
passed

2^1

Fourth Assembly
Ko. of bills
io passed

202

Fifth Assembly
No. of bills
io passed

108

S

A

137

i8l

75
h,\,k

85

169

35.2

71

42

44

120

21.8

31

25.8

40

26

92

28.2

37

Sixth Assem.bly
Ko. of bills
I0

242

passed

I55

415

64

177

42.6

Seventh Assembly
No. of bills
^ passed

188

120

63.8

162

67

41.9

its policy Committee or the Office of Policy Research and then arranges
to have one of its Assembly members to introduce it in the Assembly.

Such a legislative tactic

is adopted whenever the government deals

with a sensitive political issue and wishes to evade the responsibility
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of formally sponsorinP, a bill on
that matter.

During the Sixth

National Assembly, for example, two of
the most controversial bills
were propc-sed by individual Assemblymen-^the Bill on the Establishment
of Committee on Journalistic Ethics and
the Bill on Safeguarding
the Campuses.

Both of these bills were introduced
amid highly

emotional and militant struggles within
and outside the National

Assembly over the question of ratifying the
Korea-Japan i;orralization
Treaty.

The curbing of press activities and
those of the students

during this period was a sensitive issue
which nevertheless required
some sort of legislation.

Thus two leading DR? members of the

Assembly were asked to formally introduce these
two bills even though
the government itself was their real sponsor.

The gradual weakening of the status of the legislative
branch

vis-a-vis the executive branch has begun to be felt am.ong
the

Assemblymen themselves.

In a survey of the Assemblymen of the

Seventh National Assembly, a great majority of them felt that the
Assembly had degenerated into an ineffective body.

The following

table shows their responses (Table 2?).^^
The S eventh National Assembly

:

a case study .

The refusal of the

elected ND? Assemblymen to sit with the ruling party members for
the opening of the Seventh National Assembly marked an ominous

beginning for the highest law-making body in the nation.

2^

U Byong-kyu, op. cit

. ,

p.

70.

The ND?

.
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Table 2?.

Estimation of the Effectiveness of the
Legislative Branch by the Assemblymen

Very effective

2.6

Fairly effective

17.9

Slightly effective

33.3

20.0

Ineffective

46.2

80.0

charges of widespread election irregularities in the general election

on June 8, I967 were partly redressed by the ruling party's recognition
of such election frauds, termed "degrading" by President Park himself,

and the expulsion of eight DRF Assemblymen who were allegedly involved
in the irregularities.

The LDP, while filing a joint election suit

with the Supreme Court, boycotted the

Assembli'- for

more than five

months

While the negotiations with the opposition for the normalization

of the Assembly functions were being dead-locked, the ruling party
expelled another eight others and founded a satellite negotiating
grouD called the October Five Club(so named because the group registered

with the Secretariat of the National Assembly on that day).

This

ingeneouc method was adopted to circumvent the constitutional

provision which guarantees multiparties in the Liational Assembly.
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Even after the return of the opposition law-makers
on Lovember
29, the sessions of the Assembly were not normalized.

Insisting

that the conditions of their return were not faithfully
carried out

by the ruling party, the

I.DP

legislators staged a sit-in strike

while the budget bill for I968 was on the agenda of the Assembly.
The DRF disolayed its show of strength when the budget was rained

through on December 28 in one corner of the Assembly floor.

The KDP

proceeded to boycott several more sessions and it was not until

April 29, 1968 that the Assembly was r.crrualized after the it
passed a five-point Guarantee Legislation.

The one-party .National

Assembly in the meantime passed many bills, including the important
Revised Petroleum Tax Bill which

v/as

submitted by the administration

just five days prior to the closing of the Assem.bly session, with
a request to pass the entire provisions of the bill without revision.

Without having a sufficient time to study the bill and discussion

on the floor, the bill was passed two days after it was introduced.
The two miajor parties entered on another collision course in

the beginning' of I969 on the issue of constitutional amendment for

the third term presidency.

In a disobedience incident which shook

the ruling party, the "maincurrent" DRF legislators allied with the

opposition to help pass the non-confidence motion against the Education

Minister

Y.won

0-byong.

The incident was followed, as hasy^seen earlier,

by the expulsion of the rebelling leaders on strong orders from
President Park,

As has been discussed in Chapter II, the am.endment
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bill was passed on September

l^f

during the predawn hours in a highly

irregular fashion after the opposition legislators'
occupation of
the Speaker's rostrum.

The opposition party, having resolved to

dissolve the party temporarily to disqualify three of its
own members
who

cajTie

out in support of the amendment, once again remained
outside

the Assembly.

It took more than eight months for the opposition to

return to the Assembly to begin their negotiations with the
ruling

party on revision of electoral laws.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The -foregoing chapters probed into the development of party

politics in Korea since 19^5 when Korea emerged from the authoritarian

rule of the Yi Dynasty and the subsequent Japanese colonial rule.
Circumstances were generally

of healthy political parties.
in politics and

'

unfavorable to the development

"

A low degree of popular participation

severe restrictions on political activities had

been the norm of political life.

During the Japanese colonial rule,

the nationalist movement turned out to be an ineffective and dispersed

venture due to internal dissension and external prosecution.

In the

post-war era, Korea lived under three years of American Ililitary
Goverranent( 1945-19^1.8) during which the vicissitudes of international

politics largely determined the course of domestic politics.

Since

independence, Korea experienced twelve years of authoritarian rule

under Rhee( 19^8-1960)

,

though there was some competitive party politics

in the latter years of the First Republic.

brought

t?iis

The April Student Uprising

government down through bloodshed smd opened a way for

a multiparty liberalism under a cabinet system for a nine-month
period.

A military coup brought this governm.ent to an end, and, for

two years, the nation was in the hands of the military, which, however,
under
was increasing pressure to reestablish a constitutional government.
A

The trasition to a constitutional government was made in 1963 .

Since

then Korea has been experiencing growing two party competition under
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a presidential system.

In the short span of some twenty-five years,

Korea has rcne through the authoritarianism of one dominant
party,

multiparty liberalism, military authoritarianism and
constitutionalism.
Chapter II has given a detailed account of the origin and

development of political parties in Korea since

19^+5.

it has /clearly

shown that political parties cannot be institutionalized simply

because the party elites want them to.

Both the ruling parties of

the past and the present— the LP and the

DR?—

are externally created

parties: the form.er was created by a decree of an authoritarian and

charismatic President who saw it useful for consolidating his power;
the latter was organized preemptively by military men who had staged

a COUP before party activities were permitted.

This peculiar situation

affected the functioninp- of ruling parties in various aspects.

As

LaFalombara and Weiner have noted, externally created parties tend
not to be identified with the legislature but with the administration,
thus foresaking its representative function.

The first major opposition party was created more or less in
the legislature as a response to President Rhes's systematic alienation

of those who had supported him.

To these initially disenchanted

former associates flocked many politicians who had been frustrated
in their bid for positions of power and influence.

LP's

repe?..ted attempts to

Rhee's and the

perpetuate their power gave solidarity to

these politicians who otherwise had little in common.

A collection

of ambitious politicians with little or no positive common denominator.
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the OT^tDosition party was in fact,
a "party of parties" in which

several factions with each led by a dominant
personality fought for
the hegemony of the party.

By the latter half of the First Republic, the form
and the
substance of a quasi-competitive two party structure
were attained,
but the prospect of a peaceful transfer of
power was betrayed by

election riggings and the resultant student uprisings
which toppled
the LP regime.

The collapse of the Liberal Party clearly
showed the

degree to which the ruling party was dependent upon
the power of the
administration.

With the forceful overthrow of the L? government,

the hope of the first ruling Korean party to outlive
its dominant

personality disappeared.
The Second Republic, as a negation of the ancien regime
under an entirely different system.

,

operated

As far as parties were concerned,

almost unlimited freedom was accorded in the range of activities and
the scope of policies they could espouse.

The party in power was

badly split into two groups and in endless counter maneuverings to
gain ascendancy over each other.

The factional struggle had taken

its toll when the military staged a coup d etat in I96I.
'

Political

activities were banned for two years, during which the groundwork
was laid by some elements of the junta for the organization of a

politica? party to nrovide for the transition to a civilian goverrjnert.
The paj-ty thus created, the DRP, was a product of a careful political

engineering, and it has functioned as a cohesive and disciplined

—

.
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oolitical Dai-ty quite unlike the LP.

As for the major opposition

party in this period, it, too, has been a refuge for
frustrated
politicians

In this dissertation, Korean political parties are seen as
structures which carry out activities in the pursuit of
oolitical
power.

In the manner of Frank Sorauf 's study of American political

parties, this study has divided the Korean parties for
analytical
puriDoses into thj-ee

sectors— the party in the electorate, the narty

organization and the party government— and has examined their
activities.

Charter III dealt with the oarty organization nroper in terms

of the policy orientations, the formal and informal structures and
the elites of m.ajor Korean parties.

Except for a very brief period

iinmediately after the liberation, the international position of

Korea dictated the elimination of the leftist and progressive
ideologies.

A bloody war with Korth Korea, continued armed provocation

from the North solidified the conservatism of major Korean parties.
Under these severe restrictions, party programs or policies were

advocated vrithin the boundary of the conservative right.
turn reduced Darty politics

to;^

struggle for power.

This in

Rarely have the

two major parties fought on substantive issues; such issues as

dicta torshio, tenure of power, abuse of power
emerged as salient election issues.

—

all procedural ones

More often than not, the two

—
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narty battle was fought not on the basis of policy but on personalities,
not on the basis of substance but on procedures.

Kore often than not, Korean political parties failed to outlive
its founder or the dominant personality.

The Korean parties have

been prroups of individual politicians seeking personal power.

Kany

Doliticians have deserted their original parties when that would

better serve their self-interest.

frapility of Korean parties

In other words, the or,';anizational

is rooted in personalism.

Faction and

factional Tx>litics have blocked institutionalization of party structure

and leadershio.

They have caused discontinuity of party politics

and rarty rxjlicy.

They have evoked the sense of alienation of the

public toward oolitical parties.

They have caused corruotion.

A

party e;enerally draws people for reasons of money, personal power,
special interest, blood relations, place of origin, and on occasion,
involuntarily through abuse of administrative power.

It appears that

the commitment to membership in a party is rarely made on the basis

of ideolopy or policy.

when conditions

This means the transiency of party membership

chane^e, one could abandon a oarty in favor of another.
a.',gravated

The recruitment problem has been ^ by

the severe legal limitations

on the elif^ibility to party membership.
If any categorization be made of

Korea^^

are all "elite" oar ties in a sense that

political parties, they

each

is exclusively oriented

toward maintenance of personal political power.

The party elites

in the National Assembly tend to be a highly educated group.

Since
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1963, the DRP's Assemblymen were principally composed of two groups—

the bureaucrats and the retired military men.

The opposition party's

Assemblymen tend to have a more varied background who have come
together mainly to oppose the ruling party.
Chapter IV treated the sector of the party structure ensconced
in the electorate.

The associational interest groups in the Korean

context lack autonomy from state

fXDwer in their

and hence in their external affairs.

internal affairs

They tend to shy away from

taking independent political action since their well-being depend
to a cTeat extent on the crraces of the administration.

years of the L? reo-ime, these

?-roups

In the early

served as adjuncts to the party

in power and a mere accessory to the regime in power.

On the other

hand, the strength of the institutional and anomic interest groups
in Korea may be viewed as a consequence of the failure of party

politics.

In the political milieu in which the legitimate interests

cannot be articulated and aggregated into policies, the likelihood

that the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond the
prescribed procedures are increased.
How are we to evaluate Korean voters?

How have the twenty-five

years of riarty politics affected their political habits and orientations
tradition of subjugation to the state and the ruling

fron the

lonfr

elites?

AA'ailable data clearly point to encouraging directions.

The imriorted system of liberal democracy is on the way of earning

legitimacy through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition,
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acceptance, adoptation and acculturation.

Although the Korean voters

are yet to vote the incumbent party
out. they seem to have accepted
elections as a vital institution of
de^nocracy.
The rate of voter

participation in elections is analogous
to that of western democracies.
Yet there are disturbing signs as well.
While it was discovered that
they accept political parties as a
legitimate institutional apparatus
in the Korean context, they are
hesitant to openly identify with a

narticular tx)litical party or become a member
of a political party.
The 'Vaos" evident between the ^orban and
the rural areas and between
the regions in Korea, and, especially the
forr.er,

ha.ve

substituted

the ethnic, religious and class cleavages
evident in other developing

states of Asia and Africa.

The electoral process sketched in Chapter V has
provided an
outline of the functioning of political parties in
the sectors of
the electorate and the party organization proper at
the peak of their

activities.

The elections in Korea exhibit characteristics
peculiar

to many developing countries in that the incumbent
power holders

have a built-in advantage over the party out of power in the resources

they manage— in terms of mem.bership. political funds, organizational
strength and the ixjtential use and abuse of administrative power.

Where these resources could easily be translated into votes— in the
has

rural areas in the Korean case, the incumbent party fared consistently

A
well.

In the urban areas with their opix)3ition proclivities, the

opposition party^ied the ruling party, at least since a semblance

of the two party system was established.

The election under study
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pointed to an encouraging sign that the party battle for the
electorate's vote on the whole took the

policy alternatives.

fom

of reasonably clear-cut

This was a clear departure, for example, from

ten years ago when presidential elections were fought basically on
the virtues of the personality of the candidates.

This can be

interoreted as the maturation of both the party system and the

electorate which are mutually supportive.

Strictly speaking, elections do not determine the policy of the
nation, but decide who shall decide what the government shall do.

Korean voters rarely bind their representatives

—

both on the

presidential and the Assembly levels— to a certain set of policies,

except for the broad mandate the winning party brings into office.
The nation has undergone eieht general and seven presidential

elections (one indirect) and rarely has the losing party acceded to
the defeat at the polls.

Charges of election frauds and court

litigations for annulment of election results have been widespread.
This has been of serious consequence for the legitimacy and the

stability of the government regardless of the merit of the opposition
claims of vote rigging.

been no exception.

The presidential election under study has

This has undermined dialogue and compromise and

opened the way for the opposition to take a militant posture toward
the party which they regard as having acquired power through

illegitimate means.

There is no question but that the incumbent

party has always been able to mobilize its resources and

v/age

electoral
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campaigns from the position of strength.

The opposition, at great

odds to unseat the incumbents, however, has
waged an intensely

emotional campai^m.
The sector of the party structure in the government
is discussed

from the perspective of the behavior of the
legislators in the
National Assembly.

The prospective of having a fruitful dialogue

between the ruling and opposition legislators has been
marred to a
great extent by the shared belief on the part of the
oprosition

Assemblymen that the ruling oarty has cone to occupy the seat of
pjoverrwient throurh illegitimate means.

The

tvra

parties collided on

the floor of the rational Assembly on issues which appeared to be

capable of resolution through compromise and debate.

This situation

often ended in such militant tactics as opposition walk-out and the
"one party National Assembly."

Such militant style of politics

dominated the life of the JJational Assembly in recent years, and
also in the later years of the Liberal Party regime.

The fact that

no peaceful transfer of power was made in the post-liberation era

strengthens the arguement that party politics has failed to resolve
conflicts in Korean politics.

Repeated constitutional amendments

and martial laws are eloquent illustrations of resolving conflicts

through physical and not political means.

The opposition, on the

other hand, responded to the assault by the administration through

militant struggle to the point of violating constitutional order.
The opposition appeared to be incapable of wresting power.
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Without having tasted political power, the
opposition party has
degenerated into a protest group rather than a
responsible political
.

party.

reduced

On the other hand, its irresponsible behavior has
further
its

chance

of taking the reigns of government.

lis

Through a number of years of confrontation in
the Kational
Assembly, the two major parties' Assemblymen
appeared to have

internalized value systems peculiar to their own.

with the DP, the present

IvTDP's

As was the case

major plank has been its expressed

concern for democracy and the prevention of dictatorship.

The D.tP's

emphasis on modernization and policy output has made the
leaders of
the r^alin? party impatient about the militant opposition
tactics

within and outside the ^Jational Assembly.

The collision of these
has

value systems and the different life-styles often resulted in the
paralysis of the legislative process, and the domination by the

executive branch in the law-making function in the i.ational Assembly.

It is no wonder that under these circumstances, the image of the
nation's legislature has been deteriorating in the eyes of the public.

Kost important of all, the National Assembly has failed to resolve
the great issues of the time through mediation and dialogue.

In their

struggle for power, politicians have lost touch with the general
public and party politics has become a "game" among the elites.
Ultimately, Korean political parties should be judged on the
basis of their contributions to political stability, government

decision-making, and the general well-being of the Korean people.
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An alien institution cannot be expected to take
root in the short
span of twenty-five years.

It should be remembered that there is

no iimnediate panacea for all the ills of Korean
parties.

The pathology

of the Korean political parties described in the
preceding pages has
complex roots, and its cure lies in part in a careful
examination

of the Korean political tradition and an unwavering commitment
to
the values of liberal democracy on the part of both the leaders and
the masses.

Any imorovement of the party system

pieceneal and gradual.

is likely to be

i
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